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As our needs are constantly advancing, the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that cover 
these needs should be able to handle more and more complexity. No matter which of the 
many available definitions of System one may accept, two things are certain; they are 
ubiquitous and keeping them safe and resilient is, by any measure, extremely important 
and difficult at the same time. Many causes are responsible for this difficulty, the most 
significant of which being the redundancy of some systems’ components, their use within 
a context different to that they were designed for and finally the fact that their huge variety 
and complexity makes their categorisation and in turn the conception of solutions that 
apply to many of them, extremely difficult. 
 
The work presented in this thesis applies modelling and simulation techniques in order to 
improve the security and resilience of cyber-physical systems. This is achieved through 
the context of three major categories of cyber-physical systems: Critical Infrastructure – 
Industrial Control Systems (CI-ICSs), Wireless Sensor Network (WSNs) and Hot-
Desking Systems (HDS). The selection of these categories lies in the fact that they are 
used in many critical cases and often with only small changes from one case to another. 
For each one of these categories, some reference use cases are selected and then 
modelling and simulation techniques are applied on them in order for their security and/or 
resilience perspective to be improved. The set of tools that are used for the 
aforementioned modelling and simulation, consists of Game Theory, Stafford Beer’s 
Viable System Model (VSM), Epidemiology, SensomaX (a custom-made agent-based 
middleware), Monte Carlo predictive modelling and Event-Driven Simulation (EDS) and 
in every use case, one or more of them in combination are used. The presented techniques 
manage to tackle the issues identified in existing approaches while addressing the stated 
research questions and they ultimately, introduce a new way of Systems Thinking. 
 
More specifically, in terms of the three aforementioned categories (CI-ICSs, WSNs and 
HDS), this thesis includes models that use Game Theory (GT), Viable System Modelling 
(VSM), Monte Carlo predictive modelling and epidemiology techniques in order to 
improve the cyber security risk management procedure in ICSs, applications of GT and 
auction-based algorithms, EDS and SensomaX in order to suggest solutions that improve 
WSNs both from a security and a resilience perspective and finally, approaches that use 
EDS in order to apply a HDS that can improve the productivity of an enterprise. More 
details on these models and the contribution of the author to them, can be found in section 
1.3.     
 
Practically the entirety of the research conducted and presented in this thesis is published 
in nine publications for various, peer-reviewed journals and conferences with one of them 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Section I includes the first two chapters of the thesis. In more details, chapter 1 provides 
the problem statement, the aim of this work, the research questions it addresses, the 
published work of the author, the research design and the structure of the thesis. Chapter 
2 includes the necessary background knowledge and review of the existing literature 
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hapter 1 provides the problem statement, the aim of this work, the research 
questions addressed in this thesis, a full list of publications with a short 
summary of what each one is about and its contribution to the literature. The 
research design is also thoroughly discussed in this chapter as well. A more detailed 




























Our needs are constantly becoming more and more complex. As a result, the 
mechanisms that cover these needs are steadily becoming more and more complex, as 
well. The number of parameters that these mechanisms involve is growing higher and 
higher to the point that not only computers are absolutely necessary in order to handle all 
that complexity, but there is a need for the involved procedures to be as optimised as 
possible in order for, even the most modern systems, to be able to provide a useful 
outcome or service within a reasonable amount of time. In some cases, even minor 
improvements on the running time, efficiency, resources needed or cost, can lead to a 
huge difference on the quality of the service provided or on the impact that the outcome 
can have on people’s lives.  
Additionally, due to the aforementioned situation, the variety of the existing 
systems and the available tools that can be used for building, understanding and tweaking 
them, is so big, that there is no single tool, method or mechanism to usefully apply to all 
of them. Both the systems and the applied tools can be categorised to so many categories 
and often the separating lines among them are really vague. 
However, this work makes an attempt, through multiple case studies, to categorise 
the presented (often critical) systems and propose novel approaches for solving their 
important problems using each time the necessary tools. Every time, the benefits are 
clearly identified and discussed, analysing also what was the gap in the existing literature 
around these topics and what could have made these solutions even better. 
 
1.1  Problem Statement 
 
There are many definitions of what a system is and they tend to vary according to 
the field they apply on or refer to. A well-known general one is the following: “System 
is a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or an interconnecting network; 
a complex whole.” provided by Oxford Dictionaries1. No matter which one of them 
                                                     




someone is willing to accept, two things are sure; they are ubiquitous and keeping them 
safe and optimised is of major importance. In other words, their safety and resilience is, 
by any measure, very important. This, however, is not usually easy. As mentioned before, 
systems’ applications and the needs that they have to cover, are constantly evolving but 
this is not always the case for their security or resilience mechanisms. That is because 
many kinds of systems exist for many years now and were built under completely 
different circumstances, in order to cover completely different needs and having to be 
protected from completely different dangers. However, as the circumstances, the needs 
and the threats are advancing rapidly, it is not easy for systems to keep up with the same 
pace, for various reasons. Two of the most common are the following. 
 Firstly, it is often the case that some parts of a system cannot keep evolving with 
the pace that some other parts of the same system do. As such, what we end up with is a 
system including some components significantly older than others. These redundant 
components, though, will often have their security issues and since, according to the 
previous definition, the system is “a set of things…” it will only be as safe as its weakest 
component. 
 Secondly, the huge variety and omnipresence of systems have caused some of 
them to be used for purposes other than the ones they were designed for. Even if that 
purpose is similar, the design requirements could be different enough in order for 
weaknesses to occur.  
That variety and omnipresence though can cause another issue; systems’ 
categorisation is neither easy nor obvious. With so many of them, so many differences 
and similarities among them and so much chaotically-organised research around them, it 
is very hard to put them into groups, such that the same security or optimisation solutions 
can apply for all the members of the same group and this is another reason that makes, 
keeping systems safe and resilient, an extremely difficult task. Making this task a bit 
simpler is the direction that this work aims towards, by answering the research questions 
that follow. 
It should be highlighted that although the term “resilience” is a bit broad and 
vague and it can even have a security aspect, in this thesis it is used as an umbrella term 
to denote, every non-security aspect of a system that the presented models attempt to 




been used instead is the “Quality of Service” (QoS). However, the term resilience was 
chosen because it reflects better the element of optimisation (and recovery, where 
applicable) that is involved and also because the word “service” could create confusion 
in some cases. 
 
1.2  Aim and Research Questions 
 
As mentioned, it is very difficult to provide solutions that apply on many kinds of 
systems due to their extremely big variety, both in terms of components and 
interconnections among them but also in terms of the scope they serve.  
In this thesis, we focus on Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) which are the systems 
that have both a cyber or digital dimension along with their physical one. More 
specifically, what we mean by the term CPSs, is the group of systems that can be 
compromised either physically (i.e. by physically removing some sensors from a WSN) 
or non-physically due to their access to the internet or a dataset/database that can be 
compromised remotely.  
CPSs have all the characteristics (and therefore the same vulnerabilities, as well) 
of a system that were mentioned before. However, due to their twofold nature (cyber and 
physical), not only some additional vulnerabilities can be present, but mitigating these 
(additional or not) vulnerabilities can require unconventional, sophisticated methods that 
can capture the connections and relationships between the various system components. 
Exploring methods of improving CPSs security or resilience (as it was defined before) is 
the goal of this thesis and this exploration will go through answering a series of Research 
Questions (RQs) related to them. More specifically, these are: 
 
• RQ1: Up to what level can the existing approaches improve the security and the 
resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems? 
• RQ2: How can we improve the security of Cyber-Physical Systems?  





However, even the group of CPSs can include too many and sometimes too 
different with each other representatives, making it extremely difficult to propose 
methods that improve their security and/or their resilience and apply on all of them. 
Therefore, the research questions will be answered through the context of some sub-
groups of CPSs. In order for this to be as useful as possible though, members of these 
sub-groups need to meet some requirements. More specifically, they should: 
 
a) be used in many fields and cases and for many scopes 
b) do so with only small changes from case to case 
c) be considered of significant importance due to their use cases  
 
As such, we are going to address the research questions through exploring: 
 
i) Critical Infrastructures and Industrial Control Systems (CI-ICSs) 
ii) Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
iii) Hot-Desking systems 
 
Exploring these types of systems is of great worth and importance not only 
because they meet the previous three properties but also because in conjunction with the 
earlier mentioned chaotically-organised research that has inevitably left essential gaps, 
such an exploration could lead to solutions and mechanisms that have a great range of 
application and solve problems that are not only critical but also neglected 
Under the prism of those categories, the three RQs that were presented above, 
could now be further elaborated into the following research questions: 
 
RQ1.1: Up to what level can existing tools protect WSNs? 
RQ1.2: Up to what level can existing tools protect ICSs? 
RQ1.3: Hot-Desking is becoming popular again. Can the traditional Hot-Desking 
methods keep-up with the modern businesses’ needs? 
 
RQ2.1: Can we improve WSNs security? 




RQ2.2.2: Can we improve existing risk management approaches for ICSs? 
RQ3.1: Can we improve non-security aspects of WSNs? 
RQ3.2: Can we improve Hot-Desking applications? 
with a few more that can possibly be added. The numbering is such so that the 
corresponding to the initial three RQs is obvious. 
Although these elaborated RQs are all answered in this thesis, it is the structure 
of the initial three RQs that is adopted in order to avoid causing confusion to the reader. 
However, the answers to all RQs are specifically pointed out throughout the thesis and 
also in section 5.2, in a way that, no matter what RQ (either out of the three former ones 
or out of the eight latter ones) the reader is seeking, it is very easy for him or her to find 
them. 
More specifically, in terms of the three aforementioned categories (CI-ICSs, 
WSNs and HDS), this thesis includes models that use Game Theory (GT), Viable System 
Modelling (VSM), Monte Carlo predictive modelling and epidemiology techniques in 
order to improve the cyber security risk management procedure in ICSs, applications of 
GT and auction-based algorithms, EDS and SensomaX in order to suggest solutions that 
improve WSNs both from a security and a resilience perspective and finally, approaches 
that use EDS in order to apply a HDS that can improve the productivity of an enterprise. 
More details on these kinds of systems and elaboration on their importance, take place in 
their respective chapters. 
The research work that is presented in the following chapters orbits around the 
research questions and it will be specifically mentioned throughout this work, every time 
that one of these is answered.  
 
1.3    Published Outputs 
 
Before we move on to the Research Design section, it is useful that all publications 
are presented (in chronological order) along with a small summary for each of them. 
These publications thoroughly and coherently bond the research material. It should be 
mentioned that all this work, was funded and supported by the Systems Centre and the 
EPSRC funded Industrial Doctorate Centre in Systems (Grant EP/G037353/1) and 






1. Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., Oikonomou, G., & Li, S. (2014). 
Managing cyber security risks in industrial control systems with game theory and 
viable system modelling. In 2014 9th International Conference on System of 
Systems Engineering (SOSE) (pp. 266–271). 
 
This paper presents an innovative approach in the context of cyber security risk 
management in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) which challenges not only the research 
community but the practitioners, as well. Their proprietary nature along with the 
complexity of those systems renders traditional approaches rather insufficient and creates 
the need for the adoption of a holistic point of view. This approach aims at providing 
cost-efficient protection solutions to the defender by combining the concepts of Viable 
System Model (VSM) and Game Theory (GT). During the development of this method, 
the proprietary and interconnected nature of an ICS was taken into consideration. VSM 
was not only used to capture the interconnections of the ICS’s cyber components but also 
the relationships among the components of different ICSs. The proposed model provided 
cost-efficient defense strategies and at the same time demonstrated a cost-benefit cyber-
security risk management process in ICSs that would require minimum informational 
input.  
The contribution of the author of this thesis to this publication was his 
participation in the brainstorming and the whole set-up of the paper as well its game 
theoretic framework and the calculation of the Nash Equilibria. 
 
2. Maraslis, K., Spyridopoulos, T., Oikonomou, G., Tryfonas, T., & Haghighi, M. 
(2015). Application of a game-theoretic approach in smart sensor data 
trustworthiness problems. In IFIP International Information Security Conference 
(pp. 601–615). Springer. 
 
In this paper, Game Theory has been employed for the purposes of developing an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) model for 
From the list below, paper 3, has been awarded the Best Paper Award 




the protection of WSNs. The attacker’s goal is to compromise the deployment by causing 
nodes to report faulty sensory information. The defender, who is the WSN’s operator, 
aims to detect the presence of faulty sensor measurements (IDS) and to subsequently 
recover compromised nodes (IPS). With this game-theoretical approach we attempt to 
identify the presence of Nash Equilibria in the two proposed games. Two methods of 
validation have been applied in order to reveal the models’ effectiveness. The results of 
the first one matched the results of the analytical models, while the results of the second 
one confirmed the detection model’s effectiveness in a simulated IPv6-connected 
network of smart objects.  
All parts of this publication were contributed by the author of this thesis, apart 
from the two validation methods that make use of SensomaX and Cooja.  
 
3. Haghighi, M., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2015). Game-
theoretic approach towards energy-efficient task distribution in wireless sensor 
networks. In 2015 IEEE SENSORS (pp. 1–4).2 
 
This paper uses game-theoretical approach along with auction-based techniques 
for the purposes of optimising task distribution among the sensor nodes and improving 
energy consumption in WSNs. The proposed game-theoretical approach enabled 
SensomaX to allocate resources to the deployed applications, based on nodes’ processing 
and memory availability, as well as their remaining energy level. 
The contribution of the author of this thesis to this publication was his 
participation in the brainstorming and the whole set-up of the paper as well its game 
theoretic framework, its auction-based techniques and the calculation of the Nash 
Equilibria. 
 
4. Haghighi, M., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., Oikonomou, G., Burrows, A., 
Woznowski, P., & Piechocki, R. (2015). Game-theoretic approach towards 
Optimal Multi-tasking and Data-distribution in IoT. In 2015 IEEE 2nd World 
Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT) (pp. 406–411). IEEE. 
                                                     




Existing applications often require nodes to implement logical decision-making 
on aggregated data, which involves more processing and wider interactions amongst 
network peers, resulting in higher energy consumption and shorter node lifetime. In this 
paper, the focus was given on improving energy consumption and optimizing task 
distribution amongst WSN sensor nodes by combining SensomaX and auction-based 
techniques and taking into account nodes’ processing capability, memory availability and 
remaining energy level. The proposed model demonstrated that in a multitier, hierarchical 
WSN where there are cases that the applications are collaboratively executed by multiple 
clusters, then the energy consumption could be reduced.  
The contribution of the author of this thesis to this publication was his 
participation in the brainstorming and the whole set-up of the paper as well its game 
theoretic framework and the calculation of the Nash Equilibria. 
 
5. Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Mylonas, A., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. 
(2015). A game-theoretical method for cost-benefit analysis of malware 
dissemination prevention. Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective, 
24(4–6), 164–176. 
 
This paper links Game Theory and virus proliferation models for the purposes of 
developing a cost-benefit approach that is able to assess defence strategies capable of 
mitigating malware proliferation. This work combines a game-theoretical framework 
with existing well-known epidemiology models (Susceptible - Infected – Recovered 
(SIR) and Susceptible - Infected – Susceptible (SIS)), resulting in a custom model which 
incorporates the ability to capture the relationships between nodes within a network, 
along with their effect on malware dissemination process. Drawing upon a model that 
illustrates the network’s behaviour based on the attacker’s and the defender’s choices, 
Game Theory is employed for calculating the optimal strategies for the defender in order 
to minimize the effect of malware spread and the cost of security at the same time. The 
proposed model provides a cost-benefit risk management framework for managing and 
mitigating possible malware spreads. 
The contribution of the author of this thesis to this publication was his 
participation in the brainstorming and the whole set-up of the paper as well its game 




6. Maraslis, K., Cooper, P., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2016). An Intelligent 
Hot-Desking Model Based on Occupancy Sensor Data and Its Potential for Social 
Impact. In Transactions on Large-Scale Data-and Knowledge-Centered Systems 
XXVII (pp. 142–158). Springer. 
 
This paper presents a model development that employs occupancy sensor data in 
a commercial Hot-Desking environment for the better facilitation of office resources 
management. In this particular case, desk allocation in a Hot-Desking environment is 
employed, with results that outweigh the costs of occupancy detection. We explored the 
potential for intelligent hot desking to substantially improve productivity in the working 
environment compared to the traditional hot-desking systems. It has been verified, that 
occupancy-based smart building concepts, can not only be valuable, but at the same time 
operationally practical.  
This publication was contributed almost solely by the author of this thesis. 
 
7. Fagade, T., Maraslis, K., & Tryfonas, T. (2017). Towards effective cybersecurity 
resource allocation: the Monte Carlo predictive modelling approach. International 
Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 13(2–3), 152–167. 
 
This work demonstrates why using conventional risk assessment approach as 
budgeting process can result in significant over/under allocation of resources for cyber 
capabilities. Instead, the proposed Monte Carlo predictive simulation model can serve as 
a benchmark for policy and decision support to aid stakeholders in optimizing resource 
allocation for cyber security investments.  
The contribution of the author of this thesis to this publication was his 
participation in the brainstorming and the whole set-up of the paper as well the validation 
procedure of the Monte Carlo approach. 
 
8. Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2017). Critical 
infrastructure cyber-security risk management. Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: 
Assessment and Response, 136, 59. 
 
This paper presents an alternative tactic on approaching ICSs using VSM and 




process that would take into account all the interdependencies among the critical 
components of an ICS to be developed. As a result, the proposed model avoids the 
commonly inherited weaknesses of existing approaches that are caused by incomplete 
data sets or estimation mechanisms that are not specifically designed for ICSs but are 
rather adaptations of traditional and often redundant approaches.  
The contribution of the author of this thesis to this publication was his 
participation in the brainstorming and the whole set-up of the paper as well its game 
theoretic framework and the calculation of the Nash Equilibria. 
 
9. Cooper, P. B., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2017). An intelligent 
hot-desking model harnessing the power of occupancy sensing data. Facilities, 
35(13/14), 766–786. 
 
This paper’s aim was to develop a model based on employee’s occupancy data in 
a hot-desking environment. More specifically, to calculate and take a decision of which 
desk needs to be allocated to each employee by the time of arrival. This decision is taken 
based on the projects that all the employees are working on at that specific point of time, 
and not only taking into consideration the project of the particular employee that should 
be assigned with a desk. The purpose of this work was not only for employees to be as 
productive as possible, but also for the organization to be benefited from this model 
development as the employees will be working under the most optimal working 
environment and at the same time the number of desks will be reduced. The proposed 
model is compared to some theoretically ideal but practically impossible models in order 
to demonstrate that our model produces results directly comparable to the ideal ones and 
feasible at the same time.  
This publication was contributed almost solely by the author of this thesis. 
10. (To be submitted) - Maraslis, K., Haghighi, M., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. 
Game-theoretic and Auction-based Algorithms towards Autonomous Decision-
making in WSNs. 
 
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach using game theoretic and auction-
based techniques in order to optimise task distribution and data gathering in WSNs. We 




adaptive dynamic middleware aimed at seamless integration of computational algorithms 
for multitasking in large-scale sensor networks. Additionally to our similar, previously 
published work, this one also confirms the reduction of agent processing time, when our 
algorithms are applied.   
The contribution of the author of this thesis to this publication was his 
participation in the brainstorming and the whole set-up of the paper as well its game 
theoretic framework, its auction-based techniques and the calculation of the Nash 
Equilibria. 
1.4  Research Design and Methodology 
 
 In this section, the whole exploration that was mentioned in the previous section, 
will be further analysed and justified, starting from the reasons that CI-ICSs, WSNs and 
Hot-Desking, were the chosen models. 
 As mentioned in section 1.2 these reasons are the following: 
 
a) they can be used in many fields and cases and also for many scopes 
b) they can do so with only small changes from case to case 
c) they are considered of major importance due to their use cases (more on that in the 
chapters to follow) 
 
 There is also an extensive set of tools that are used in this work, and these tools 
are Game Theory, VSM, Epidemiology, SensomaX, Monte Carlo Simulation and 
traditional Event-Driven Simulation, for reasons that are directly related to the paradigms 
they are applied on. For example, Game Theory is considered a state-of-the-art tool that 
can effectively model a situation where the participants have antagonistic motives. VSM 
can successfully capture the multiple interdependencies of a system’s components which 
essentially cancels the need to study multiple scenarios since an alteration of some 
interdependencies is still captured and it does not have to lead to a different case-study. 
Epidemiology is a very effective, holistic tool that can easily be tweaked to cover a 
plethora of use cases. SensomaX is a custom tool, developed by Mo Haghighi (co-author 




core changes were possible in order to make the model cover the needs of our research in 
the best possible way. Monte Carlo simulation is great in viably handling uncertainty 
which is crucial in a decision-making process and finally, traditional Event-Driven 
Simulation (EDS) is exactly the needed insightful, easily modifiable tool to handle the 
simulation required about Hot-Desking and provide meaningful, well-presented results. 
The suitability of these tools is more extensively justified in the following chapters, where 
these tools are put in use. 
 Risking oversimplification, we could categorise these tools in two main 
categories: Modelling (GT, VSM and Epidemiology) and Simulation (SensomaX, Monte 
Carlo, EDS). Roughly speaking, we could say that modelling offers great insight to 
systems with their cyber side more dominant (instead of their physical one) while 
simulation achieves the same for systems with their physical side more highlighted. 
Although both of these categorisations (i.e. modelling/simulation and cyber/physical) are 
risky because the involved categories’ respective boundaries are often extremely vague, 
they are helpful in order to demonstrate the wide range of the applications presented, the 
rationale behind choosing them and finally to help us extract some useful patterns and 
conclusions.  
The whole work that is presented in this thesis consists of smaller pieces of work 
that have all been published (papers 1-9). Table 1 demonstrates the correspondence 
among these papers and the aforementioned tools and categories followed by the full list 
of published papers (that was presented also in section 1.3) for better visibility. 
 
Table 1: Categorisation of publications based on their fields of application and used tools 
 
Since the numbers in Table 1 and Figure 1 correspond to the published work, the 
publication list is mentioned below again, for convenience.  
CI-ICSs WSNs Hot-Desking
Game Theory 1, 5, 8 2, 3, 4
VSM 1, 8
Epidemiology 5












1 Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., Oikonomou, G., & Li, S. (2014). Managing 
cyber security risks in industrial control systems with game theory and viable system 
modelling. In 2014 9th International Conference on System of Systems Engineering 
(SOSE) (pp. 266–271). 
2 Maraslis, K., Spyridopoulos, T., Oikonomou, G., Tryfonas, T., & Haghighi, M. (2015). 
Application of a game-theoretic approach in smart sensor data trustworthiness problems. 
In IFIP International Information Security Conference (pp. 601–615). Springer. 
3 Haghighi, M., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2015). Game-theoretic 
approach towards energy-efficient task distribution in wireless sensor networks. In 2015 
IEEE SENSORS (pp. 1–4). 
4 Haghighi, M., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., Oikonomou, G., Burrows, A., Woznowski, P., 
& Piechocki, R. (2015). Game-theoretic approach towards Optimal Multi-tasking and 
Data-distribution in IoT. In 2015 IEEE 2nd World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT) 
(pp. 406–411). IEEE. 
5 Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Mylonas, A., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2015). A 
game-theoretical method for cost-benefit analysis of malware dissemination prevention. 
Information Security Journal: A Global Perspective, 24(4–6), 164–176. 
6 Maraslis, K., Cooper, P., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2016). An Intelligent Hot-
Desking Model Based on Occupancy Sensor Data and Its Potential for Social Impact. In 
Transactions on Large-Scale Data-and Knowledge-Centered Systems XXVII (pp. 142–
158). Springer. 
7 Fagade, T., Maraslis, K., & Tryfonas, T. (2017). Towards effective cybersecurity resource 
allocation: the Monte Carlo predictive modelling approach. International Journal of 
Critical Infrastructures, 13(2–3), 152–167. 
8 Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2017). Critical 
infrastructure cyber-security risk management. Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: 
Assessment and Response, 136, 59 
9 Cooper, P. B., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2017). An intelligent hot-
desking model harnessing the power of occupancy sensing data. Facilities, 35(13/14), 
766–786. 
 
To be submitted 
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of applications' classification 
  
Figure 1 depicts an additional categorisation of the publications, this time reflecting the 
orientation of the proposed models (Security or Resilience, where resilience is defined on 
page 5) and the nature of the systems that these models are applied on (Cyber or Physical). 
Once more, it needs to be emphasised though that the boundaries of such categories are 
sometimes very vague. This is especially obvious in the case of the nature of the systems 
and that is due to the fact that the involved systems have both cyber and physical 
subsistence (since they are CPSs). Therefore, many of the dots on Figure 1, could have 
also been placed elsewhere, although still close to their current position. As far as the 
presented applications’ orientation is concerned, we have established from the beginning 
a strict disunion between the resilience-oriented applications and the security-oriented 
ones, which also led to the creation of the logic of the chapters of this thesis. Due to that, 
in Figure 1 we did not expect to see any dots/papers within the grey horizontal zone in 
the middle of the graph. Therefore, in order for this work to be able to claim that studies 
a range of relevant systems that is as wide as possible, the dots of Figure 1 should cover 
an area as wide as possible. As one can easily surmise from the graph, this is indeed the 
case! Additionally, since the horizontal position of most dots could be slightly different, 




the area within which it could have been moved. It is apparent that these fields cover a 
significant portion of the remaining area (apart from the aforementioned grey horizontal 
zone) which is another indication of the thoughtful selection of the case-studies that are 
presented in the following chapters and in general the wide field of application of the 
proposed research models.    
Finally, another useful observation that Figure 1 can lead to is the, essentially 
obvious by definition, overlap of modelling and simulation. 
 
1.5  Structure of Thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 includes some necessary background knowledge on the scientific areas that 
the proposed work belongs to as well as a review on the related literature. In addition, in 
this chapter the research gaps of the existing approaches are presented along with the 
benefits of the proposed ones. 
Chapter 3 provides the proposed models on improving WSNs and CI-ICSs from a 
security and risk management perspective, along with the research findings. The work 
documented in this chapter has been peer-reviewed and published in papers 1, 2, 5, 7 and 
8 from the list of papers in section 1.3. 
Chapter 4 includes the proposed models on improving WSNs from a non-security 
perspective (energy efficiency, packet loss and processing time) and a novel application 
on using Hot-Desking in order to increase productivity in a work environment. The work 
documented in this chapter has been peer-reviewed and published in papers 3, 4, 6, 9 and 
10 from the list of papers in section 1.3. 
Chapter 5 summarises the research contribution, discusses the way that the research 











































































hapter 2 includes the necessary background knowledge on the scientific areas 
that the proposed research work focuses on, as well as a review of the existing 
literature around the areas of Systems’ Security and Risk Management and also 
Systems’ Resilience and Optimisation. This chapter also identifies the gaps of existing 
literature while answering RQ1. Finally, it provides the benefits of our proposals 




























2. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter includes, in its first part, some necessary background knowledge 
about the work that is going to follow and a review of the related literature in its second 
one. 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In this section, there is firstly, some background knowledge that the reader needs 
to know in order to be able to follow the literature review that is presented later in this 
chapter and the contribution which begins in the next chapter. Although much 
information could qualify to be included in background knowledge, only the more 
technical parts that are about some used tools will be established here. The remaining 
necessary background knowledge will be established in the, each time, corresponding 
chapter or section. 
 
2.2  Background Knowledge 
 
The necessary technical knowledge about Viable System Model, Game Theory 
and Epidemiology is presented in this section. 
 
2.2.1 Viable System Model (VSM) 
 
The Viable System Model was firstly introduced by Stafford Beer in 1972.[1]. 
VSM models the organisational structure of viable and autonomous systems. The model 
initially divides the enterprise in three fundamental parts (Operations, Management and 
Environment), which are connected to each other in order to maintain the viability of the 
whole system. 
As presented in Figure 2, an enterprise, composed of the operational and 
management parts, entails five different systems that communicate with each other and 




them and their communication with the corresponding environment, preserve the viability 
of the enterprise. 
System 1 refers to the operational units within the enterprise. Each unit can 
communicate with other operational units and the external environment, transferring and 
receiving data. The overall coordination of System 1’s operations is managed through 
System 2. The control of System 1 is carried out by System 3, while System 3* is 
responsible for auditing the operations in System 1. Each operational unit within System 
1 has its own management system, exchanging data with it and forming a new VSM inside 
the initial VSM. 
System 2 is responsible for the coordination of the activities of the operational 
units that form System 1. It also communicates with System 3 in order to transfer the 
results of its coordination actions. 
System 3 manages the units of System 1, controlling their behaviour by having 
access to all of them. It is also responsible for the provision of synergies among the 
operational units. It receives the coordination-related data from System 2 and the results 
of the audit conducted by System 3* in order to take new decisions regarding the 
management of System 1. It also communicates with System 4, which dictates the 
changes that should be made due to the ever-changing external environment. 
System 3* audits the operational units of System 1 in order to identify whether System 
3’s management commands are followed by the operational units and whether changes 
should be made for the System 1’s performance improvement. 
System 4 communicates with the environment in order to identify changes in it 
and propose certain approaches to System 5 for the whole system’s evolution. It also 
communicates System 5’s decisions to System 3. 
System 5 is the upper level of the management part of the VSM. It deals with the 
policies of the enterprise and its role within the environment. It communicates with 
System 4 in order to receive information regarding the changes in the environment. After 
deciding the changes that have to take place in the operational part of the enterprise, it 
delivers them to System 4. System 5 also monitors the homeostasis between System 4 
and System 3 and receives information from System 3 regarding the current status of the 




In our proposed model, we make use of the systemic approach that the VSM embodies in 
order to construct a formal method for the evaluation of cyber components in the complex 
environment of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). By identifying the purpose of each 
cyber component and the dependencies that are created, according to the VSM structure, 
we unveil the real dimensions of the consequences of its disruption or destruction. In 
addition, its recursive nature that dictates a VSM to be composed of other VSMs and, at 
the same time, be part of a wider VSM in a system of systems way gives us the ability to 
explore interdependencies between various ICSs. 
VSM will be a very important tool for us in the chapters to follow. 
 
 





2.2.2 Game Theory  
 
Game theory is a tool that is applied more and more on numerous problems and 
various scientific fields. It is considered to be a modern approach suitable for situations 
where adversarial strategies and conflicting interests take place [2][3]. In particular, 
Game Theory is used to describe scenarios where decisions need to be made by multiple 
contestants. Every combination of all contestants’ decisions corresponds to a possibly 
different reward for each of them. Those contestants are called players and the whole 
scenario, including all the possible actions (that are called strategies) and the rewards 
(that are called payoffs), is quantified and is considered a game. One of the basic 
assumptions that apply on such games is that the players are considered to be rational in 
a sense that they will decide about their actions based exclusively on their aim to 
maximise their reward and that they are generally risk-averse. It should be noted that 
reward/payoff can also be a negative number. In this project, it is assumed that an 
unknown payoff can be either positive or negative unless it is explicitly mentioned 
otherwise or if it is called “loss” which implies that the aforementioned payoff is negative 
[4]. 
There are different approaches available for a game that depends on the kind of 
the game itself. The basic kinds of games along with the characteristics that a game needs 




A game is called cooperative when players do not care about maximising their 
individual payoff as is the case with the non-cooperative ones. Instead, the goal is the 
maximisation of the overall payoff. As far as the research area of network security is 
concerned, the games usually include players with conflicting interests (e.g. attacker and 
defender) and thus they mostly fall into the category of non-cooperative ones since no 







Perfect/Imperfect Information Games 
 
A game is considered to be a perfect information one when every player knows 
all the strategies that all the other players have already followed before, as part of the 
same game. If this principle does not apply to all players or all past strategies, then the 
game is considered of the Imperfect information type [2]. 
 
Complete/Incomplete Information Games 
 
As in the perfect and imperfect information games, the division between complete and 
incomplete information games is made based on the amount of information that is known 
by the players. If every player is aware of the available strategies and payoffs of all the 
players in the game, then this game can be considered a complete information one. If this 
is not the case for every player all for all strategies/payoffs then it is considered to be an 
incomplete information game. This category should not be confused with the previous 
one (complete / incomplete information). The distinction lies in the fact that the actions, 
which are the strategies already followed in the past, are not taken into account in this 
category although they consist an important characteristic of the previous one. What 
every player is only required to know in order for the game to be treated as a complete 
information one is the payoffs and all the available strategies of the players, without the 




In static (or one-shot) games all players choose a strategy simultaneously in the 
beginning of the game and they cannot change it throughout the whole game. Dynamic 









Iterated/Non – iterated Games 
 
Iterated games are the ones that are comprised of more than one iterations while 
the non- iterated ones consist of a single iteration. It should be noted that an iterated game 
can be either a static or a dynamic game while a non-iterated can only be a static. That 
holds because there is a chance that a game consists of many iterations but the players are 
not allowed to change their initial strategy after the game has started. In this case, the 
game is typically considered iterated (although from a solver’s view all iterations can be 




Games where the sum of the payoffs of all players is always equal to a constant, 
are constant sum games. In any other case, the game is a non-constant one. Zero-sum 
games constitute a subcategory of constant sum games that consists of the games where 
the sum of the payoffs of all players is always equal to zero. That of course entails that if 
not all payoffs are equal to zero, there is at least one player with negative payoff [7]. 
In positive sum games (i.e. constant sum games for a positive constant), some 
players can take advantage, which means raise their payoff, due to the actions chosen by 
all players, even if some of them benefit more than the others. In this way, there can be 
some players loosing when other players are winning while there is an overall gain. On 
the other hand, in a negative sum game each player can cause loss to both themselves and 
the other players and end up with a loss in total. 
When a game theory problem is investigated, it is firstly quantified so that it is 
brought to a form like the one described above; with strategy sets and payoffs for all 
possible combinations of them. Afterwards, a solution to this problem is found. The 
notion of “solution” to these kinds of problems could take many forms. Some of the most 








Maximin and Minimax 
 
Maximin and Minimax strategies are very important in Game Theory and 
especially in two player, zero sum games which is the kind of games that will be 
investigated in this work. The maximin strategy is the one that the player whose payoffs 
correspond to the payoff matrix elements should follow in order to receive the maximum 
possible payoff in the worst case scenario where the opponent chooses the best strategy 
with respect to their own benefit. In other words, maximin strategy will lead the 
aforementioned player to the maximum guaranteed payoff that this player can get. 
Similarly, the minimax strategy is the one that the player whose payoffs are the opposites 
of the elements of the payoff matrix elements should follow in order to ensure that the 
opponent will receive the least possible reward under the assumption that this opponent 
has chosen the best possible strategies with respect to their reward. Equivalently, the 
minimax strategy is the strategy that will ensure the aforementioned player that the 
opponent will receive the worst guaranteed payoff. 
Of course, there can be strategies that could enable a player to receive a payoff 
even greater than the one that corresponds to the maximin strategy, but the crucial clue is 
that in this case this payoff is not guaranteed and therefore it could also be lower than the 
one that the worst payoff that the maximin strategy would result in. Since it is assumed 
that involved players are rational and thus risk-averse, it can be claimed that the maximin 
strategy would be preferable. The equivalent logic applies for the minimax as well [8]. 
 
Pure Nash Equilibrium 
 
Pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a set that consists of one strategy of every player. 
These strategies are called optimal strategies and this set leads to a payoff for each player 
such that if any of them decides to change strategy unilaterally, then the new set of 
strategies will produce a payoff for the player that changed strategy that is not bigger than 
the one that the previous set produced. A game can have more than one Pure Nash 
Equilibria and in this case all of them will lead to the same payoff for all players. In the 
special case of a two player, zero sum game, the Pure Nash Equilibrium, if it exists, is 




payoff is measured since the other player’s payoff is the exact opposite) is called value 
of the game. In addition, where a Pure Nash Equilibrium exists, the two strategies that 
constitute it are the maximin and the minimax. 
 
Mixed Nash Equilibrium 
 
In the case of pure Nash Equilibrium, the optimal strategy denotes that the 
corresponding player should follow this strategy throughout the whole game in order to 
achieve the best guaranteed payoff. If the players were allowed to choose not only an 
individual strategy but a set of those and they were also allowed to attach a probability to 
each individual strategy of this set which would correspond to the probability that this 
strategy would be followed in the game (this implies that all those probabilities should 
add up to 1), then this set with its attached probabilities would lead to the best payoff of 
every player and all players’ aforementioned sets co-create what is called Mixed Nash 
Equilibrium. As before, the best payoff of a player is considered to be the highest among 
the payoffs that this player could achieve by unilaterally changing strategy [5]. 
Game Theory will be a very useful tool in the chapters to follow, applied with 




This section presents the mathematical specification of the two commonly used 
epidemiology models SIS and SIR on which the developed model is also based. In 
general, such models are formulated over a fixed-size network. Nodes represent 
individuals and links or edges between nodes represent contacts between individuals. The 
infection spreads along direct links between nodes and the network is assumed to be 









The SIR Model 
 
In the SIR model [9][10][11], the total population is divided into three parts: i) 
susceptible nodes (denoted by S), ii) infected nodes (denoted by I) and iii) recovered 
nodes (denoted by R). The differential equations (1), (2) and (3) describe the rate of 
change of the susceptible nodes, infected nodes and recovered nodes respectively over 
time [12]. Here, β denotes the infection rate (i.e.: the rate at which an infected node infects 
other nodes within the network, or in other words, the probability that a susceptible node 
gets infected by an infected one, when these two come in contact), γ denotes the 
recovery/immunization rate (i.e.: the rate at which infected nodes are recovered/patched 
within the network or in other words, the probability that an infected node gets recovered 
from an infection and becomes immune thereafter). In this work a contact is considered 
as a network link between two nodes and as all nodes are connected to one another 
(directly or through a number of hops depending on the network’s topology), they are 














= 𝛾𝐼 (3) 
 
The SIS Model 
 
In the SIS model, the total population is divided in two parts, susceptible nodes 
(denoted by S) and infected nodes (denoted by I). Equations (4) and (5) model the rate of 
change of susceptible nodes and infected nodes respectively over time [13]. Again, β is 
the infection rate and this time γ is the recovery/disinfection rate. Even though the term 
“recovery rate” is used in both the SIR and the SIS model, it is used for slightly different 















= 𝛽𝐼𝑆 − 𝛾𝐼 (5) 
 
Both of these models will later be compared to a third one, which is custom made 
by us in order to cover the needs of our research. 
The next section of this chapter is a short review of the literature related to our 
work and Systems Security and Risk Management. 
 
2.3  Literature Review 
 
In this section, there is a summary of the existing literature around the subjects 
and scientific areas that our work is based on. The reasoning behind the choice of the 
presented projects is that they manage to be close, or somewhat close, to the logic and 
practices of our proposed models that will be analysed later, while, at the same time, 
provide a good demonstration of the different kinds of applications that such models can 
be applied on. 
The presented literature is split in two main categories. The first one is about the 
security and risk management perspective of systems and therefore, the research that is 
included in this category will mostly aim at providing some kind of security-related 
benefit to the applied system. The second category is about projects that optimise some 
aspect of a system, other than its security (although sometimes other aspects can have an 







2.3.1 Systems’ Security and Risk Management 
 
As mentioned, this section is about similar security-related literature applied on 
systems. This section is, in turn, split in more categories that correspond to the categories 
of the chapters to follow. There is a category about managing CI-ICSs using GT and/or 
VSM, another one about systems’ security and risk management using Monte Carlo 
predictive modelling, later a category about Game Theory on WSNs’ security and finally 
the part about Epidemiology and malware dissemination within a system. 
 
2.3.1.1 Managing CI-ICSs using Game Theory or VSM 
 
Managing cyber security risks in conventional Information Technology (IT) 
infrastructures usually follows certain established approaches [14][15]. In general, 
following the ISO/IEC 27005 standard on Information Security Risk Management, the 
methodology adopted by those approaches comprises four discrete phases and each phase 
consists of straightforward steps [16]: 
 
Phase 1: Information Security Risk Identification 
• Assets identification. 
• Identification of cyber threats. 
• Identification of existing security controls. 
• Identification of vulnerabilities. 
• Identification of consequences in case a vulnerability is exploited by an 
identified threat. 
 
Phase 2: Information Security Risk Analysis 
• Impact assessment. 
• Assessment of cyber security incident likelihood. 






Phase 3: Information Security Risk Evaluation 
Risks are evaluated as the product of the impact of a cyber security incident and 
the likelihood of that incident.  
 
Phase 4: Information Security Risk Treatment 
The last step encompasses the proposal of risk mitigation mechanisms that will 
retain risks in acceptable levels or even avoid them. 
 
Traditional approaches towards cyber security risk management in ICSs follow 
this methodology most of the times, adapting it to the needs of an ICS. However, as 
described by the authors in [17] and [18], the fact that this methodology originally focuses 
on IT infrastructures makes such approaches inapplicable in the complex environment of 
ICSs. Towards this direction many researchers have proposed methods that follow a 
holistic point of view in the ICS cyber security risk management process. More 
particularly, in [19] the authors adopt a mixed holistic-reductionist approach for the 
impact assessment of cyber-attacks. The proposed conceptual methodology, models’ 
heterogeneous systems and evaluates the impact of an attack through the definition of 
different agents and their dependencies. However, although it can identify emerging 
interconnections, its complexity due to the lack of a unified approach towards the 
definition of interconnections renders it un-manageable when more details are added. The 
complexity also rises from the fact that it models each attack separately. 
Another approach is presented in [20] where the authors use the VSM in order to 
examine strategic cyber security attacks that an adversary could use in order to strike the 
viability of an organisation. By modelling traditional cyber-attacks as attacks against the 
various systems that compose the VSM of the organisation, they managed to analyse the 
available attack tactics and their possible use for effectively attacking an organisation. 
Although this study does use VSM for security-related purposes, it emphasises on the 
attacker’s perspective and therefore its scope is not to provide a tool that the defender can 
use, even if some of its content can be used towards this direction. 
Authors of [21] build on the knowledge from models [22] and [23] about software 
assistants IRIS and ARMOR respectively, in order to come up with GUARDS, a novel 




for security-related resource-limited allocation tasks regarding the protection of 400 
airports of the United States. Unlike the previous two models, it can handle heterogeneous 
security activities and multiple diverse threats, with an almost decentralized method 
(meaning that headquarters do not plan a common strategy for all airports) that can take 
into account multiple security layers simultaneously while attempting to protect a set of 
targets. This project solves the game by finding its mixed Nash Equilibria. Although it is 
a robust model, it considers the airports almost autonomous to each other and not as 
systems within a larger system (TSA) making the adoption of a centralized solution that 
could respect the specificities of the airports, impossible. 
Similarly, in [24], another airport (Los Angeles International Airport – LAX) is 
under investigation and ARMOR is adopted to convert the problem of optimally using 
their security resources (i.e. checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine 
patrol routes) into a solvable one where mixed Nash Equilibria can be found. Although, 
the resources are composed of two factors, ARMOR can only focus on one of them per 
application. 
A game-theoretical approach applied to a Critical Infrastructure is demonstrated 
in [25]. The authors examine a scenario where, in a smart grid with state estimators that 
are supposed to accurately measure the price of electricity at any given time, an attacker 
tries to inject faulty data while a defender tries to withstand the attacks. Those behaviours 
are modelled as two-player, zero-sum games, the Nash Equilibria of which need to be 
found. The results are then validated with simulations. However, this method lacks the 
element of Risk Evaluation where the possibilities of a successful attack would depend 
on additional parameters that would make the model more realistic. 
Game-theoretic approaches are not new to Risk Analysis [26], however they are 
far from being used as state of art, despite various authors demonstrating how they can 
offer a deep insight into the problem, as they can be “mutually reinforcing” approaches 
[27]. 
In [28], the authors presented a conceptual recursive model of secure ICS that is 
capable of identifying the cyber security threats and take responsibility on decision-
making against them using the principles of the VSM. In order to be able to have a better 
view of the critical sections of the ICS networks, a secure network design model has been 




sophisticated attacks and their mitigation techniques rather than on how to simplify 
security best practices. In order to address this gap, they introduce their framework which 
would identify feasible best practices in a simpler way. By introducing security in ICSs 
and by integrating the expertise of security and control systems, it would be possible to 
mitigate security risks and attacks. In addition, since IT controls were introduced in 
industrial processes, many best practice models are based on isolation. This is another 
one of the few projects that use VSM on ICSs security. However, its primary goal is to 
simplify existing practises instead of emphasising on improving them or implementing 
them in more holistic security framework. 
 
Elements of originality 
 
  
A very common problem regarding systems’ security (and more particularly on 
ICSs) and risk management is the lack of consideration for the multiple interdependencies 
within the system. Other common problems include that, very often, adopted methods are 
just adaptations of security mechanisms not specifically designed for their use-cases or 
that the involved likelihood estimations are estimations or even guesses, based on past 
experience or incomplete sets of data. 
 The proposed approach that will be presented in chapter 3 not only takes into 
account the aforementioned interdependencies by using VSM, but also applies Game 
Theory which leads to the identification of Nash Equilibria in a way that considers multi-
dimensional strategy sets, both for the attacker and the defender. What we end up with, 
is a holistic approach that focuses on improving existing security mechanisms and can 
take into account more complex attacking methods (like zero-day attacks) and emphasises 
on providing the defender of the system with a decision-making instrument that will best 
The content of this section is part of the answer to RQ1 by summarising the gaps 
of existing literature on CI-ICSs security and our addition on it. The actual 
additions consist part of the answer to RQ2, a more detailed response of which 
can be found in section 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.2 where our approach and 





protect his interests. Traditional security and risk management techniques, even those that 
are not only based on fixed patterns for well-documented dangers, cannot address 
situations like these and to the best of our knowledge there is no other research work that 
combines VSM and Game Theory, in a similar scheme. 
 
2.3.1.2 Systems’ Security using Monte Carlo predictive modelling 
 
There are several works [29][30][31][32], that evaluate the budgetary allocation 
problems of information security investments, in an attempt to justify optimum security 
investment decisions. The work in [33] showed how system vulnerability can be reduced 
through security patches. A game-theoretic model was developed to study the strategic 
interaction between a vendor and a firm in balancing the costs and benefits of patch 
management. The approach presented by [34] is based on expected utility value of 
investment in order to determine the optimal investment amount. The approach suggests 
that the level of investment for asset protection depends on the vulnerability of the asset 
and associated potential losses. The work further assumes that with increase information 
security investment, probability of security breach decreases but marginal improvement 
on security also decreases with higher investment. Hence, risk averse management may 
maximise the expected utility of a budget to determine the maximum amount to invest, 
which should not exceed the potential loss of breach. The approach presented [35], uses 
the term ‘Return on Security Investment’ (ROSI), which is similar to the traditional 
accounting figure. The approach incorporates one-time costs and benefits of information 
security while it discards running costs and benefits as well as non-financial security 
measures. In order to support investment decisions. ROSI is calculated as: 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝐼 =
(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) / (Solution Costs) and 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝐴𝐿𝐸 × 𝐴𝑅𝑂 where ALE denotes annual loss exposure while ARO 
denotes annual rate of occurrence. 
In a work presented by [36], information security investment decision is based on 
a balanced scorecard performance measuring system. This method, in its original context 
evaluates organisation business performance from the angle of financial, customer, 
internal process and innovation. The authors extended and applied balanced scorecard 




approach uses goal measurement to establish investment needs. Goal importance e.g. 
server downtime reduction is weighted relative to other goals in order to set goal 
fulfilment minimum average degree. If an investment’s average degree is considered to 
be above the threshold, then it is deemed economically viable. This approach considers 
all financial and non-financial mitigation measures. 
 
Elements of originality 
 
 
The aforementioned research works are based on traditional predictive modelling 
approaches where cost estimations regarding assets tend to become unreliable, especially 
as the complexity increases. We applied Monte Carlo simulation in the context of 
information technology and more specifically on security resource allocation decisions 
and proposed a model that is based on a single-block optimal allocation at organisational 
level. This approach uses a probabilistic simulation and as a result it simplifies the cost 
estimation process while allows us to have a great insight of the system it is applied on. 
A big advantage of the adopted method is that it replaces the otherwise deterministic 
estimates of uncertain values about asset breach costs with a variable following triangular 
distribution. This distribution is one of the most commonly used in the case of limited or 
absence of historical data. As a result, the outcome is again probabilistic, including but 
not limited to the three main scenarios (best, most likely and worst case) and allowing the 
benefits of such type of result (i.e. better understanding of the impact of the involved 
parameters, confidence levels, easier sensitivity analysis if needed etc) which will 
ultimately lead to more accurate resource allocation on security investments and in turn, 
to improved security. 
 
The content of this section is part of the answer to RQ1 by summarising the gaps 
of existing literature on CI-ICSs security and our addition on it. The actual 
additions consist part of the answer to RQ2, a more detailed response of which 
can be found in section 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.2 where our approach and 





2.3.1.3 Game Theory on WSNs security 
  
Game Theory has been used in the past for simulating and solving security-related 
problems in WSNs. For example, in [37] the behaviour of a system under a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is under investigation based on previous work of [38]. 
The target environment there is a network, however the model is generic and based on 
the same networking principles that apply to WSNs. The attacker aims to perform a DDoS 
attack at a system that has implemented a firewall. The attacker’s strategy is defined by 
the number of occupied nodes and the distribution according to which she transmits 
malicious traffic. The defender on the other hand can control the settings of the system’s 
firewall. This situation was modelled as a two-player, static, non-cooperative, zero-sum 
game. The research concludes with suggestions for the strategy of the defender which 
maximise the minimum payoff of the defender regardless of attacker’s decision and 
behaviour. 
Authors in [39] try to improve the security and energy efficiency of a WSN by 
applying a reputation system on its nodes where low-reputed ones are shut down. Every 
node can improve its reputation by forwarding incoming packages. However, this 
forwarding causes draining of their batteries. Since conflicting interests are present, a 
game-theoretic model is adopted in order for the maximum possible battery life of the 
nodes to be assured while sustaining an unproblematic operation. In addition, there are 
malicious nodes that can cause package drops, making the proper flow of data even more 
difficult. On all scenarios of the WSN games of this work, the authors solve the problem 
by finding the network’s Nash Equilibria. Under the assumption that the involved players 
are rational, the authors find the optimal strategies for both the defender and the attacker 
that ensure an upper limit for the expected losses when they are followed. As far as the 
security and power conservation are concerned, the network improves significantly in all 
three cases, comparing to the scenario were the game-theoretic model was not applied. 
Authors of [40] investigate the case where a clustered WSN is under attack. In 
this project, the attacker targets the Cluster-Heads (CHs)  in an attempt to crowd the data 
flow or drop it. The underlying Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitors the data 
transfers and attempts to keep the WSN functioning by detecting malicious nodes in the 




and it is proved that the game has no pure Nash Equilibria. This means that the game is 
unstable, and therefore does not provide a state at which we would expect it to be 
stabilised after a large number of iterations. In the resource-constraint environment of 
WSNs this instability is translated into increased power demands. 
Kodialam and Lakshman [41] present a game-theoretic approach on detecting a 
network intrusion via sampling. Assuming that an accomplished malicious package 
transfer from an “entry node” to a “target node”, as a result of a proper selection of 
communication paths, defines a successful intrusion, that every sample examination 
comes with a non-trivial cost and finally that in case a malicious packet is sampled then 
the intrusion is detected and circumvented, the authors tried to come up with a method 
that balances the antagonistic relationship between the intensification of the sampling and 
the cost restriction below the total available sampling budget. This was achieved by 
finding the Nash Equilibria of the corresponding two-player, zero-sum games and 
adopting the strategies that constitute them. The result was two heuristic algorithms for 
approaching the problem. The algorithms can be considered successful since their 
performance was proved upon some sample networks. In the positive characteristics of 
the model one could mention its applicability since it is applied in many real-life 
instances, however there is the not always true assumption that every malicious package 
is always detectable by the performed tests. 
Another game-theoretic approach of an intrusion detection problem is the work 
of Tansu Alpcan and Tamer Basar [42]. In this work, the goal is the “development of a 
formal decision and control framework” with the use of two models. The first one is a 
simple to use and implement model that inserts different functioning modes to the 
Intrusion Detection System that will be adopted according to the warning level and uses 
concepts of cooperative game theory for the corresponding analysis. The second model 
is a more complicated one that presents the interaction between the attacker and the IDS 
as a two-player, finite game with dynamic information. As a result, with the use of those 
two models, the basic trade-offs of network security were addressed. 
In [43], there is a game-theoretic approach where the case of multiple 
collaborating intruders attempt to inject malicious data into a target node and the defender 
(which in this case is represented by the IDS) tries to reject that attack. In this scenario, 




cooperative zero-sum game occurs. In this game, the intruders in order to send their 
packages, always try to find the paths leading to the target node that will maximise the 
probability of successful delivery of the packages. The IDS on the other hand, can opt 
among different sampling strategies aiming to minimise the probability of a successful 
attack but also taking into account the underlying cost of each sampling strategy. Under 
that scheme, the authors demonstrate the optimal strategies that constitute the game’s 
Nash Equilibrium. 
In a similar fashion, the case investigated in [44] is a game-theoretic application 
of a resource allocation problem where the intruder sends malicious packets to the WSN 
from multiple entry points of the network while the defender seeks for the most efficient 
way to allocate the available recourses aiming in maximising the probability that the 
aforementioned packets are detected. According to the adopted deep packet inspection 
method, a subset of the incoming packets is selected and the corresponding packets are 
inspected. Unfortunately, this can lead to major delays in the throughput of the network. 
Thus, there is an upper bound for the fraction of inspected packets out of all incoming 
packets. The problem is again solved by making use of the notion of equilibrium and the 
optimal strategy of the defender, suggests the best options on where (inside the network) 
and how, inspections should be performed. A basic assumption that holds, once more, 
throughout the game is that once a malicious package is inspected, it is always detected 
and thwarted. Although the optimal strategies, as defined above, are found and validated 
experimentally in the project, it has to be mentioned that computational complexity leads 
to reduced scalability by rendering it intractable when applied on large networks. In order 
to overcome this problem, the authors came up with a polynomial approximation 
algorithm (called GRADE) which eliminates scalability problems, but they also introduce 
zero-sum simplified substitutes of the original networks when the latter are large.  
The authors of [45] worked on a project that combined a game-theoretic approach 
and epidemiology in order to evaluate under what circumstances, it is beneficial for a 
network’s operator to apply security measures and eliminate any security breaches the 
network may have. In a network, the security of every host is also affected by the security 
breaches of the other hosts of the network due to interconnectivity. Thus, the attack could 
spread in the network and the investigation of its behaviour requires the employment of 




the remaining ones, a game-theoretic approach of a non-cooperative game was taken into 
account as well. Therefore, a unified framework that combines the  SIS epidemic model 
that was employed in [46] with a non-cooperative game model was created. Since the 
protection from the breaches comes with a cost, bearing it may not always be the best 
choice, at least not for all hosts (which is possible since hosts decide autonomously). 
Indeed, the research proved that there are two thresholds for the cost of protection and 
when the actual cost surpasses the first one (which is constant), there is only one Nash 
Equilibrium which is achieved when all hosts are completely unprotected. On the other 
hand, if the protection costs less than the other threshold (which is a variable), every host 
should invest in it. Additionally, the authors provided a bound for the inefficiency due to 
the non-cooperation of the game and they noticed that in some cases it is excessively 
high. For these cases, they proposed two methods (by affecting the relative costs and by 
implementing an upper bound on infection probabilities) that could alter the network’s 
equilibrium. Although it is a very interesting project that combines epidemiology and 
game theory there are two disadvantages that can be detected. Firstly, the fact that it is 
still unanswered what happens in case the actual cost is not greater than the first threshold 
and not less than the second (for the values of the second threshold that this is applicable) 
or in case the actual cost is both greater than the first threshold and less than the second. 
Secondly, it is a model that depends on the topology of the network and as such, it cannot 
be applied in networks with different topology. 
In [47], the authors apply a game-theoretic approach on a WSN in an attempt to 
maximise the network’s performance while compromising its power efficiency as less as 
possible and vice versa. In order for a WSN to keep servicing the purpose it was built for, 
the sensors that constitute it have to forward the information they receive from the other 
sensors until the information finally reaches the base station. Although, this goal will be 
served if some of the sensors stop forwarding incoming data, that will not hold if those 
‘selfish’ sensors become more and more. The reason for which a sensor could not forward 
incoming information is power management, since every sensor spends non-trivial 
amount of energy when forwarding. To prevent a service failure both due to power 
insufficiency and vast amount of selfish sensors, the authors build a cooperative game-
theoretic model based on reputation. According to that model, a reputation will be 




penalized so that they are motivated to participate in the forwarding procedure. In 
addition, sensors will be penalized when spending excessive amounts of energy. Another 
aim of the model is to isolate the most selfish sensors (i.e. the ones with the worst 
reputation) as this is an indication that they could be malicious. The solution to the 
problem will be the Nash Equilibrium of the whole game. The outcome of the model can 
be considered successful as the network could lower its power needs (in comparison to 
the WSN with a less sophisticated decision-making algorithm supporting it) while 
keeping its throughput in acceptable levels and the possibly malicious sensors isolated. 
The whole research could have great impact due to its many real-life applications and 
although the topology of the network is of crucial importance, which makes the model 
inapplicable in many cases, the authors have taken into account many different topologies 
and network properties. 
In [48], the authors, focused on providing a precise and more efficient alternative 
to identifying the position of malicious nodes within a WSN than the existing methods 
that make use of GPS technology. Their method is based on modelling the interaction 
between the anchors (i.e.: sensors with known positions used in order for other sensors to 
determine their positions by multilateral triangulation) and the remaining nodes as a 
signaling game. The purpose of this work was not only the identification of when the 
secure localisation methods were required but also the optimisation of secure localisation 
costs by maintaining a low energy usage profile. In addition, the lifetime of the sensors 
would be substantially extended. This was different to what has been done in the past as 
the focus of the existing literature of such game-theoretic applications has mostly been 
within the context of Verifiable Multilateration trying to identify the best position of the 
verifiers in the WSN and increase the capability of localising malicious nodes securely 
by adopting a two-player non-cooperative game [49]; not on when it was required to 
activate a secure positioning method. The simulations conducted, proved that this 
mechanism is more efficient and only called when necessary (i.e.: when a node is 
classified as potentially malicious) than the one where secure localisation is always 
applied.  
Authors of [50] proposed a hierarchical framework by adopting usage control 
(UCON) technologies and chance discovery, to improve the security of the WSNs by 




decision-making, were used to mitigate the ongoing attacks in WSNs while a dynamic 
adaptive chance discovery mechanism was used to detect the unknown ones. At the same 
time, the low complexity and the high security requirements of WSNs were still taken 
into consideration. The aforementioned mechanisms were utilised by a unified framework 
in which low-level attacks were detected using simple rules applied on sensors and high-
level attacks were detected using complex rules applied on the sinks and the base station. 
As far as the mitigation part is concerned, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and 
Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) mechanisms were applied to that end, regardless 
of the type of the attacks. Finally, a simulation was conducted, for evaluating the attack 
detection and resource consumption rate and it showed that the proposed framework is 
feasible for WSNs and at the same time the detection rate, especially for unknown attacks, 
is higher than that of the most typical and existing detection schemes.  
In [51], the authors proposed a game-theoretical framework by modelling a non-
cooperative zero-sum attack-defense security game aiming to examine the interactions 
between an attacker and a defender within a cyberwar by dynamically choosing their 
strategies aiming to maximise their individual payoffs. In this model, each player has 
three possible strategies of attack/defense that are different to each other in terms of 
strategy cost, potential gain/damage caused and effectiveness in anticipating of the 
opponent’s strategy. Finally, the authors find the mixed Nash Equilibrium of the 
aforementioned game and conclude that their method saves energy while attaining a high 
rate of success instead of having to have the defense system turned on constantly. 
 
Elements of Originality 
 
 
Compared to all those projects, our particular one can offer both a method that 
falls into the Intrusion Detection area and another that falls into the Intrusion Prevention 
one. Additionally, it combines some properties that are met in epidemiology models 
The content of this section is part of the answer to RQ1 by summarising the gaps 
of the existing literature on WSNs security and our addition to it. The actual 
additions consist part of the answer to RQ2, a more detailed response of which 





which is something rear and only demonstrated once in the related work. Thirdly, the 
level of complexity found in our work can be considered significantly higher since there 
are demonstrated cases that two parameters affect each player’s strategy simultaneously 
(which leads to multi-dimensional strategy sets), with a third one playing also its role 
although not being part of the strategy and that is something that renders the suggested 
models applicable to a much wider range of scenarios. Finally, our approach incorporates 
an iterated version that apart from its obvious interest due to the fact that it applies on 
situations where the non-iterated ones could not, it also gives the opportunity to perform 
forecasting based on this particular model’s outcome. This idea will be further elaborated 
at the end of the project. 
 
2.3.1.4 Game Theory and Epidemiology on Malware Dissemination Prevention 
 
The way that viruses and worms spread in a computer network shares common 
characteristics with the proliferation of biological diseases in human populations. 
Therefore, the analysis of malware can benefit from investigating the behaviour of 
biological diseases. Two types of models for analysing malware proliferation in 
epidemiology exist, namely stochastic and deterministic models. Stochastic models (e.g., 
[52]) are used to analyse small-scale networks, and deterministic models are mainly used 
to analyse large- scale networks [53]. Our work focuses on malware spread in a large 
computer network, so we utilise deterministic models. 
The majority of the deterministic epidemiology models are continuous-time 
models [54], since they offer higher precision when representing the emerging dynamics 
compared with discrete-time models. They divide the computer population of a network, 
known as node population, in discrete compartments, such as “Susceptible” and 
“Infected,” and model the emerging dynamics between those compartments utilising 
differential equations. Individuals in the epidemic population may have several states, 
including susceptible, infected, and recovered. The differential equations used to model 
the transitions between those states form the mathematical description of each model. 
Two models have been widely used in the field of epidemiology modelling: the 
SIR by [9][10][11] and a modified version of it, known as the SIS model [55]. Both 




are susceptible to the malware in the initial phase and an individual may go through each 
state sequentially. In the SIS model, the state transitions of an individual form a 
circulation. The individual may recover from the infection, but there is still a chance to 
be reinfected. In other words, an individual node becomes again susceptible to the 
malware after its recovery. In the SIR model, the final state is described as the recovered 
state. An infected individual can recover from the infection and become immune to the 
malware and an immunized individual cannot be reinfected by the same malware. 
However, neither SIR nor SIS can individually represent reality accurately; the SIR model 
lacks the option of returning an infected node into the susceptible pool, while the SIS 
model lacks the ability of immunization after recovery. 
The authors of [56] proposed a modified version of the SIR model by introducing 
the notion of “temporary immunization.” Their model (SIRS) consists of three 
compartments, Susceptible, Infected, and Temporarily Recovered. Individuals transit 
from the susceptible state to infected, from infected to temporary recovered and then back 
to susceptible. In reality this model introduces a delay in the traditional SIS model, since 
the infected individuals that recover return to the susceptible state after an amount of time. 
This amount of time is defined by the rate at which removals lose their immunization and 
become susceptible again. Resusceptibility represents the situation where a computer 
infected by malware recovers from the infection and becomes immune, remaining 
susceptible to modified versions of the same malware. Even though this model is more 
accurate than the traditional SIR and SIS models, it still lacks the ability to encompass 
situations where the individual becomes immune to the malware before getting infected. 
Furthermore, even though it takes into account the fact that a malware may appear in 
different versions, it does not clarify whether each version exploits the same vulnerability, 
in which case patching this vulnerability would immunize the computer against any 
variation of the same malware. 
A similar approach is followed by [57], who proposed a dynamic discrete 
compartmental model. In their work, they mathematically formulated a four-state model 
encompassing the population compartments of Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and 
Susceptible with Vaccination (SEIS-V). This model adds one more state in the traditional 
SIS model, the Exposed state. By introducing this state, the authors denoted that not every 




contact with an infected node then he also gets infected. However, following the SIS 
paradigm an infected individual can recover and transit to the susceptible state. Another 
additional state is the Vaccinated state, where a susceptible node can be “vaccinated” and 
therefore immunized against a specific malware. Nevertheless, as in the work of [56], an 
immunized node can become susceptible again after a certain amount of time, and as 
before the authors do not take into account the mechanism of vulnerability patching. 
Furthermore, the exposed state is meaningless when modelling the spread of a random 
scanning malware in a fully connected network such as the Internet, where each 
individual within the susceptible population has the same probability of getting infected 
by an infectious node. 
The focus in [58] is on modelling the spread of topological scanning malware. 
This type of malware spreads based on topology information. Therefore, the connectivity 
of each node plays a significant role in the malware propagation within the network, 
directly affecting the rate of infection. Unlike the previous model, it can also be used to 
model random scanning malware. Nevertheless, as mentioned by the authors, this model 
does not take into account patching and therefore there is no transition from susceptible 
to immunized. 
Typically, disease spreading depends on common shared characteristics of the 
individuals in a population. In a network of computers, malware exploits certain 
vulnerabilities in the system in order to infect a host. [59] Common practice of malware 
is to exploit vulnerabilities in software that is installed in the victim-host. Thus, in order 
for a host to be considered as susceptible to a certain piece of malware, it must have 
installed the specific software version that bears the vulnerability that the malware can 
exploit. Otherwise, it cannot be infected and thus cannot be considered as susceptible. In 
the real world, not every host in a network carries the same vulnerabilities, forming 
therefore a heterogeneous computer network. This heterogeneity can be considered as an 
additional compartment of immune nodes. Our work has also taken into account the 
transition to this compartment from the susceptible or recovered state through the 
application of patching. 
Authors of [60] took into consideration the dependability assessment of 
Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSNs) with malware diffusion and 




propose some metrics. In addition, in order for them to disclose the malware diffusion 
process, the authors proposed a heterogeneous discrete time SIS model that considers the 
heterogeneity of sensor nodes as well as the probability of malware choosing the Spread 
option (i.e.: self-diffuse) instead of Not-Spread. The aforementioned disclosure was 
achieved by the development of a non-cooperative, non-zero-sum game that formulated 
the relationship between a HWSN and the malware. During the whole process, a measure 
called Mean-Time-To-Infection (MTTI) had to be invented. Therefore, not only the 
infection behaviour of malware could be predicted but also the selection problem of 
optimal strategies for the purposes of balancing the costs and benefits of an HWSN 
system and malware could be solved. Consequently, a dependability assessment 
mechanism for HWSNs with malware diffusion, was set up.  
In [61], the authors formulate a homogeneous WSN as a game where malware 
intelligently adapts its strategies in order to maximise the overall cost of the WSN while 
the system (could be the network operators) dynamically varies its strategies in an attempt 
to achieve the opposite. The developed model is based on epidemiology, differs a lot from 
the traditional SIS/SIR models and takes into account the sleep mode that the sensor may 
occasionally enter in order to save energy. With this procedure, the existence of a saddle-
point which still meets the necessary Quality of Service (QoS) level and minimises the 
interference introduced due to the adoption of the corresponding security methods, is 
confirmed. The saddle-point strategies are able to limit the propagation of the malware 
and can be easily applied on the sensor nodes. 
 
Elements of Originality 
 
  
The content of this section is part of the answer to RQ1 by summarising the gaps 
of existing literature on CI-ICSs security and our addition on it. The actual 
additions consist part of the answer to RQ2, a more detailed response of which 
can be found in section 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.2 where our approach 





Our unified malware proliferation model, combines the traditional SIS and SIR 
while eliminating their omissions (as previously mentioned, SIR model lacks the option 
of returning an infected node into the susceptible pool, while the SIS model lacks the 
ability of immunization after recovery). This is done in a way that mitigates the 
aforementioned criticism about the existing work since providing patching capabilities 
allows the transition from susceptible to immunised. Finally, on top of that, it combines 
Game Theory to compute optimal strategies for the defender to minimize the effect of 
malware spread, while minimising the security cost. 
 
2.3.2 Systems’ Resilience and Optimisation 
 
This section is about similar, or somewhat similar, literature applied on systems 
but this time from a perspective other than security. This section is, split in more 
categories that correspond to the categories of the following chapters. Specifically, there 
is a category about Game Theory applied on WSNs in order to somehow optimise the 
functionality of the latter and also another one about Hot-Desking. 
 
2.3.2.1 Game Theory on WSNs Resilience 
 
According to [62], the main categories that the game-theoretic approaches of such 
conflicts fall into are: Network Management, with indicative topics such as Resource 
Allocation, Task Scheduling and Power Control, Communication with topics like QoS, 
Topology Optimization and Routing Protocol Design, Network Security grappling with 
Intrusion/Denial of Service Attack Detection and Prevention and finally Applications 
such as Target Tracking, Data Collection and Packet Forwarding.  
In terms of network management, communication and applications, [63] offers a 
model to improve the performance of a heterogeneous WSN, by taking into consideration 
the reliability, connectivity and the power efficiency of the network. The results indicate 
that the existence of a Nash Equilibrium is always achievable. In similar work, [64] builds 
an energy-efficient control model, which offers great improvement to energy reduction 
in terms of QoS. it attempts to improve the so-called Gur Game algorithm [65], a 




Authors of [66] propose a Localised Game-theoretical Clustering Algorithm 
(LGCA), which tackles the problem of choosing the most appropriate Cluster-Heads. It 
attempts to improve the Clustered ROuting for Selfish Sensors (CROSS) [67], and the 
Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [68]. As the most fundamental 
part of the proposed solution, knowledge on the number of players (nodes) in each round 
is considered unnecessary. The key for this is that each node plays a clustering game only 
with its neighbours within a predefined radius. Moreover, exactly one node can bid for a 
position of the Cluster-Head in one district successfully, in order to achieve an optimal 
payoff. Simulation showed that LGCA performs better than CROSS and LEACH in terms 
of network lifetime. Focusing on security related applications of game theory within 
WSNs, [40] investigates cases where a clustered WSN is under attack. The proposed IDS 
monitors the data transfers and strains to keep the WSN functioning properly. This 
situation is modelled as a two-player, non-cooperative, zero-sum game where the 
attacker’s reward is proportional to the damage caused to the network and the defender, 
which is represented by the IDS, receives a reward proportional to the network’s 
functionality. As a result, it is proved that the game has no pure Nash Equilibrium. 
In [39] a reputation system on different sensors is applied in order to make it more 
energy efficient and secure. Forwarding packages, in a fashion required by both ends, 
brings positive reputation to a sensor, but also consumes more energy, which could 
ultimately affect the networks performance later. There are malicious nodes that are 
injected in the network in order to randomly drop packets in order to shut down nodes 
with low reputation. In such cases there arises a number of conflicting motivations, where 
game-theoretic tools could offer a suitable solution. This model, which extends the works 
done in [69][70], attempts to divide nodes’ interaction into three distinctive domains 
including: any node-to-node communication, one-hop neighbours communication and 
inner-cluster communication. It concludes that for all three types, there can always be a 
Nash Equilibrium, by which security and power conservation can be improved. 
In [66] there is a game-theoretic approach of multiple collaborating intruders who 
try to inject malicious data into a target node and the “defender” (the IDS) tries to prevent 
the attack. Since intruders can be assumed to act as one, there is a two-player, non-
cooperative zero-sum game that occurs. Intruders, in their attempt to send their package 




successful delivery. The IDS on the other hand, can opt among different sampling 
strategies aiming to minimise the probability of a successful attack always by taking into 
account the underlying cost of each sampling strategy. Under that scheme, the authors 
demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium and the optimal strategies. 
Authors of [71] worked on a game-theoretic clustering algorithm that is applied 
on WSNs and its scope is to improve the network’s load balancing, as well as its execution 
time and energy consumption. The algorithm attempts to decide which node(s) will act 
as Cluster-Heads and which not. It is based on the principle that all nodes are ‘selfish’, 
meaning that they would all prefer not to be Cluster-Heads. However, if there is no 
Cluster-Head in the network that would lead to all of them not gaining any utility. 
Therefore, that leads to an antagonistic situation where, on one hand, nodes would prefer 
to not act as Cluster-Heads but, on the other hand, there has to be at least one Cluster-
Head in the network in order for the nodes to be able to gain some utility. That makes 
Game Theory a suitable tool for the solution of this problem. The proposed algorithm is 
compared to Chor Ping Low’s approximation algorithm (GLBCA) [72] and Gaurav 
Gupta’s algorithm LBC [73] and is found to outperform both of them in terms of load 
balancing3, execution time and energy consumption. 
The work of Duan Jungi et al [74] is also about improving efficiency of the trust 
evaluation process in WSNs. In particular, the authors introduce a custom energy-aware 
trust derivation scheme which aims to keep the consumed energy and the latency of a 
WSN at a minimum, while at the same time maintains its security at an adequate level. 
To that end, they firstly present a method of risk strategy analysis that stimulates 
cooperation among the nodes of the WSN and secondly, they introduce a game-theoretic 
approach, the so-called Trust Derivation Dilemma Game (TDDG) in order to reduce the 
overhead of the network. The TDDG is based on the principle of the nodes being 
evaluated by their neighbouring ones. Each participating node can choose between Reply 
and Not Reply when receiving a trust request by another node. There is also a mechanism 
that prevents nodes from their default inclination to not replying, in order to preserve 
battery. The network is considered secure only if the number of recommendations is 
                                                     
3 In order to judge the quality of the load balancing, we measure the standard deviation of the loads of the 




greater than a specified threshold. Finally, the numerous simulations that are made lead 
to the result that this whole approach is not only able to keep the security levels of the 
WSN at the desired level and reduce its energy consumption when compared to traditional 
mechanisms but also to do it with only a minimal increase in latency. 
The authors of [75], presented a decentralized, scalable and stable 3D game-
theoretic energy balance (3D-GTEB) routing protocol, which manages to improve the 
routing decisions while minimising the network overhead and at the same time improving 
the energy balance (by attempting to lead to the energy of all the sensor nodes getting 
depleted approximately at the same time), using two levels of decision making. The first 
level, which is called wedge level energy balance, balances traffic load over a set of 
forwarding wedges using evolutionary game theory. According to the authors, the latter 
can demonstrate significant improvement in the lifetime of the network and also in energy 
consumption per packet. The second level is called node level energy balance. This 
technique captures the infamous selfish nodes’ behaviour of not participating in 
forwarding in order to preserve their energy and encourages them to participate in 
forwarding, by using classical Game Theory. The simulation conducted, proved that the 
proposed routing protocol can improve and extend network’s lifetime compared to a 2D-
GTEB (Two Dimensional Game-Theoretic Energy Balance). 
 
Elements of Originality 
 
 Differently to the existing work in this field, we combine Game Theory with 
SensomaX, a custom agent-based WSN middleware developed by Dr. Mo Haghighi. The 
many benefits of this approach are mentioned later in the corresponding chapter, where 












The key value driver of the initial applications of Hot-Desking was that office 
sizes could be reduced up to 30%4 depending on the tendency of the business to visit 
clients and collaborators outside the premises. 
Today, the most common form of Hot-Desking is simply “employee-led” (i.e.: on 
attendance to the office, an employee chooses a desk themselves that they deem to be 
unoccupied and claims it for the day). 
While the value case presented by Hot-Desking is summarized as being relatively 
clear and by no means insignificant, such schemes have had mixed success [76]. Today’s 
literature’s criticisms can be broadly categorised into the following key aspects: 
 
− Ineffective management: A mixture of slow and inconsistent methods of 
distributing desks, ranging from “this desk is free” signs to entirely free-for-
all situations, introduces misunderstandings about whether or not a desk is 
occupied [77]. 
− Loss of working synergies: In traditional territorial (i.e. “assigned”) working 
systems, members of a specific teams are assigned desks in close proximity to 
one another to enable easy and regular collaboration and discussion between 
individuals working on similar projects and on similar themes. When desks 
are assigned either randomly or linearly in a “pegs into a slot” system, this is 
lost. While it is difficult to attribute the impact of this on issues, such as 
productivity and employee happiness, it could be envisaged that even small 
variations (e.g. 1% decrease in productivity) have significant impact on even 
the smallest scales [78]. 
− Cultural and behavioural barriers: A territorial working system encourages 
individuals to build and adapt their desk to their own personal preferences and 
working ideals; with a Hot-Desking system, these are lost. This ranges from 
sentimental issues, such as photos of loved ones and favourite literature, to 
working documentation, such as large drawings and annotated reports, to 
                                                     




office furniture, such as specific ergonomic desk heights and chair 
configurations [79] 
 
It is clear that there are significant shortcomings to the use of Hot-Desking within 
a commercial office environment, which can be broadly translated to influence on 
employee productivity. There is a consensus that these benefits in general are inherently 
hard to quantify. 
The rise of data collection and connectivity as detailed in the introduction can be 
hypothesized as an opportunity to fundamentally alter the nature of Hot-Desking by 
utilising increased data about the workplace, its occupants and their intentions and 
preferences. While this is theoretically possible, little research exists on how optimization 
might look in practice, and on the value it could bring to the workplace. What does exist 
however is considerable discussion of the workplace and its influence on the occupants. 
Although there are quite a few definitions of “productivity”, a rather general one, 
that we can also adopt for the needs of this work, is the one of [80], which is “the ability 
of people to enhance their work output through increases in the quantity and/or quality of 
the product or service they deliver”. According to [81], health and well-being are two 
“prime requisites” of productivity, where health is an employee’s mental and physical 
health and well-being is the perception of the employee of their satisfaction and 
happiness. Because health and well-being are inextricably connected to productivity, a 
configuration that manages to improve either or both, is a means of increasing 
productivity. 
A framework for the measurement of office productivity using factor analysis has 
been formulated by [82]. The components were initially seven but were refined by the 






The decision-making process of a Hot-Desking model could take many of these 
variables into account. These could be some of the following, which correspond to 
elements of Table 2: 
1) Nature of work [83]. Not all employees of a company work on the same 
project or even the same theme of project. Therefore, each employee’s office 
attendance could be associated with specific projects or skills, and a 
distribution system could try to put employees that work on the same project, 
or using similar skills, close to each other, which could be theorised to make 
them communicate better and thus be more productive. Indeed, interviews 
undertaken in support of this paper suggest, this “proximity synergy” may 
even be better than traditional allocated systems because desk associations are 
typically totally re-evaluated on anything from a yearly to 10-yearly basis and 
also because an intelligent system allows people to vary their associated group 
on a day-to-day basis. In general, this is only currently done on extremely 




large “megaprojects”, such as the London 2020 Olympics, but evidence 
suggests these create powerful working environments; there is a suggestion 
that, if it could be made practical, then similar benefits would be realised for 
such groupings for smaller and part-time projects. 
2) Noise level [84]. Noise levels and the distractions that these can cause have a 
significant impact on the actual productivity [85]. Therefore, it is important to 
put employees with similar needs. For example, attention-to-detail work 
usually requires quiet environments and typically generates little noise, 
whereas team-focused work may not necessarily need a loud environment, but 
will be able to function in one, and will certainly contribute to the noise. Data 
for noise levels can be derived from acoustic sensors distributed about the 
office or estimated from input data on employee’s principle tasks for the day. 
3) Duration of stay in office. This information could be derived from calendar 
data or asked for upon arrival. Individual’s staying for exceptionally short 
periods of time is probable to be happy with smaller and more casual “touch 
down desk”. This may further improve the floor area savings of traditional 
Hot-Desking. 
4) Environmental preferences [86]. This information could be derived from 
many types of data set, including temperature and light sensors across the 
office. Many small miscellaneous factors have been identified as being 
significant in the workplace, and achievement of these could be improved by 
consideration of individual’s preferences. For example, individuals who 
prefer a warmer office environment could be placed further away from colder 
areas, typically atriums and stairwells. 
 
With the rapid growth of Smart Building technology, some of the variables of 
Table 2 are easy to be monitored and changed automatically, especially the ones that 
correspond to the component of comfort. For example, studies show that improving 
lightning conditions can improve productivity even up to 20% in some cases [87], while 
proper air quality has been found to improve productivity by 6%-9% [88]. Furthermore, 




temperature has been found to be between 22 and 26°C [90] although the regulations 
differ by country. 
This is possible because there are already many affordable commercial solutions 
available for collecting data to inform these parameters. However, when it comes to 
commercial solutions for the distribution aspect, using these data sets in a way that will 
aim at a productivity increase, there are no products or services observed in the market. 
Despite the absence of literature covering the possibility of digital innovation in hot- 
desking, the aforementioned specific areas, combined with the corresponding hypotheses, 
form possibilities for an optimisation use case to assess the value proposition and 
practicalities of an intelligent Hot-Desking implementation. As it is described below, this 
model will take into account the “nature of work” variable. 
The literature that is related to Hot-Desking can be mostly categorised into three 
main research topics. Firstly, it is the topic about the impact of Hot-Desking on the health 
status of the employees. The second category is related to the examination of the 
evolution of the workspaces throughout the years. Finally, the third one is about the 
importance of the workplace for the employees and its impact on their productivity or 
even on the mind-set and their sense of team spirit. Existing studies were not found to 
have similarities to this one. Related work that is presented here is about different use 
cases that the concept of Hot-Desking is used for and although they can be seen as 
somewhat similar to our work (by various criteria that are explained below) they are still 
remote enough. 
It is worth mentioning that the definition of Hot-Desking is somewhat vague and 
therefore some conflicts can often occur among different authors [91][92]. However, the 
term ‘hot desks’ is most commonly used in order to express ‘desks that can be used each 
time by a different user’ and this is the definition that we will use in this work. 
It is often due to this controversy on the definition, that the topic of Hot-Desking 
is related to Sit-and-Stand desks and therefore to employees’ health. Authors of [93] for 
example relate hot desks with standing desks and they look into the impact that this kind 
of desks has on the sedentary work time in an open plan office. According to the findings, 
these desks did not have a great impact on the sitting working time of the employees. 
In a similar fashion, the effectiveness of sit-stand workstations in terms of their 




this ‘Stand@Work randomised controlled trial pilot’ differ significantly from the 
previous one since that study shows that these kinds of desks can indeed reduce sedentary 
work times in the short term. It should be mentioned though that authors note the necessity 
of larger scale studies on more representative samples in order for the exact impact of sit- 
stand workstations on the health of individuals to be more accurately determined. 
In [95], an attempt for results of six related pieces of research to be compared is 
made. All six of them are about the effect that some interventions at the workplace can 
have on the sitting habits of the employees during their working hours. The interventions 
vary from one another and in all of them, sitting time had not a significant decrease due 
to the aforementioned interventions. 
Authors of [96] relate hot desks with sit-stand desks. These are desks that are 
considered ‘hot’ according to the definition that we adopt, with the specificity of being 
used in a standing position. The objective here was to examine whether the use of these 
desks along with awareness regarding the importance of postural variation and breaks 
would manage to cause better sedentary habits for the employees. The results showed that 
the adoption of these desks led to a better sedentary behaviour. 
In a fashion similar to the previous works that were presented, authors of [97] 
experiment on the effect that the installation of sit-stand workstations could have on the 
reduction of worker’s sitting times. In this study the results were very encouraging since 
the adoption of the sit-stand workstations was astonishing with huge impact on the sitting 
times (‘Sitting was almost exclusively replaced by standing’). However, although the 
strong acceptability of these workstations, there were some design limitations that should 
be considered in future attempts. 
All the aforementioned pieces of research belong to the first of the three categories 
that the bibliography can be summed up to (i.e. the impact of Hot-Desking on the health 
status of the employees). Below, we present characteristic representatives of the 
remaining two categories. Representatives of the second category (i.e. examination of the 
evolution of the workspaces throughout the years) followed by the ones related to the 
importance of the workplace and its impact on the productivity, mind-set and team spirit 
of the employees, which is the third category. 
The evolution of the workplaces is examined at [91]. In particular, its authors 




Hot- Desking. It is interesting though that the authors define ‘hot desks’ as ‘desks which 
workers have to book in advance to use’ while the definition we adopted resembles more 
the definition that authors use for ‘collective office’ which according to them is ‘facilities 
that are shared and used on an as needed basis’. Combining many sources of evidence, 
authors conclude that although workplaces tend to differ more and more from the typical 
conventional ones that were used in the past almost exclusively, this is happening with a 
slower rate than some claim. The findings of this study are mostly confirmed by the 
findings of [79]. According to the evidence of the latter, office work is increasingly 
differentiated from the traditional workplaces although for the majority of employees, 
work still corresponds to a designated place. 
In [98] we meet once more the concept of Stand@Work, but this time it is not its 
impact to the sedentary patterns that is investigated. Instead, the objective was to 
qualitatively evaluate the willingness of the employees to adopt new types of workplaces, 
the feasibility of such a venture and the general perception of employees about the use of 
sit-stand workstations. The whole scheme was generally perceived as both acceptable and 
feasible although studies with different populations and settings need to be made. 
Another study [98], considers Hot-Desking within the grand scheme regarding the 
societal changes in the ownership of space. The aim of this study is to sociologically 
analyse the emergent sociospatial structures in a Hot-Desking environment where space 
is used by more than one users, exchangeably. The study results in two interesting 
findings. Firstly, the find that the perception of mobility may not be spread evenly among 
the employees, resulting in two different groups of them: the settlers (i.e. the most 
resistive to change) and the ‘hot-deskers’. Secondly, according to the findings, the routine 
of mobility itself can generate additional work and a motion of marginalisation to the 
adopters. 
For the third and final category of related studies, we can include [76] as well, 
although it belongs to the previous category too. That is because its findings are related 
not only to the evolution of workplaces but also to the impact that this has on the adopters, 
from multiple perspectives. 
Apart from that study, there is also [78] which examines the impact of Hot-
Desking on organisational and team identification. The study tested the level up to which 




secondly the impact that physical arrangements have on the level of engagement with the 
organisation. According to the results, team identity is more salient than organisational 
identity when a traditional desks assignment is applied whereas organisational identity is 
more salient when Hot-Desking is applied. The findings also denote that physical 
arrangements not only have significant impact on the level of engagement of the 
employees, but also on the on the type and focus of organisational participation. 
 
Elements of Originality 
 
It is obvious from the related work that is presented, that research in the field is 
relatively undeveloped, especially when we consider when existing studies were made. 
Most importantly though, there is a big gap in the bibliography when it comes to the 
research of the connection between the Hot-Desking and the productivity of the adopters. 
As shown already, studies on that connection are very scarce and even then, it is only an 
indirect connection that researchers usually study. Now, researchers almost always 
examine the implications of Hot-Desking on health, or more specifically on the sedentary 
habits of the adopters. Even the impact on profitability (which is one of the reasons that 
Hot-Desking was initially developed as it leads to reduced desks and resources in general) 
has been ignored by the aforementioned approaches. 
Furthermore, the nature of the existing work is such that no modelling is 
performed in order to utilise Hot-Desking in the best possible way, both in terms of 
organisation’s profitability and employees’ productivity. Thus, we could say that existing 
literature has not managed to keep up with the needs of modern business environments. 
What we offer is a different view; a model that based on occupancy data of the 
employees, calculates and suggests in real time which desk to be assigned to every 
employee at the time they arrive at the organisation. The model decides which desk will 
make the incoming employee or all the employees as productive as possible, based on the 
The content of this section is part of the answer to RQ1 by summarising the gaps 
of existing literature on Hot-Desking and our addition to it. The actual additions 
consist part of the answer to RQ3, a more thorough response of which can be 





project that they are working on, at that period of time. That way, not only employees 
find themselves working in the most productive environment possible, without having to 
decide the sitting arrangements themselves (with any disadvantages that this would entail 
in terms of the relationships among them) but also the organisation will have a double 
benefit as it will make profit not only due to the number of desks that will not need to be 
used anymore (desks will be less than the employees while still covering their needs), but 
also due to the fact that all employees will work under optimal productivity conditions. 




























II. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
 
Section II, includes Chapter 3 and 4 which consist of our proposed models. In particular, 
the former includes the security and risk management-oriented part of the research with 
models on the security of WSNs and four different use cases on the security of CI-ICSs 





























































hapter 3 discusses the common systems-related issues and provides some use-
cases applying the proposed models on improving WSNs and CI-ICSs from a 
security and risk management perspective, along with the research findings. 
Within this chapter, RQ2 is addressed.  
 
This chapter includes material from the following published papers, as per below: 
Section • Published paper 
3.3 • Maraslis, K., Spyridopoulos, T., Oikonomou, G., Tryfonas, T., & Haghighi, 
M. (2015). Application of a game-theoretic approach in smart sensor data 
trustworthiness problems. In IFIP International Information Security 
Conference (pp. 601–615). Springer. 
3.3.1.1 • Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., Oikonomou, G., & Li, S. 
(2014). Managing cyber security risks in industrial control systems with 
game theory and viable system modelling. In 2014 9th International 
Conference on System of Systems Engineering (SOSE) (pp. 266–271). 
3.3.1.2 • Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2017). 
Critical infrastructure cyber-security risk management. Terrorists’ Use of the 
Internet: Assessment and Response, 136, 59 
3.3.2 • Fagade, T., Maraslis, K., & Tryfonas, T. (2017). Towards effective 
cybersecurity resource allocation: the Monte Carlo predictive modelling 
approach. International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 13(2–3), 152–167. 
3.3.3 • Spyridopoulos, T., Maraslis, K., Mylonas, A., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, 
G. (2015). A game-theoretical method for cost-benefit analysis of malware 
dissemination prevention. Information Security Journal: A Global 
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3.  SYSTEMS SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 This chapter will focus on examining common systems-related issues from the 
perspective of their security and risk management (as opposed to the next chapter that 
will examine issues from the perspective of their utility and resilience) following novel 
methods. Overall, the chapter investigates some use-cases which can be divided in two 
general categories: the ones related to WSNs and those that are related to CIs and ICSs 
(without implying that a system cannot fall into both of these categories).  
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Systems’ security and risk management techniques have plenty of space for 
improvement. To this end, in the following sections we present some use cases where we 
apply methods with explicit benefits (that are described in the corresponding sections) 
compared to the more conventional existing ones. As discussed before, the cases 
explained fall into two main categories; WSNs and CI-ICSs with the latter one including, 
among others, a use case where Monte Carlo predictive modelling is applied and another 
one using Epidemiology. Although, these two are used within a context that is not 
explicitly presented as CI-ICS, they can both easily fall within the definition of ICS, no 
matter which of the two most dominant ones [17][99] someone chooses to adopt; not to 
mention the vaguer definition of CI. 
 
3.2  Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks constitute a very important and often critical field with 
a great amount of research around it. In the following section there is some background 
knowledge on WSNs, the proposed models for an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and 
an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) which are followed by a double validation of their 





3.2.1 Introduction and Background Knowledge on WSNs 
 
The use and progress of the WSNs, especially the recent years, has been 
dramatically increased since they can now offer a low-cost solution to the challenges of 
today’s world [100][101]. WSNs are homogeneous application-centric networks 
comprising of several autonomous devices (sensors) that are spaced accordingly in the 
network [102][103], measuring environmental or physical conditions like temperature or 
pressure [104], working together to collect necessary data, and sending them through the 
wireless network to the final central position [102][103]. They are used in numerous 
instances with great advantages for the quality of life of millions of people every day 
[100]. However, those networks come with their vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities can 
be used by intruders in order for them to cause damage to the data or the network itself. 
Therefore, the field of Wireless Sensors Network Security is critical since it investigates 
ways that those intruders can be mitigated, and data can be communicated and used safely 
and efficiently. 
Two vigorous areas of Wireless Sensor Network Security field are the IDSs and 
the IPSs. The former area is about methods that can enable the network operator to detect 
an intrusion to the network while the latter expands the potentials and introduces the 
probability for the operator to block the intrusion. One can easily surmise the huge 
importance of such systems if they think of the potential damage that an intrusion can 
cause, from every possible aspect. In this chapter, there are two models that are 
demonstrated. One that falls into the general category of Intrusion Detection Systems (or 
algorithms) and another one that can be seen as an Intrusion Detection System (or 
algorithm). 
  
Problem Definition and Scope  
 
In the models studied below, there is a WSN along with an attacker (who will be 
assumed female from now on, for better understanding of the work in some cases) and a 
defender (who will be assumed male from now on, for the same reason) of this network. 
The former can attack the WSN using some or all of her resources while the latter, who 




all of his resources. The problem is that the more of their resources they use, the more 
cost they incur and the more profit at the same time. Since it is not obvious what part of 
their resources both parts should use in order for them to have the highest possible profit 
for themselves and taking into account that the more profit one has the less has the other, 
there is a complex problem that arises that makes a Game-theoretic approach suitable 
since adversarial strategies are involved. This is, roughly, the problem that will be 
analysed and solved.  
The use case that the first model is applied on is a WSN that measures a 
characteristic (e.g. the temperature) of a predefined area. According to this use case, the 
attacker tries to compromise the network by making the sensors transmitting faulty 
measurements instead of the real ones. The scope of the introduced algorithm is to enable 
the defender (e.g. network operator) to adjust the network parameters he can affect, before 
an intrusion is attempted, in the best possible way so that that the least possible faulty 
information is used when the attack occurs.  
The second model applies on the same use case, but it now offers an intrusion 
prevention mechanism as well. It can be used as a tool to prevent an intrusion or at least 
reduce the impact as much as possible. Its scope is to enable the network operators to 
adjust the network parameters they can affect, in a way that the damage of the infiltration 
can be minimised in the best possible way.  
Detailed descriptions of the methods used, and the parameters mentioned are 




Some useful basic information and essential notions of the involved technologies 
are presented in this section for a better understanding of the analysis that follows later 
and understanding of the wide use, and therefore importance, of WSNs. 
A WSN, is composed by self-powered sensors (or nodes; these terms are used 
interchangeably in this thesis) bounded from a small number to thousands [105]. 
Depending on the case, each of these sensors is linked to one or more others [100]. When 




reliability and low power. Energy, storage, processing power and communicational 
characteristics are some of the limitations of each sensor network node. 
A self-powered sensor is divided into the following parts: a microcontroller, a 
transceiver which may have an internal antenna or work in conjunction with an external 
one, a possible interconnection of the sensors with an electronic circuit, a memory unit 
and a source of power (battery in our case). The size of each node is not always the same 
even within the same network and its cost can vary a lot depending on its characteristics. 
Often, constraints on size and cost cause additional restrictions on resources such as 
energy, bandwidth and memory [100]. The topology of WSNs varies from a simple star 
network to a more advanced multi-hop wireless mesh network Routing or flooding may 
be the spread method between the network hops. The figures below, illustrate a 
characteristic simple star network and a multi-hop WSN. 
 
 




Figure 4: Characteristic multi-hop wireless sensor network [106] 
 
 
WSNs have many applications and among others, they are used widely in 




WSNs have many applications and among others, they are used widely in 
transportation, security, science and civil infrastructure [44]. Some interesting examples 
are surveillance, child education, machine health monitoring, environmental monitoring, 
micro-surgery and monitoring or studying natural phenomena (e.g. hurricanes, forest 
fires) [102][103][105]. Military applications like battlefield monitoring caused the 
expansion of WSNs [102][103][107]. A continuous tracking of an object, human or 
characteristic is detected in most of the monitoring applications.  
 
Security in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
The possible vulnerability of a WSN to attacks, causes the necessity for security 
measures. The major reason for that is the wireless nature of the network since physical 
access of the attacker is not necessary [108]. Security in WSNs is essential for guarding 
safety and privacy of sensitive data [109]. The main difficulty in network security is the 
nature of decision making. Protection strategies are used by nodes and network users in 
order to overcome security vulnerabilities. When users and nodes are taking autonomous 
decisions then a non-cooperative game is raised due to the fact that these decisions affect 
other users [45]. False information could be sent from malicious nodes to other nodes in 
the network or private data could be intercepted. These phenomena occur due to the 
absence of security in a network [110]. 
There are many reasons for which security in WSNs is complex. Firstly, wireless 
communications used by the sensors are easier to eavesdrop. Secondly, WSNs are not 
always secured physically and sometimes they can be located in an unsafe environment. 
Furthermore, for a network with many sensors, it would be difficult to defend each one 
from a natural disaster. The instability of a WSN is caused by a large number of different 
security threats that are invented by the attackers. Therefore, what is required is, firstly, 
data confidentiality which is the main subject in the network security. Secondly, data 
integrity, the property that ensures that received data is delivered unchanged and finally, 
availability which is the last among the most important security requirements. Although 
these three are the main requirements of the data security, authentication, data freshness, 
self-organization, time synchronization and secure localisation can also be considered for 




IDSs expand the standard of information security across traditional protective and 
reactive security. IDSs can monitor or even control WSNs and are crucial in detecting 
attacks in the latter and reinforce the growth of IPSs [42]. Monitoring and controlling the 
network, gives the opportunity to the administrator to react against many possible security 
issues. When attackers damage nodes or network resources or alter their behaviour, then 
this is considered an intrusion. IDSs are responsible to alarm outright when an attack is 
detected so that the operators can prepare their actions [101][111]. IDSs are usually 
categorised into rule based (or signature based) IDSs and anomaly-based ones. Although, 
rule based IDSs, detect accurately the well-known attacks since they have predefined 
rules for them, they are incapable of detecting new attacks where the signatures are not 
included in their database. On the other hand, anomaly based IDSs can detect new attacks 
apart from the well-known ones by monitoring traffic patterns or the utilization of 
resources [111][112].  
IPSs attempt to prevent attacks from entering the system or making the impact of 
the attack as mild as possible. IPSs that cooperate with an IDS or include such a 
mechanism, can be called Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) [113][114]. 
IPSs mostly use one of the following detection ways. Rule Based (or signature based), 
Anomaly Based or Protocol Analysis (comparison between observed activity and 
predetermined profiles of actions that are considered non-malicious) [115].  
Having presented the very basics on the security of WSNs, IDSs and IPSs, it has 
to be pointed out that in order for the defender to decide how to react against the detected 
attacks, a decision-making framework is essential. Game Theory has been proved to be a 
powerful scientific tool that could be used for analysing and modelling the decision-
making procedure in situations where antagonistic interests take place, such as an attack 
against a WSN where the attacker and the defender have, obviously, adversarial benefits. 






3.2.2 Proposed Models and Case Studies on WSNs 
 
 
As already mentioned, IDSs and IPSs are two fields of significant research 
development. In this section, the presentation of two models takes place, one for each of 
these categories. Firstly, there is an IDS and afterwards, two versions of an IPS, an 
iterated and a non-iterated one. 
 
3.2.2.1 Intrusion Detection System 
 
In this model, a game between the defender which could be the security team 
responsible for the seamless operation of a WSN that gathers data about the temperature 
of the area under monitoring and the attacker who randomly chooses which sensors to 
attack and tries to make the network transmit as much incorrect information as possible, 
is replicated. It should be noted that in this scenario, a compromised sensor cannot affect 
the other sensors in any way. Even if it needs to forward packages of an uncompromised 
sensor towards the base station, it is not possible to distort them before sending. Thus, 
considering that some sensors are attacked, all the remaining sensors, including the 
neighboring ones, will keep functioning properly, which is a realistic assumption.  
As in any game in strategic form, the players (attacker and defender in this case) 
have their adversarial strategies and the parameters that define them. Any possible 
combination of those generates a payoff for each of them. This particular game can be 
considered a two-player zero-sum one which means that only one player’s payoffs need 
to be specified since the other player’s payoffs will be the opposite ones. In addition, it is 
assumed to be a static, non-cooperative game, properties that were chosen due to their 
realism and applicability on the model.  
Since the defender needs to monitor a specific, predefined area, sensors have to 
be spread throughout the area of interest. The question that naturally rises is what the 
The content of this section addresses part of RQ2 by demonstrating how Game 
Theory can be used in order to build an IDS and an IPS that are applied on a 





density should be (i.e. number of sensors per area unit) that the defender should choose. 
Since the region under investigation is predefined, it is only the number of sensors that 
can affect this density. Hence, the number of sensors is part of the strategy of the defender 
and throughout the game the player should try to find the most beneficial number within 
a set of realistic choices.  
In addition, there is a significance coefficient for every sensor. This coefficient 
is proportional to the level of trust that is related to the information transmitted by this 
particular sensor. In other words, it reflects the trustworthiness that the network operators 
assign to every sensor and in a way, echoes the probability that the measurements 
provided by the sensor are indeed true. The reasons that this coefficient differs from 
sensor to sensor could be various. Firstly, it is depended on the kind of measurements that 
are taken. If, for example, it is the temperature under measurement, as in this case, then 
the spot that a sensor is placed on can affect the measurements. If the network is already 
set and has, even a small, history then those coefficients could be the outcome of an 
ongoing learning procedure and therefore reflect how trustworthy were the past 
measurements of each sensor. It is also worth mentioning that two sensors with identical 
specifications, operating within the same area can still report slightly different values due 
to structural features of the sensing elements. Although significance coefficients can 
affect the game, they are not something that the players can choose or change so they are 
not part of anyone’s strategy. 
Apart from this parameter, tolerance is also part of the defender’s strategy and it 
is a property of the whole network. Having defined untrusted / trusted / total 
information as the sum of significance coefficients of untrusted / trusted / all sensors, 
respectively, tolerance denotes the minimum portion of the total information that the 
untrusted information should be, in order for the latter to be believed by the defender. In 
other words, it denotes the minimum value that the following fraction can have in order 
for the incorrect information that has been injected into the network to be treated as 
correct. We call this fraction Attack Coefficient (AC): 
 








This is part of the defender’s strategy since he is the one to decide which piece of 
information is treated as valid. The choice of tolerance can directly affect players’ tactics 
due to formula (7) that we will see later on.  
Before AC can be of some use, some further aspects regarding the attacker’s 
behaviour need to be clarified. It is realistic to assume that the sensors, under normal 
circumstances and when they are not under attack, transmit information that although it 
can be slightly different from sensor to sensor, it does not change dramatically since all 
sensors measure the same characteristic of the same area. Thus, in order for an attack to 
have a point and a possibility of success as great as possible, it is realistic to assume that 
the attacker’s goal is to make a sensor transmit data that demonstrates noteworthy 
deviation from the data that uncompromised sensors transmit and at the same time, all 
compromised sensors transmit (erroneous) values that are very close to each other.  
 
At this point it is essential that some basic assumptions of the model are presented:  
 
1) Players are rational (i.e. they want to maximise their individual reward and 
they are considered risk-averse).  
2) Full area coverage is desired.  
3) Two sensors of the same network with identical specifications, operating 
under identical conditions can still report slightly different values.  
4) A compromised sensor cannot affect the information that other sensors 
transmit.  
5) The attacker’s goal is to make sensors transmit faulty values that demonstrate 
noteworthy deviation from the ones that uncompromised sensors transmit but 
still (faulty) values similar to each other (for the reasons explained before). 
Additionally, the attacker only affects the information transmitted and not the 
protocol itself. 
6) Compromised network is the network into which the injected faulty 
information is believed by the defender.  
 
Under those assumptions, the network operators try to take into account only the 




Therefore, if the attack coefficient is greater than tolerance then the incorrect information 
is considered to be accurate, correct data is disposed and the attempt for compromising 
the network is considered successful, which in turn increases attacker’s payoff. 
Otherwise, the network is not considered compromised, which implies a lower payoff for 
the attacker. Thus, the algorithm and, in turn, the defender can judge whether the network 
is under attack by the percentage of the believed information out of the total information 
which justifies its inclusion in the IDS category. Intuitively, tolerance should only be a 
value greater than 0.5 (50%) and of course less or equal to 1 (100%). In this way, the 
weighted information that will be ultimately “believed” by the defender will correspond 
to at least half of the total weight. Our goal is to help the defender choose the best options 
(i.e. options that will lead to the highest possible payoff for him) about the number of 
sensors that will constitute the network and the tolerance adopted.  
Since the only aspect that the attacker can affect is the number of sensors to attack, 
she will have to choose the most beneficial number of attacks within a set of realistic 
values for this purpose. Of course, every attack comes with a cost as is the case for the 
sensors, each of which comes with an obtaining and maybe installation cost. Therefore, 
it is not obvious which are the optimal strategies for both players and a game-theoretic 
approach would be enlightening.  
Now that the strategies have been described, although not explicitly defined yet, 
it is only the payoff function than remains to be presented. As expected, it is a function 
that is affected by the tolerance, the number of sensors that the defender decided to adopt 
and the number of attacks that the attacker decided to perform. This function denotes the 
payoff of the attacker and it is with the help of this function that a payoff matrix will be 
populated. The function for the attacker’s payoff (AP) is:  
 
 𝐴𝑃 = (
𝑖𝑠
𝑡𝑠
≥ 𝑡)  ∙  𝑟𝑐𝑛 + 𝑠 ∙  𝑐𝑝𝑠 − 𝑎 ∙  𝑐𝑝𝑎 + 𝑡 ∙  𝑡𝑐 (7) 
 
where, 𝑖𝑠 = incorrect sum (i.e. the sum of significance coefficients of the actually 
compromised sensors), 𝑡𝑠 = total sum (i.e. the sum of significance coefficients of all 
sensors), 𝑡 = tolerance, 𝑟𝑐𝑛 = reward for compromising the network, 𝑠 = number of 







≥ 𝑡) = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠               0  𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  (8) 
 
As the formula denotes, the attacker will only be rewarded with 𝑟𝑐𝑛 if she 
manages to compromise the network (𝑖𝑠/𝑡𝑠 ≥ 𝑡) which is equivalent to [(𝑖𝑠/𝑡𝑠 ≥ 𝑡) =
1], whereas she bears the cost of attacks, regardless their impact. Since the players are 
antagonistic, the attacker takes advantage of the defender’s expenses. Thus, everything 
that has a cost for the defender, like the total cost of sensors (𝑠× 𝑐𝑝𝑠) or the total tolerance 
cost (𝑡 × 𝑡𝑐) , is added to the attacker’s reward in formula (7). The necessity of tolerance 
cost lies in the fact that the greater the tolerance is, the greater part of the whole 
information, should be faulty in order for it to be “believed”. That motivates the attacker 
for a more comprehensive attack and therefore a less possible recovery by the operators 
of the network. Under this perspective, it could be preferable for the network to suffer a 
mild assault that will compromise the network temporarily, than risk suffering a massive 
one that will render it totally useless or unaffordable to be fixed. It should be noted that 
the payoff function has no units of measurement. It is just a necessary quantification of 
the advantage derived for each player due to the actions taken so that the problem can be 
solved and resembles the role of a utility function. 
It is worth noting that although the defender is not aware of which piece of 
information is compromised, he is still able to use the outcome of formula (7). In other 
words, although the defender cannot distinguish between correct and faulty data, he is 
aware of the payoff that he receives when both players choose specific strategies. 
Furthermore, there is a chance that (𝑐𝑠/𝑡𝑠) < (𝑖𝑠/𝑡𝑠) < 𝑡, where 𝑐𝑠 = correct sum. In 
this case, the compromised information will not be believed (although it is greater portion 
of the total information than the correct information is) and therefore no reward for 
compromised network is given to the attacker, which makes this situation relatively 
beneficial for the defender because although he will not be able to figure out which piece 
of information is correct and which not, he will be aware that he is under attack which 
gives him the option to not take any information from the sensors into account and 
therefore the attacker will not be awarded with 𝑟𝑐𝑛. Later on, this state will be called 







In order for the game to be solved the optimal strategies have to be found. In 
practice, those strategies are represented by the strategies that constitute the Nash 
Equilibria (pure ones in our case). As explained in previous chapter, the existence of such 
pure Nash Equilibria will also mean that there are specific strategies, not necessarily one 
dimensional, that the players can follow and if they do so, none of them will be tempted 
to unilaterally change their strategy. That implies that the game has a “steady state” 
[37][38]. These Nash Equilibria will be found in this section with a rather complex way 
since the defender has two parameters that affect his strategy which makes the latter, a 
two dimensional one.  
Since every strategy of the defender consists of a pair (m,n) where m is the number 
of sensors and n is the acceptable tolerance, it is not a typical case of game with two one-
dimensional strategy sets and a two-dimensional payoff matrix. One way for this to be 
tackled and thus for the optimal strategies to be found, is the procedure that is adopted in 
this project and also in [37][38], although in our case it is more complex. The procedure 
is as follows. Firstly, the number of sensors is quantified and takes values in a predefined 
set. In this case, the number of sensors varies from 500 to 600 which is considered a 
realistic number for large areas. After the number of sensors is specified, a significance 
coefficient is generated for each sensor. Two cases have been considered about these 
coefficients. According to the first one, they are all equal to each other and according to 
the second one they are assigned values that follow a predefined distribution. Two 
distributions will be examined as part of this scenario. The Uniform(1,4) and the 
Normal(2.5, 0.25). Uniform distribution was chosen because it expresses a random 
assignment of significance coefficients and Normal due to its popularity based on the 
frequency that this distribution is met in various phenomena. Both are commonly used to 
describe various elements of network activity [118][119]. More about the employment of 
their parameters will be mentioned in the results analysis. The model can be easily 
modified so that those values follow any other distribution. After the number of sensors 
and the significance coefficients have been set, we will be left with many “standard form” 
games with two one-dimensional strategy sets remaining and a two-dimensional matrix. 




project, the number of attacks lies in the interval from 400 to 600 while tolerance values 
vary from 0.55 to 0.9 or from 55% to 90%. The number of attacks takes values close to 
the ones of the number of sensors since it is realistic to assume that when an attacker 
wants to attack a network, she usually knows or can approximately estimate the number 
of sensors that comprise it and adapts the attacks accordingly. In the case where the 
number of attacks that the attacker decides to fire is greater than the sensors, it is assumed 
that all sensors are attacked. Of course, all of those attacks will bear the corresponding 
cost and not only the necessary ones. The following figure visualises the game for better 
observation of the reader. 
 
 
Figure 5: Visualized concept of the Intrusion Detection System, Sensor Weights not part of 
defender’s strategy 
 
In this figure, green colour denotes the parameters that are chosen by the defender 
and constitute his strategy (“Number of Sensors” and “Tolerance”) while orange is used 
for the parameter that is chosen by the attacker and constitute her strategy (“Attacks” 
which is the number of attacks performed). Sensor weights are the aforementioned 
significance coefficients of the sensors which can shape defender’s strategy, but their 
values are not chosen by the defender and therefore it is in grey colour. The 




all three scenarios for the values of significance coefficients (i.e. the significance 
coefficients being all equal to 1, following Uniform(1,4) and following Normal(2.5, 
0.25)). Since the latter is not part of the defender’s strategy, those three scenarios will be 
examined as individual cases.  
These parameters shape the values of Attacker′s Payoff (formula (7)) which 
populate Attacker′s Payoff Matrix that is seen in Figure 5. This is the matrix of the game, 
based on which we will later look for Nash Equilibria. 
The pseudocode of the approach that described above is the following: 
 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 
    𝑆𝐶(𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠) = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤⁄ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(1, 4) 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤⁄ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(2.5, 0.25) 
    𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
        − 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎 (7)        
         − 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑅(𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠)) 
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
𝑁𝐸 =  {𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠), ∀𝑠} 
𝐴𝑅(𝑁𝐸) = {𝐴𝑅(𝑛𝑒()), ∀ 𝑛𝑒() ∈ 𝑁𝐸} 
𝑁𝐸𝐺 =  {𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠) ∈ 𝑁𝐸 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐴𝑅(𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠)) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐴𝑅(𝑁𝐸)} } 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝐸𝐺 
 
where s is the number of sensors in the network, 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 are the minimum and 
maximum possible number of sensors, respectively, 𝑆𝐶() denotes the significant 
coefficient of deployed sensors, 𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠 is the Attacker’s Payoff Matrix (Figure 5) that 
occurred for 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 = 𝑠, 𝑛𝑒() is the Nash Equilibrium/a of a sub-game, 
𝐴𝑅(𝑛𝑒()) is the attacker’s reward that corresponds to 𝑛𝑒() and 𝑁𝐸𝐺 is the Nash 











Scenario 1: All significance coefficients are equal to 1 (all sensors equally trusted)  
 
Assuming that the following parameters that affect the model are assigned the 
values: Sensors: [500, 600], Tolerance: [0.55, 0.9], Attacks: [400, 600], 𝑟𝑐𝑛 = 10, 𝑐𝑝𝑎 = 
1.2, 𝑐𝑝𝑠 = 2.3, 𝑡𝑐 = 10 the plots below are derived. Those numbers can be considered 
realistic in a sense that the 𝑟𝑐𝑛 and 𝑡𝑐 should be indeed considerably higher than 𝑐𝑝𝑎 and 
𝑐𝑝𝑠 respectively in order to motivate the attacker to perform massive attacks to 
compromise the network and discourage the defender from employing very high 
tolerance that could more easily lead to the Middle State mentioned earlier (which 
although is considered relatively beneficial for the defender, as already explained, it is 
still not as good as having a properly working “healthy” network).  
In this section, we present our models’ simulation results visualized as a triple 
graph. 
As we know, for every possible number of sensors there is a different game that 
occurs. When this game has a pure Nash Equilibrium the attacker’s and defender’s 
strategy that constitute it can be found as well as the value of this particular game which 
is the payoff of the attacker when both players follow the aforementioned strategies. This 







Figure 6: Game Value (Attacker’s Payoff), Num. of Attacks and Tolerance for the NE that 
occurs for every 
 
We interpret the figure, bearing in mind that we help defender to take the best 
possible decision regarding the maximisation of his payoff. In this figure, we can see the 
Nash Equilibria of all the sub-games that occurred. The horizontal axis in all sub-graphs 
of the figure is the number of Sensors. A Nash Equilibrium can be seen, as a vertical line 
that goes through all three sub-figures. If (x,y1), (x,y2) and (x,y3) are the points that this 
line cuts the blue lines of sub-figures 1, 2 and 3 (starting from the upper one) respectively, 
that means that the best option for the defender would be to deploy x sensors and tolerance 
equal to y3 for the WSN. The best response to that for the attacker is to perform y2 attacks. 
That strategy would lead to a payoff for the attacker equal to y1. The pair (x,y3) represents 
the best strategy that the defender can choose in order to respond to attacker’s y2 strategy 
and vice versa. Since every vertical line that goes through all sub-figures is a Nash 




the least payoff for the attacker which is represented by y axis in the top sub-figure. Since 
the scope of the project is to help the defender make the optimal choices so the 
interpretation and exploitation will be made with respect to his interests. Therefore, given 
that the values of the first top sub-graph of the figure represent attacker’s benefit, the best 
decision for the defender is to opt for the number of sensors that will guarantee the least 
of those values. The least possible attacker’s payoff is 703.3 which is achieved when the 
defender deploys 511 sensors (x axis) in a WSN with tolerance equal to 0.8 (bottom sub-
figure) and the attacker performs 400 attacks (middle sub-figure). Thus, the defender’s 
optimal strategy is (x, y3) = (511, 0.8) and the optimal strategy for the attacker is y2 = 
400. This leads attacker’s payoff equal to 703.3. 
It should be noted that not all sub-games have a pure Nash Equilibrium and this 
is the reason behind the discontinuity of the graphs. Therefore, we conclude that when 
the number of sensors lies in the set S = [500, 511) U (533, 545) U (571, 583) the 
corresponding games have no pure Nash Equilibria. Although there is no pure Nash 
Equilibrium for the games with number of sensors that belong in the set S, there is a 
chance that the defender will receive even greater payoff if he chooses for a number of 
sensors in this set. But this payoff would be by no means guaranteed and given that all 
players are considered rational and therefore risk-averse, they should seek the Nash 
Equilibrium strategies that lead to the best guaranteed payoff.  
Based on the previous figure, one can see that no parameter of those three (i.e. 
Tolerance, Sensors and Attacks) can be changed unilaterally and lead to a better payoff. 
Indeed, if the optimal strategy set changes into another but the Number of Sensors 
remains unchanged, this will not lead into a better payoff because for this Number of 
Sensors the current Nash Equilibrium led to the optimal value of 703.3. If the Number of 
Sensors changes, then this will lead either to another Nash Equilibrium among the ones 
depicted and thus the Game Value will be reduced or to a game with no Nash Equilibrium 
that the defender should avoid because he is assumed risk averse due to his rationality. It 
is worth mentioning that this holds even if Number of Sensors and Tolerance change 
simultaneously which is possible since they co-create defender’s strategy. As a result, the 
vector (511, 0.8, 400) represents the Nash Equilibrium of the whole game and the 




This whole analysis will not be presented in all other examples for different 
distributions, but this logic is the same for all these cases.  
 
Scenario 2: Significance coefficients follow a predefined distribution 
 
In a similar way as in the previous scenario, similar figures with equivalent 
meaning will be created. Those are the following:  
 
Distribution: Uniform (1,4)  
For the following two cases, the values of the initial parameters (i.e. 𝑟𝑐𝑛, 𝑐𝑝𝑎, 
𝑐𝑝𝑠 and 𝑡𝑐) are the same as before.  
The multiple graph for the case where significance coefficients follow 
Uniform(1,4) distribution is: 
 
Figure 7: Game Value (Attacker’s Payoff), Num. of Attacks and Tolerance for the NE that 




Sig nificance coefficients were chosen to vary from 1 to 4 because variance in 
not expected to be too high among them since all sensors are in the same field. Following 
the same logic as in the case with equal significance coefficients, the number of sensors 
that the defender should choose is 503. This will lead to the optimal strategies: 400 attacks 
for the attacker and 0.85 tolerance for the defender. When these strategies are chosen, the 
payoff of the attacker will be equal to 685.4.  
 
Distribution: Normal (1,4)  
The multiple graph for the case where significance coefficients follow 
Normal(2.5, 0.25) distribution is: 
 
 
Figure 8: Game Value (Attacker’s Payoff), Num. of Attacks and Tolerance for the NE that 







In a similar fashion to the previous cases, the number of sensors that the defender 
should choose is 500. This will lead to the optimal strategies: 400 attacks for the attacker 
and 0.85 tolerance for the defender. When these strategies are chosen, the payoff of the 
attacker will be equal to 678.5.  
These numbers are very close to the case where the significance coefficients 
follow Uniform(1,4). That could partially be due to the fact that the Normal(2.5, 0.5) 
distribution takes values that belong to the interval [μ - 3σ, μ + 3σ] = [1, 4] with 
probability 99.7% [120] The mean and variance of Normal distribution were chosen that 
way so that a direct comparison with the case of Uniform distribution is possible. 
However, the change of those values usually changes the results only a little and 
especially the number of sensors.  
It should be taken into account that all the figures presented for all cases result 
from numerous iterations and that the last two models require the generation of random 
numbers which could lead to slightly different results every time those models are tested. 
It is worth noting that the points that constitute the optimal strategies in the final two 
figures are not easily observable because they are individual points. Below there is an 
aggregated table with all the results of this section. 
 
Table 3: Cumulative results for the Intrusion Detection System 
 
 
3.2.2.2  Intrusion Prevention System 
 
With so many possible kinds of data for collection by the sensors and assumptions 
regarding the attacks, the detection and/or defense mechanisms and even the operation of 
the WSN, it is obvious that the possible use cases are practically endless. For simplicity, 
it is assumed that the use case under investigation is similar to the previous one (i.e. 
wireless sensors that measure temperature and an attacker that tries to inject faulty data 




one, compared to the previous one, has some major differences that are demonstrated 
below, some elements are still the same. There are still a defender and an attacker where 
the first one owns or operates a WSN and the second one tries to undermine it. Since this 
is an IPS and not an IDS, it is assumed that detection of attacks is not an issue any more 
and all of them are known to the defender. As before, both the attacker and the defender 
have strategy sets that depend on some parameters. However, now both players have two 
parameters that define their strategies, unlike the previous case where the defender had 
two (number of sensors and tolerance) but the attacker had only one (number of attacks). 
The attacker can now choose the distribution (and its mean value) that the number of 
attacks will follow while the defender can choose the number of sensors that the network 
will consist of as well as the number of recoveries that will be made. It is important that 
the attacker does not choose the exact number of attacks but only the distribution and 
mean value that the amount of attacks will follow. The ability of the defender to recover 
compromised sensors is a critical change that causes severe differences to the way the 
model progresses and essentially demands a whole new approach do be designed and 
implemented. Finally, the acquisition and/or installation of the sensors, the recoveries and 
the attacks come with a cost and since there are adversarial interests involved, Game 
Theory is again an appropriate tool to be used.  
The games and sub-games presented in this section will be once more two-player, 
zero-sum, non-cooperative games but there will be two different versions. One of them 
will be the static (or one-shot) game version where, the game only consists of one round 
and the other one will be the iterated version where the game consists of a predefined 
number of rounds and every round starts from the state that the previous round was 
finished. Essentially, the first version is an instance of the second for one iteration.  
 
Non – iterated game 
 
As mentioned, this is a game comprised from a single round where the attacker 
has to choose the distribution (and its mean) that the number of attacks will follow while 
the defender has to choose the number of sensors that constitute the network and the 





The formula adopted for the attacker’s payoff is the following:  
 𝐴𝑃 = 𝑎 ∙  (𝑟𝑐𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐) + 𝑟 ∙  (𝑟𝑐𝑝𝑠 − 𝑟𝑐𝑠) + 𝑠 ∙  𝑠𝑐 + (
𝑎 − 𝑟
𝑠







≥ 𝑡 = {1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠0,                𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 (10) 
 
and 𝐴𝑃 = Attacker’s Payoff, 𝑎 = number of attacks, rcs = reward for compromising a 
sensor, 𝑎𝑐 = attack cost, 𝑟 = number of recoveries, 𝑟𝑐𝑝𝑠= recovery cost per sensor, 𝑟𝑐𝑠 = 
reward for compromised sensor, 𝑠 = number of sensors, 𝑠𝑐 = sensor cost and 𝑟𝑐𝑛 = reward 
for compromising the network. 
Both the number of attacks and number of recoveries are restricted within an 
interval of possible values. The term 𝑟𝑐𝑠 appears twice because every time a recovery 
takes place, the attacker’s reward per compromised sensor is essentially canceled.  
In this payoff formula, it is crucial that some prerequisites are met in order for the 
model’s solution not to be obvious. Firstly, if the term (𝑟𝑐𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐) is a positive one, then 
the more attacks the attacker would decide to do, the more her payoff would increase. 
Therefore, there would be no reason for her not to attack as many sensors as possible. 
Similarly, if the term (𝑟𝑐𝑝𝑠 – 𝑟𝑐𝑠) is negative then the more recoveries the defender would 
choose to do, the less payoff the attacker would receive and that would always lead to a 
solution which would impose that the defender should always perform as many recoveries 
as possible. Thus, the inequalities: 𝑟𝑐𝑠 < 𝑎𝑐  and  𝑟𝑐𝑝𝑠 > 𝑟𝑐𝑠 should hold in order for 
the optimal strategies to not be obvious. Although those ensure that the number of attacks 
and the number of recoveries will not always take their highest possible values, there 
should also be a reason that those parameters will not always receive their lowest possible 
values as well, otherwise the solution of the problem (i.e. its Nash Equilibrium) would be 










where the reward for compromised network will, obviously, be a positive number. This 
product, as part of the payoff function, motivates the attacker to opt for more and more 
attacks and the defender to opt for more and more recoveries while the previous properties 
push for the opposite. This does not mean that it is impossible for the solution of the 
problem to be found to force one or both of those variables to take their highest or lowest 
possible values. It is just not obvious, from a mathematical perspective, that something 
like this would always happen when the aforementioned requirements are met. From now 
on, this set of requirements will be referred to as Requirements for Non-Obvious Solution 
(RNOS). 
 
Procedure Outline of the Non-Iterated Game 
 
In this section, the whole procedure of finding the optimal strategies for the game 
described above is outlined and the pseudocode is presented. It is not possible for the 
method that was followed in the intrusion detection system to be adopted in this case also, 
before some necessary changes that address the specificities of the problem take place.  
Initially, the intervals that the involved parameters lie in should be defined. In the 
version that the results demonstrated later are based on, the number of sensors can take 
values between 200 and 400, the number of attacks takes values between 10 and 120 and 
the number of recoveries is valued between 1 and 70. The range of the number of attacks 
matters, although not part of the strategy, because this range denotes the capabilities of 
the attacker. Due to that, the mean values of all the distributions will fall in the same range 
as the number of attacks. The distributions of the number of attacks are Normal, 
Exponential and Poisson. 
The method behind finding the Nash Equilibrium in this game is the same as in 
the IDS section although now there is one more dimension in the strategies, because the 
attacker has two parameters that affect her strategies instead of one, and it is probably 
less obvious than before that the solution found in this way is indeed a Nash Equilibrium. 







The desirable outcome will be a result of the following algorithm:  
• Initially, the variable that denotes the number of sensors iterates through the 
whole interval of possible values (from the minimum to the maximum).  
• For every possible number of sensors, the (nominal) variable that denotes the 
followed strategy iterates through the set of possible strategies (i.e. Normal, 
Exponential, Poisson). 
• For all the above parameters fixed, it is only the parameter of mean values and 
the one that represents the recoveries that are still unspecified. With only those 
two parameters still free to take their permitted values, the game will be solved 
and any possible Nash Equilibria will be found. The payoff that corresponds 
to the combination of specific values for recoveries and distribution/mean, 
occurs as follows. For every possible distribution, a variable that denotes the 
mean of the already chosen distribution iterates through the possible values 
and for every possible mean number, there are 5 random generated numbers 
that are generated in a way that they follow the already fixed distribution with 
the fixed mean.  
• The Nash Equilibria that were found by the said algorithm are then plotted in 


















The figure below is demonstrated in order to clarify things more for the reader. 
 
 
Figure 9: Visualized concept of the Non-Iterated Intrusion Protection System, Number of 
attacks not part of attacker’s strategy 
 
Before the aforementioned plots are demonstrated, the pseudocode of the 
algorithm previously described is given.  
 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐷 ∈ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = {𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙, 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙} 
        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 
            − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠(𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, … ,5 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐷(𝑚) 
            − 𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠(𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, … ,5 𝑏𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 "𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠" 
            𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 
                − 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎 (9) 
                − 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑅(𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠)) 
        𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 





𝑁𝐸 =  {𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠), ∀𝑠} 
𝑁𝐸𝐺 =  {𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠) ∈ 𝑁𝐸: 𝐴𝑅(𝑛𝑒(𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑠)) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐴𝑅(𝑁𝐸)} } 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝐸𝐺 
 
where, MeanValues is the set of all possible mean values and is described later on. By 
D(m) we mean that the variable follows distribution D with mean m. In the case of Normal 
distribution, there is also variance (σ2) needed but is omitted from the pseudocode for 
simplicity. However, it is taken into account in the execution of the real code. That 
variance remains unchanged through the model and has been chosen in a way such that 
all the values that are generated and follow N(m,σ2) lie within the defined range. In 
addition, the procedure of generating attacks has been designed in a way such that 
{𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐷(𝑚𝑖)}⋂ {𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐷(𝑚𝑗)} = ∅, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, ∀ 𝐷 ∈
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠. 
 
Results of the Non-iterated Game 
 
The plots depicted below were derived when the model run for the following 
prices: Sensors: [200, 400], Recoveries: [1, 70], Distribution of number of attacks: 
Normal, Poisson, Exponential, rcs = 1.5, ac = 3, Mean values created per distribution = 
5, rcps = 5, sc = 4, rcn = 2000, t = 0.5, Attacks: [10, 120]. Apart from being proportionally 
realistic to each other, those numbers also meet all the Requirements for Non-Obvious 
Solutions (RNOS) that apply on them. Interpretation of Figure 10 is almost identical to 
the one of 
Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8. The only difference is that there are now all three 
distributions in the same figure. Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium of this game will be the 
one that leads to the minimax price (i.e. the minimum price out of the highest possible 
ones) of “Value”. Given that every vertical line that goes through all sub-figures is a Nash 
Equilibrium of the game and (x,y1i), (x,y2i), (x,y3i), i ∈ {Normal, Poisson, Exponential} 
are the 9 points that this line cuts sub-graphs 1, 2 and 3 then if the defender chooses a 
specific number of sensors x, the attacker will choose as a response, out of points {(x,y1i), 




Poisson, Exponential}} is achieved. Thus, assuming that (x, y1i) are the points that the 
vertical line that goes through x cuts all graphs of the first sub-figure, the defender should 
choose x for which minx{maxy1{ordinate(x, y1i)}} is achieved. The strategies that 
correspond to the points found that way, form the Nash Equilibrium of the whole game 
since they follow the definition of Nash Equilibrium mentioned earlier. 
By choosing the strategies in that way the resulting strategies form the set 
(Number of Sensors, Number of Recoveries, Distribution, Mean) = (200, 1, Exponential, 
92.5) with a attacker’s payoff equal to 780.1. For the same reasons as in the previous 
model, the whole game cannot have a Nash Equilibrium with Different number of 
Sensors. Considering that variable fixed, a unilateral change of strategies would mean 
one of the following:  
 
Case 1  
A change in the Number of Recoveries that will lead to non - Nash Equilibrium 
which is to be avoided by rational players;  
 
Case 2  
A change in the Distribution that will lead to an already plotted Nash Equilibrium 
which, given that the number of sensors is still 200, will not lead to an attacker’s payoff 
greater than 780.1;  
 
Case 3  
A change in the mean value which will not lead to Nash Equilibrium; or finally 
 
Case 4  
A simultaneous change of the Distribution and the mean value (that is possible 
because those two together constitute attacker’s strategy) which will lead either to a 
plotted Nash Equilibrium with attacker’s payoff less than 780.1 or to no Equilibrium at 
all. The reasoning behind all those was explained in the IDS section.  
To sum up, the vector of strategies (Number of Sensors, Number of Recoveries, 
Distribution, Mean) = (200, 1, Exponential, 92.5) is a Nash Equilibrium because no 




advised strategy to the defender is to employ 200 sensors and almost no recoveries (only 
one). Obviously, these results would be different if the parameters were given different 
values, as well. 
 
 





The iterated version of the game is practically the same as the previous one, with 
only some small differences due to the fact that it is repeated for many rounds. The payoff 
function for the attacker is now: 
 
 𝐴𝑃 = 𝑡𝑎 ∙  (𝑟𝑐𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐) + 𝑡𝑟 ∙  (𝑟𝑐𝑝𝑠 − 𝑟𝑐𝑠) + 𝑠 ∙  𝑠𝑐 + (
𝑐𝑠𝑒
𝑠





where 𝑡𝑎 = total attacks, 𝑡𝑟 = total recoveries, 𝑐𝑠𝑒 = compromised sensors, after final 
round (for all three of them) and all the other variables are the same as in the non-iterated 




≥ 𝑡 = {1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠0,                𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 (13) 
 
 Total attacks and total recoveries are defined as follows: 
 










where 𝑛 is the predefined number of rounds. The procedure outline and therefore its 
pseudocode, is the same as in the non-iterated model with the difference that now the 
beginning state of every round (i.e. the number of compromised and uncompromised 
sensors) is the ending state of the previous one. The optimal strategies will be of the same 
form as in the non-iterated game (i.e. a single value for optimal number of attacks and a 
single value for optimal number of recoveries), because both of strategies are decided in 
the beginning of the game and remain the same for all rounds. What this game-theoretic 
approach helps us find is the optimal strategy for the players to follow in order to have 
the best possible outcome at the end of the game. We can therefore say that even the 
iterated game is a static one although in a repeated form. 
 
Results of the Iterated Game 
 
For all the same parameter values as in the non-iterated scenario and for 20 
iterations, the following figure depicts the results. Even 𝑟𝑐𝑛 remained the same although 
it is now more difficult for an intruder to compromise a network, but this happened so 






Figure 11: Game Value (Attacker’s Payoff), Mean values and Number of Recoveries of the 
Nash Equilibria 
 
Following the same way of interpreting this figure, the defender would be advised 
to employ 200 sensors and make just one recovery per round (the least possible amount). 
That would lead to a payoff for him equal to -2542 (attacker’s payoff is depicted and it is 
a zero-sum game).  
 
Below there is, again, an aggregated table with all the results of this section. 
 







Comments on the results 
 
Judging from the top sub-graph of Figure 10, it can be concluded that all 
distributions appear to have almost the same behaviour. The way that the parameters were 
set, seems to have great impact on the behaviour of both players. In particular, the attacker 
does not seem motivated enough to try to compromise the network since this target is not 
plausible enough. Additionally, it is also the fact that the whole game lasts for just one 
round that renders the attacker’s target of compromising the network rather improbable. 
Even if Normal Distribution (that seems to have the greatest mean of attacks) is adopted, 
the result is disappointing due to the high number of recoveries. Exponential and Poisson 
distributions, despite their relatively high mean of attacks, do not manage to compromise 
the network and their payoff value remains a lot lower than 2000 which would be the 
reward for this achievement.  
A one round game may seem doomed, but one would expect that this would not 
be the case for the 20-round game. And things do change for all distributions since they 
all end up with payoffs for the attacker above 2000, which is an indication of a 
compromised network because this payoff would be difficult to be raised otherwise. The 
relatively high number of mean values for all distributions and low value of recoveries 
(with the exception of Exponential which scores a little less in the end) in conjunction 
with the duration of 20 rounds make attackers motivated enough. However, it should not 
be forgotten again that mean values are not necessarily equal to the actual number of 
attacks.  
The reason that both models are included in the project is that comparison can be 
made and conclusions can be drawn about the way the players react based on the number 
of the rounds they are allowed to have. In this case, this parameter had a major role in the 
outcome although 𝑟𝑐𝑛 remained the same in both cases 
 
3.2.3 Validation in a Cluster-Based Deployment 
 
In this section, we conduct a number of experiments to validate both the IPS and 
the IDS utilising the clustering facilities offered by SensomaX which allows us to validate 




SensomaX [121][122] is an agent-based WSN middleware, which supports 
concurrent execution of multiple applications, integrates different mechanisms for 
different operational paradigms, and facilitates application developers with a component-
based architecture for seamless development process. SensomaX is written in Java and 
was modified to be used on various java-enabled hardware devices such as the Raspberry 
Pi. One its features  is a hierarchical communication mechanism, which abstracts the 
network into logical regions with exclusive functionalities. In SensomaX, each 
application is allocated a region according to its needs, whilst resources in the same region 
can be utilised by other applications simultaneously.  However, each application’s 
concurrent utilisation of the network resources is completely invisible to other 
applications. Such capability could also create a multi-tier and collaborative execution 
environment where multiple applications’ interaction using the same set of hardware 
resources is necessary. 
Using SensomaX, end-user applications physically interact with the network 
through a gateway. In the gateway, there exists a layer known as the Assessment Layer 
with a principle component called the Agent Examiner (AE). This layer provides a simple 
XML parsing tool in order to split the application requirements and label them with their 
relevant application sources. In the next step, those requirements submitted by different 
applications are processed and broken down into a single or multiple agents, based on 
their demands and complexity. This sort of top-layer processing is the result of two 
components’ coordination: Task Engine and System configuration. 
In all our experiments, both models (IDS and IPS) were programmed as two 
separate applications in every sensor node. Those two applications can be executed 
concurrently in order to detect and prevent attacks, whilst sensor nodes are carrying out 
their normal operation and meeting the requirements of their given task. The application 
itself resides in a single node, known as the Cluster-Head, where all the top-level 
executions happen. The IDS and IPS applications (i.e. model logic) are present in every 
sensor node, whilst being executed only in the Cluster-Heads.  
For the first phase of our experiment a network of 600 virtual nodes was created 
in SensomaX Companion Simulator (SXCS) [123], incorporating 30 clusters, each 
containing 20 nodes. As a way of a sensing application, all nodes were programmed to 




containing 600 nodes without any clustering mechanism was also created to report false 
temperature readings. Each experiment reported in this section was repeated 100 times to 
gain the average values. Figure 12(a) demonstrates the average number of attacks 
required before detection. For a 510-node network, the average number of attacks is 398. 
This result is on par with the results reported in  
Figure 6, given the standard deviation, which covers the 400 attacks reported 
earlier. Figure 12(b) depicts the number of nodes required for the IPS model to operate 
successfully based on a variable number of attacks. The results reported in this figure are 
also relatively on par with the results reported in Figure 11 given the standard deviation 
around the mean values. The impact on the energy consumption of the network is depicted 
at Figure 12(c).  
 
 
Figure 12: (a), (b) IDS’s & IPS’s required number of nodes vs. number of attacks, respectively, 
(c) Impact of IDS & IPM on energy consumption 
 
3.2.4 Validation in an IPv6-Based Deployment 
 
In this section we make use of Cooja [124], the network simulator distributed with 
the Contiki Operating System for the Internet of Things. Within Cooja, we simulate an 
IPv6-based wireless sensor network. Network nodes use IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless 
Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [125] and the Routing Protocol for Low Power and 




sources, distributed in a 200x200 grid. Node distribution is entirely random, with the only 
limitation being that all sources must have a network path to the sink. We choose to 
simulate a network of 40 nodes in order to achieve full area coverage, as is the assumption 
in the model. We use 10 different random topologies and for each topology we repeat the 
experiment 10 times using a new random seed for each iteration.  
In the remainder of the section, we use the following notation: n is the index of a 
node, 𝑁 = {𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ 𝑍 +∧ 𝑛 ≤ 40}, 𝐶 = {𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∧ 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑}, 𝑡 is the 
defender’s chosen tolerance, 𝐷𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 is the degree of node n discussed below, 𝑆𝑛: 𝑛 ∈
𝑁, is the significance of node n, also discussed below. In the model, the choice of node 
significance is based on a random distribution. In our simulations, we model node 
significance as a function of network density. We first calculate the node degree 𝐷𝑛 for 
each network device, which is calculated as the number of other network nodes within 
communication range. The significance 𝑆𝑛for node n is subsequently calculated as 𝑆𝑛 =
max({𝐷𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁})/𝐷𝑛. 
Thus, 𝑆𝑛corresponds to the maximum node degree observed in the network, 
divided by the node’s own degree. Since, all nodes in the network have a path to the sink, 
they have at least one other node within communication range. Hence, 𝐷𝑛> 0 and the 
significance calculation’s denominator is always non-zero. This way, nodes in dense 
areas will have lower significance, while nodes in sparse areas will have a high one. That 
is because the network is used to gather sensory information about an environmental 
parameter in a geographical region. Even between two identical devices, measurements 
are likely to be slightly different due to manufacturing inaccuracies and slight fluctuations 
of environmental parameters even within the same area. Thus, in an area where multiple 
nodes are reporting, each node’s measurement will be of lower significance, whereas in 
a sparse area where only a few nodes are reporting, it will bear more weight.  
According to the model, the optimal attacker strategy is to compromise 78.27% 
of the total number of nodes in the network (400 out of 511). With this in mind, in each 
experiment the attacker compromises a random set of 31 nodes ( |𝐶| = 31). Furthermore, 
defender’s optimal strategy is to select tolerance level T = 0.85. An attack is successful if 
the defender believes the erroneous value to be accurate and this is only true if 






Figure 13: Network set-up in Cooja 
 
Figure 13 illustrates an instance of the network set-up in Cooja. Figure 14 
illustrates the densities of the ten network deployments under investigation. For all 
deployments, the minimum node degree 𝐷𝑛 was between 1 and 3, whereas maximum 
node degree was between 7 (topology 1) and 13 (topologies 3 and 5).  
Figure 15 illustrates attack coefficients for each iteration. Across the entire 
experiment set the attacker was successful only three times. For all other iterations’ 
detection was possible. The three successful attacks were observed in topologies 3 and 5, 
i.e. the ones with the highest network density. This suggests there may be a relation 







Figure 14: Topology densities 
 
Figure 15: Attack Coefficients per experiment 
 
3.2.5 Findings and Conclusions  
 
In this work, we demonstrated how Game Theory can be used to detect and 
prevent intrusions in WSNs. The proposed models, which are applicable on a wide range 
of use cases, including IoT applications, smart metering and others, were also validated 
using two methods of validation. The first validation method used SensomaX while the 
second one used Cooja with which the effectiveness of the IDS in an IPv6-connected 
network of smart objects was investigated. In both validation cases, the results confirmed 
the ones of the analytical models. 
Another idea for future improvement is to extend the model in order to include 
forecasting, applied on the iterated game with multiple rounds. By fixating the parameters 
and running the aforementioned iterated game for many different numbers of rounds, we 
could apply forecasting methods in order to make an approximation of a player’s payoff, 
given the number of iterations. Furthermore, we aim to investigate its applicability on 




3.3  Critical Infrastructure – Industrial Control Systems (CI-ICSs) 
 
In this section there are some novel approaches about systems’ security and risk 
management applied on CI-ICSs. The presented use cases are categorised, according to 
the tools they use, to those that i) combine VSM and Game Theory, ii) use Monte Carlo 
predictive modelling or iii) combine Game Theory and Epidemiology. Details of these 
models are presented below. 
 
3.3.1 CI-ICSs Security using VSM and Game Theory 
 
Traditional cyber-security risk management methods are based on the evaluation 
of risk which is affected by the likelihood of cyber-security incidents occurring [127], 
[128]. However, these probabilities are usually estimations or guesses based on past 
experience or incomplete sets of data [129]. Incorrect estimations can lead to errors in the 
evaluation of risks that can ultimately affect the protection of the system. This is inherited 
to risk management methods used in ICSs, as they are mainly adaptations of such 
traditional approaches. Additionally, conventional methods fail to adequately address the 
increasing threat environment and the highly interdependent critical nature of ICSs, while 
proposed methods by the research community are yet far from providing a solution [19], 
[130]–[132]. The importance of managing securely ICS infrastructures is growing, as 
they are systems embedded in critical national infrastructure (e.g. city traffic lights 
controls) and thus an emerging attractive target for organized cyber criminals and 
terrorists. In this section, we present two novel approaches that combine Stafford Beer’s 
VSM [133] with Game Theory in order to develop a risk management process that 
addresses the above issues. The model we develop provides a holistic, cost-efficient 
cyber-security solution that takes into account interdependencies of critical components 




3.3.1.1  VSM on CI-ICSs - Case study 1 
 
 
For the purposes of our research we utilised the VSM to capture the relationships 
between the cyber components of an ICS and also those between the components of 
different ICSs. In that way, after the identification of the cyber components within the 
ICS, we assess the value of each component, taking into account the cascading effect of 
its failure to the rest of the components, within both the same and different ICSs. 
Assessing the value of each component through its interconnections helps us identify the 
impact of having it disrupted or destroyed.  
In order to model the interconnections, we adopt an agent-based approach. Each 
cyber component is modelled as an agent characterised by its market price, its input and 
output connections with other cyber component agents and with the environment, the type 
of its function in correspondence with the VSM structure (System 1, System 2 etc.) and 
the VSM level that it belongs according to its recursive feature. Figure 16 depicts how a 
cyber component within an ICS is modelled.  
In order to compute each component’s value, we have to answer the following 
questions: 
• What is the initial market price of the component? 
• Which VSM Level does it belong to? 
• Which other ICSs is it indirectly connected to? 
• What is its role (System x) within the VSM (operational unit, coordination 
unit, auditing unit etc.)? 
• How many environmental entities does it take input from?  
• How many entities in its environment does it provide output to?  
• How many other cyber components does it take input from?  
• How many other cyber components does it provide output to?  
 
The content of this section addresses part of RQ2 by expanding on our approach 
that combines VSM and Game Theory in order to provide cost-efficient defence 






Figure 16: An ICS Cyber Component 
 
Answering those questions for every cyber component, provides us with a way to 
determine their importance to the whole system. The number of total connections and the 
importance of the component’s role form a factor, which multiplied by the initial market 
price of the component returns the ultimate value of the component. The VSM level refers 
to the recursion level that the cyber component belongs to and provides information on 
its purpose within the ICS and the way it affects other ICSs. For example, a 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), which is a control device used in many ICSs, is 
an operational unit (System 1) within a VSM of level n. Along with other field devices it 
may compose the production department of a power production station. The production 
department itself is the operational unit within a VSM of level n-1. Along with the other 
departments it may construct the organisational structure of the power production 
company. Considering this structure as a VSM of level 1, we now have n-1=1. Therefore, 
the PLC belongs to a VSM of level n=2. A power plant in its turn affects other ICSs since 
it provides the electricity they need to function. Therefore, the PLC has a level 2 effect 
on other ICSs. The magnitude of this effect is proportional to the role of the PLC (System 
1) and the number of other devices with the same role in the same VSM level. The 
quantification of the role of each cyber component depends on the enterprise’s perception 
of each role’s importance. A quite simplistic yet acceptable, at this point of our work, 




characteristics: Value = (Market price) x (Number of connections) x (Effect on other 
ICSs) x (Role of the cyber component), where, Effect on other ICSs = (Role of the cyber 
component) / (Number of devices with the same role and VSM level)  
To demonstrate how we embed GT in our model, we present a game scenario 
where an attacker (e.g. a hacker) plans an attack against a critical infrastructure (e.g. a 
power supply plant) while a defender (e.g. plant’s operators) is responsible for the best 
possible protection under limited resources (e.g. funds). The possible scenarios are 
practically endless. Below, we will examine a use case where a PLC device is under 
attack. The attacker and the defender can be considered as players, the whole scenario as 
a game and all their possible actions as strategies.  
Due to the structure of the model, in order for a game-theoretical tool to be used, 
those strategies have to be identified, their impact has to be assessed and finally their 
probabilistic interdependencies to be evaluated. These steps are no other than 
Threat/Vulnerability Identification, Threat/Vulnerability Assessment and Risk 
Evaluation, respectively; steps that constitute the Risk Assessment of our scenario. As 
the outcome will be the proposal of specific strategies for the players, it is an integrated 
Risk Management use case.  
The parameters that define attacker’s strategies are the adoption or not of 
espionage, the core security attribute that the attack aims at (Confidentiality, Integrity or 
Availability), the inveteracy of the vulnerability that the attack targets at (less than one 
year which describes a zero-day threat or more than one year), the level of difficulty of 
the attack’s detection (very difficult in case of multiple zero-day threats, difficult in case 
of a single zero-day threat or easy in case of attacks with older than one year threats) and 
the level of difficulty of the attack’s recovery (very difficult if it requires a hardware 
replacement, difficult if it requires a system patch or easy otherwise). Similarly, the 
parameters that define defender’s strategies are the employment or not of a Research and 
Development (R&D) department for security problems, the frequency that the patches 
are applied with (yearly, more than a year or never) and the existence or not of an IDS. 
Let’s assume a scenario where the cyber asset under attack is a PLC device. We 
assume that the market price of the PLC along with its installation is 15000, the number 
of connections within the ICS is three, a sensor that feeds it with data, a mechanical 




Data Acquisition (SCADA) server that connects the PLC with the Control Centre. Its role 
is to control (System 3) the valve in the VSM level 3 and operate as a unit (System 1) in 
VSM level 2. Due to its dual purpose the value of the asset is increased by two. In this 
work we will exclude the effect of interdependencies with other ICSs but this is something 
that can be added in future. Thus, the ultimate value of the PLC is: Value = 15000 ×3×2 
= 90000. The rest values attached to the parameters, presented in Table 5, represent our 
perception of the specific problem and can be easily adapted to the needs of any ICS.  
Apart from the strategies, there are also the rewards of each player that need to be 
defined for any possible combination of strategies. Below are the formulas employed for 
attacker’s rewards. We assume that the reward of a player is the loss of the other (zero-
sum game), therefore the identification of one player’s rewards is sufficient. 
 







Figure 17: Flowchart of probabilities of successful attack 
 




Gain = Value of Asset × Security Attribute × Probability of Successful Attack  
(for Probability of Successful Attack given by Figure 17.)  
 
Cost of Defence = R&D + Patch Frequency + IDS  
Cost of Healing = Difficulty of Recovery 
Cost of Attack = Espionage + Inveteracy of Vulnerability × Difficulty of Detection 
  
Taking also into consideration the following assumptions:  
• Attack against C cannot be very difficult to recover  
• Zero-day attack cannot be easy to detect  





and adding also the case of not attacking within the strategies of the attacker’s strategies 
(the case of not defending is already included in the defender’s strategies and it is 
equivalent to adopting no defence mechanisms out of the proposed ones), we end up with 
a 43×12 table of rewards. The game is solved by identifying its Nash Equilibria, which is 




This game was found to have two Nash Equilibria that are presented in the format:  
A: (Attack, Espionage, Core Attribute, Inveteracy of Vulnerability, Difficulty of 
Detection, Difficulty of Recovery) 
D: (R&D, Patch Frequency, IDS)  
 
The Nash Equilibria are:  
A: (Yes, No, Integrity, 1 Year, Very Difficult, Very Difficult)  
D: (Yes, > 1 Year, No) and  
 
A: (Yes, No, Availability, 1 Year, Very Difficult, Very Difficult),  
D: (Yes, > 1 Year, No)  
 
Both lead to a payoff of 174,600 for the attacker, which is equivalent to 174,600 
loss for the defender under our assumptions.  
 It is worth mentioning that if the three aforementioned assumptions had not been 
implemented, then we would have ended up with a larger table of rewards and thus, 
maybe with even more Nash Equilibria. However, these Nash Equilibria would be based 
on unrealistic requirements and we would therefore exclude them anyway. 
 
Findings and Conclusions  
 
This work presents a novel approach towards cyber security risk management in 
ICSs. Combining the VSM with GT we created a method that provides cost-efficient 




ICS. The proposed method requires the modelling of the ICS’s cyber components as 
agents that represent systems in the VSM structure. In this way we quantify the criticality 
of an asset through its interconnections to other components. Then we construct a game 
between the attacker and the defender in order to compute the most cost-efficient 
strategies of both, when they compete upon each cyber component. Our model is generic 
and can be applied on many ICSs, regardless of its nature and function. Nevertheless, it 
can be further enhanced covering a wider range of defence and attack strategies, while 
validation against real data is also required. 
 
3.3.1.2  VSM on CI-ICSs - Case Study 2 
 
 
Similar to the previous one, this model approaches an ICS as a VSM, as well. 
Each component within the system is represented as part of a VSM and carries the 
characteristics and connections that correspond to its particular purpose within the 
system. Thereby, the system can be modelled as an aggregation of interdependent VSM 
components with specific characteristics that contribute to the system’s viability. The 
viability of the ICS is defined through a system of weighted components connected 
through weighted links. The weights in both cases reflect the purpose of the element in 
the VSM or in other words its importance to the system. Subsequently, we define the 
strategies of the two adversaries, extending the work of Levitin and Hausken [134], 
maintaining their systemic nature so that we can provide defence strategies against 
unknown threats. Eventually, we develop a two-player, zero-sum game with pure 
strategies. The defender’s objective is to minimise the impact of a cyber-attack while 
minimising the security costs regardless of the attacker’s move. This is achieved by 
following a strategic plan that represents the Nash Equilibrium of the game.  
The content of this section addresses part of RQ2 by thoroughly presenting a novel 
approach that combines VSM with Game Theory in order to develop a risk 
management process which provides a holistic, cost-efficient cyber-security 
solution that takes into account interdependencies of critical components as well 





The VSM of ICS 
  
Figure 18 presents an architectural block diagram of a typical ICS. The system is 
divided into three sections. The first part consists of the field devices, including devices 
used to control mechanical processes or transfer data from and to other devices (e.g.  
PLCs - that control the speed of a motor, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) that exert 
wireless control on operations etc.). The second part forms the control centre, which 
exerts control on the field devices. It communicates with the field devices and includes 
operator workstations also known as Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), data historians, 
databases etc. Finally, the third part of an ICS represents the outer world with which the 
system communicates.  
In order to show how the various parts of an ICS can collectively form a VSM, 
we examine a simplified ICS version which includes three operations: 1) the control and 
monitoring of the speed of a motor, 2) the remote control and monitoring of a waste 
disposal unit and 3) the voltage control on a specific instrument used within the ICS. 
Figure 19 shows how this example can be presented as a VSM. As we see, the three 
operations are managed by a PLC, an RTU, an Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) and 
their corresponding sensors. Those elements form the components/operational units of 
System 1. Those components are controlled by the Control Centre which is an aggregation 
of machines (data historians, shared resources, HMIs etc.) that help controlling the 
various field devices. Therefore, the Control Centre forms System 3. The communication 
between the Control Centre and the field devices is managed through the control network 
and the use of a SCADA server. Therefore, the SCADA server forms System 2. The HMIs 
within the Control Centre are responsible for auditing the system. Thus, they play the role 
of System 3∗. Lastly, System 4 and 5 are realised through the Forward Planning Direction 
of the organisation and the Management Board respectively.  
 
Measuring Viability  
 
According to the VSM the viability of the system depends on its subsystems; the 
performance of each subsystem affects the whole system’s viability. Therefore, to 




(S2, S3, S3∗, S4, S5 and operational units within S1 are considered as elements) within 
the system identifying (based on the VSM representation in Figure 19) the way 
interdependencies affect it.  
We consider the performance of each element as gradual taking values from 0 (the 
element has stopped functioning) to x (the higher is x the better is the performance of the 
element). Its value depends on the element’s functional capability, which refers to its 
performance before we take into account interconnections (normally this is equal to 1, 
“optimal performance”; values less than 1 would indicate some malfunction), and its 
connection to other elements (each connection is weighed from 0 to 1 according to its 
significance to the element’s performance).  
 
 








Figure 19: The VSM of an example ICS 
 
Performance of Operational Units within System S1 
  
Figure 20 emphasises on the interdependencies between an operational unit and 
the other systems within the VSM (it has to be noted that there is no communication 
between operational units in this level). A weight is assigned to each connection 
according to its significance to the unit’s performance. Additionally, a performance value 
is assigned to each connected system. Based on that, Equation (16) calculates the 
performance of the unit taking into account its functional capability, its dependencies on 
other systems (𝑆2, 𝑆3, 𝑆3∗ and the environment) within the VSM and the performance of 






Figure 20: Dependencies of an operational unit 
 





PU stands for the unit’s performance and FCU represents its functional capability. 
𝐸𝑖 represents the input from environmental groups (under normal conditions this is 
considered equal to 1; values less than 1 would indicate issues in the connection with the 
environment), βi is the weight assigned to the specific environmental input, σ is the 
significance of the total environment to the unit and n is the total number of environmental 
groups that communicate with the unit. 𝑃𝑆2 represents the performance of System 2 that 
coordinates the unit’s communication within the VSM with weight 𝜆, 𝑃𝑆3 stands for the 
performance of System 3 that controls the unit with weight 𝜃 and 𝑃𝑆3∗ is the performance 
of the System 3∗ that audits the unit with weight 𝛿. The coordination, control, and audit 
weights denote the significance of those functions to the performance of the unit. All 




Taking into account that 𝑆3 and 𝑆3∗ cannot communicate with 𝑆1 without the 𝑆2, 
and also that 𝑆3 (for control) and 𝑆3∗ (for monitoring) are essential for 𝑆1’s operation, 
Equation (16) can be simplified in: 
 





Performance of System 2  
 
Since System 2 is responsible for the connection of operational units in 𝑆1 to the 
rest of the VSM. Its performance does not depend on other systems; it relies solely on the 
element’s functional capability and is described by Equation (18)  
 
 𝑃𝑆2 = 𝐹𝐶𝑆2 (18) 
 
where 0 ≤ 𝐹𝐶𝑆2 ≤ 1 represents the functional capability of System 2.  
 
Performance of System 3  
 
The ability of System 3 to monitor and control the operations within System 1 
depends on its connection to 𝑆1 that is coordinated by 𝑆2 and audited by 𝑆3∗, and its 
communication with 𝑆4. Thus, the performance of System 3 can be described by Equation 
(19)  
 
 𝑃𝑆3 = 𝐹𝐶𝑆3 ∙ 𝑓(𝜐 ∙ 𝑃𝑆2, 𝜔 ∙ 𝑃𝑆3∗, 𝜒 ∙ 𝑃𝑆4) (19) 
 
where 𝐹𝐶𝑆3 is the functional capability of System 3, 𝑃𝑆2 corresponds to the performance 
of System 2, 𝑃𝑆3∗,  corresponds to the performance of the System 3∗, 𝑃𝑆4 is the 
performance of System 4 and 𝜐, 𝜔 and 𝜒 the respective weights that indicate the systems’ 




Taking into account that 𝑆2 and 𝑆3∗ are essential for 𝑆3’s operation (monitoring and 
control of 𝑆1’s operations), and that although 𝑆4 adds to 𝑆3’s performance, it cannot be 
considered as vital, we simplify Equation (19) as:  
 
 𝑃𝑆3 = 𝐹𝐶𝑆3 ∙ 𝜐𝑃𝑆2 ∙ 𝜔𝑃𝑆3∗ ∙ (1 + 𝜒𝑃𝑆4) (20) 
 
Performance of System 3*  
 
System 3∗ is responsible for auditing the operations within𝑆1. Its performance is 
therefore based on its connection to the 𝑆1 which is realised through 𝑆2. Thus, the 
performance of System 3∗ is:  
 
 𝑃𝑆3∗ = 𝐹𝐶𝑆3∗ ∙ 𝑓(𝜅 ∙ 𝑃𝑆2) (21) 
 
where 𝐹𝐶𝑆3∗ is the functional capability of System 3∗, 𝑃𝑆2 the performance of 𝑆2 and 0 ≤ 
κ ≤ 1 its weight depending on its significance to 𝑆3∗.  
Given the fact that without  𝑆2 there is no communication between 𝑆3∗  and  𝑆1 Equation 
(21) can be simplified in:  
 
 𝑃𝑆3∗ = 𝐹𝐶𝑆3∗ ∙ 𝑘𝑃𝑆2 (22) 
 
Performance of System 4  
 
The performance of System 4 depends on its connection to 𝑆5 and although it does 
not depend on 𝑆3, it takes data from the environment and after 𝑆5 has processed them, 
they are sent back to 𝑆3. Thus, it can be calculated as: 
 
 𝑃𝑆4 = 𝐹𝐶𝑆4 ∙ 𝑓(𝛼 ∙ 𝐸𝐼, 𝜀 ∙ 𝑃𝑆5) (23) 
 
where 𝐹𝐶𝑆4 is the functional capability of System 4, 𝐸𝐼 represents the interaction with 




for the performance of System 5 and α and ε are the corresponding weights. All weights 
take values from 0 to 1.  
Given the fact that both 𝑆5 and 𝐸𝐼 are essential for the operation of S4, the 
Equation (23) can be simplified in:  
 
 
𝑃𝑆4 = 𝐹𝐶𝑆4 ∙ 𝛼𝐸𝐼 ∙ 𝜀𝑃𝑆5 (24) 
Performance of System 5  
 
System 5’s functionality is based on the knowledge it receives from System 4, and 
therefore its performance that represents its speed of decision is based on 𝑆4’s 
functionality as shown in Equation (25),  
 
 𝑃𝑆5 = 𝐹𝐶𝑆5 ∙ 𝑓(𝜇 ∙ 𝑃𝑆4) (25) 
 
where 𝐹𝐶𝑆5 is the functional capability of System 5 (we consider this equal to 1 since we 
do not take into account ill management practices), 𝑃𝑆4 is the performance of System 4 
and 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1 the corresponding weights.  
Since in case 𝑆4 is missing 𝑆5’s decisions cannot be applied in the lower levels of 
the system the Equation (25) can be simplified as:  
 
 𝑃𝑆5 = 𝐹𝐶𝑆5 ∙ 𝜇𝑃𝑆4 (26) 
 
Total Performance  
 
Modelling each element’s performance according to their contribution to the 
VSM gives us an insight on how interconnections affect the performance of the system. 
From the equations provided above, we can observe that operations within System 1 
depend on the performance of each element of the system. To ensure viability we have to 
ensure that elements (operational units) within S1 operate in their maximum possible 
performance.  
Since the investigation of the effect of ill management and poor planning practices 




𝑃𝑆5 to be constant; for simplicity we assume 𝑃𝑆4=𝑃𝑆5=1. Thus, combining Equations 
(17), (18), (20), (22), (24) and (26) we have:  
 





Since 𝑃𝑈 refers to the performance of one operational unit within 𝑆1, and due to 
the fact that operational units are independent of one another, the total performance can 
be calculated as:  
 
 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝛷1𝑃𝑈1 + 𝛷2𝑃𝑈2 + ⋯ + 𝛷𝑘𝑃𝑈𝑘 (28) 
 
where k is the total number of operational units and 𝛷𝑖 is the importance of each unit  
to the functionality of the whole system.  
 
Defining Strategies  
 
In order to overcome likelihood estimations of conventional risk management 
approaches we use game theory. By deploying a game between the attacker (cyberthreat 
actor) and the defender (ICS operator), both of which are considered as rational players 
(i.e. they both want to maximise their payoff taking into account the incurred cost), we 
can identify strategies for the defender that will return the optimal outcome (here defined 
as maximum system performance under the minimum cost) regardless the attacker’s 
strategy.  
We consider two types of defence methods for the defender. The first defence 
method we use is redundancy. In particular, the ICS operator needs to find the elements 
within the system to which redundancy should be applied in order to maximise the total 
performance while minimising costs. The cost of redundancy depends on the element 
(e.g. in an example where legacy systems are used within 𝑆1while 𝑆3∗ has been upgraded 
with modern systems, the application of redundancy is much easier in 𝑆3∗ than 𝑆1). The 
second type of defence is patching. In the same way with redundancy, the ICS operator 




maximise performance while minimising costs. The cost of patching depends again on 
the element (e.g. remote, inaccessible operational units and legacy systems are more 
difficult to patch). Via ‘patching’ we mean an essential software update that mitigates 
known vulnerabilities.  
From the attacker’s point of view, the strategies involved depend on the selection 
of the element that should be compromised (e.g. compromising the SCADA server - 𝑆2 - 
may return a larger payoff compared to compromising a single operational unit within 𝑆1) 
and the complexity of the attack that should be used (e.g. complex Advanced Persistent 
Threats (APTs) that include previously unseen ‘zero-day’ attacks, or exploit common 
vulnerabilities).  
 
Deploying the Game  
 
Our game is based on Equations (27) and (28). For the players’ strategies we make 
the following assumptions:  
 
• Attacks on elements are binary: successful (decrease the element’s functional 
capability to 10%) or unsuccessful (the element’s capability is not affected).  
• Attacks can be deployed against multiple elements. 
• Available attacks per element: common or zero day (one attack per element; 
no mixed attacks)  
• Available defences per element: redundancy or patching (one defence per 
element; no mixed defences) 
• Patching renders a common attack unsuccessful. 
• A zero-day attack is successful against patching. 
• Redundancy renders both zero-day attack and common attack unsuccessful.  
• The cost of an attack-strategy depends on the number of elements to attack 
and the type of attack (Costzero−day > Costcommon).  
• The cost of a defence strategy depends on the element type (e.g. applying 
redundancy or patching to S3 may be more expensive than applying them to 




(e.g. redundancy may seem more costly but patching may require system 
reboot that - especially in the case of legacy systems - can also be costly). 
• There could be a probability of patching failure but in this case it has not been 
taken into account. It only requires a very small change to the model though.  
 
Figure 21, Figure 22, Figure 23 and Figure 24 provide the attack/defence trees for 
all elements on which the game is played. At this point we have to note that Figure 21 
represents one element within the 𝑆1; since we have k elements within 𝑆1 (𝜅 operational 










Figure 22: “Attack/Defence on S2” tree 
 
 






Figure 24: “Attack/Defence on S3∗” tree 
 
 
Considering the game as a zero-sum game (since the defender’s loss is the 
attacker’s gain and vice versa), the players’ payoffs are calculated as:  
 
 𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙′ − 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (29) 
 
And 
 𝐴𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = −𝐷𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = −𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙′ + 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (30) 
 
where 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙′  is calculated based on Equations (27) and (28) using the attack/defence trees, 
𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the total cost of defence and 𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the total cost of attack. 
  
Model Application – Case Study 
 
In this section, we apply our model to the ICS of Figure 25. As shown, there are 
six elements to attack/defend, including the PLCs in the field level (that correspond to 
changes to the 𝐹𝐶𝑈1, 𝐹𝐶𝑈2 and 𝐹𝐶𝑈3), the control server (𝐹𝐶𝑆2), the HMI (𝐹𝐶𝑆3∗) and 




these elements and depends on the way their functionality changes as a result of the 
opponents’ chosen strategies.  
 
 
Figure 25: ICS Example 
 
We consider that initially all elements operate in optimal performance (𝐹𝐶𝑈1= 
𝐹𝐶𝑈2= 𝐹𝐶𝑈3= 𝐹𝐶𝑆2= FCS3* = 𝐹𝐶𝑆3∗= 100%). Additionally, we assume that the HMI 
(𝑆3∗), the workstations (𝑆3) and the SCADA server (𝑆2) are equally important to the 
system (ω = δ = θ = λ = υ = κ = χ = 1). Furthermore, since there is only one connection of 
the field level to the environment (remote access to PLC3) and is used for maintenance 
rather than control purposes we consider σ = 0.5 as the weight for the connection to the 
total environment and β = 1 as the weight to the remote connection in particular. For the 
purposes of our illustration we also assess the importance of the field level devices (PLC1, 




motors (the highest number of devices compared to the other PLCs), therefore we 
consider 𝛷2 = 1. PLC1 controls three motors, thus 𝛷1 = 0.9. Finally, since PLC3 controls 
only one process (the valve) we consider 𝛷3 = 0.7.  
In a real-world scenario, these values would derive from the asset evaluation 
process where the ICS operator would identify and assess all system assets. 
The most challenging part of the model application is the cost evaluation. As we 
mentioned in the previous section, the available moves for the defender include patching, 
redundancy and “no security”. The cost for the latter is DCost = 0. However, the cost for 
the patching and redundancy strategies is based on the ICS implementation and the 
operator’s budget that are difficult to simulate. In our experiment we consider that the 
ICS operator uses legacy devices (PLCs) in the field level that are difficult to reboot or 
replace (in some cases legacy devices may not be available in the market) and modern 
machines within the control centre. Thus, the cost of patching or redundancy for the field-
level elements is much higher than the cost of securing the elements within the control 
centre. Additionally, in a modern system it is easier to patch than deploy redundancy. In 
short, we assume the following values for the defender’s costs:  
 
• When deploying redundancy for elements within 𝑆1(field-level elements): 
CS1b = 107. 
• When patching elements within 𝑆1 (field-level elements): CS1a = 105. 
• When deploying redundancy for the HMI (𝑆3∗): CS3*b = 104. 
• When patching the HMI (𝑆3∗): CS3*a = 103. 
• When deploying redundancy for engineering workstations (𝑆3): CS3b = 104. 
• When patching the engineering workstations (𝑆3): CS3a = 103. 
• When deploying redundancy for the SCADA server (𝑆2): CS2b = 103. 







From the attacker’s point of view, we have only two costs, the cost of deploying 
a zero-day attack and the cost of deploying a common attack. We assume the following 
values for the attacker’s costs:  
• Cost of zero-day attack: CAZ = 105.  
• Cost of common attack: CAC = 102.  
 
Based on this information we can now construct the attack/defence trees in Figure 
26, Figure 27, Figure 28, Figure 29, Figure 30 and Figure 31 
 
 







Figure 27: Attack/Defence tree for PLC2 
 
 







Figure 29: Attack/Defence tree for HMI 
 
 







Figure 31: Attack/Defence tree for SCADA server 
 
Based on the attack/defence trees we can identify all possible scenarios in the 
game. Since the defender can apply either patching, redundancy or “no security” to each 
of the six elements, the number of available defence strategies is 36. Additionally, since 
the attacker can choose between zero-day, common attack or “no attack” for each 
element, the total number of attack strategies is 36. Figure 32 shows part of all available 
pair of strategies along with the defender’s corresponding payoff calculated based on 
Equation (29). In order to find the Nash Equilibria of the game, we apply the algorithm 
where the attacker tries to maximise her minimum payoff and the defender to minimise 
his maximum loss. The algorithm is also known as low risk algorithm and can be 
described with the following two steps:  
 
• Defender calculates the minimum payoffs for each of his 36 strategies, based 
on the fact that for each of them, the attacker would choose a strategy that 
minimises defender’s payoff (at the end of this step the defender has 36 
minimums).  
• Among those 36 minimums, the attacker chooses the strategy that returns the 






Figure 33 plots the minimum payoffs for each of the defender’s strategies. As seen 
there are four areas that return maximum minimums. In particular, the defender’s 
strategies that correspond to the Nash Equilibrium are:  
• Strategy no.16: 000120 (patching 𝑆2 and applying redundancy to 𝑆3)  
• Strategy no.93: 010102 (patching PLC2, patching 𝑆2 and applying 
redundancy to 𝑆3∗)  
• Strategy no.257: 100111 (patching PLC1, patching 𝑆2, patching 𝑆3 and 
patching 𝑆3∗)  
• Strategy no.343: 110200 (patching PLC1, patching PLC2 and applying 
redundancy to 𝑆3) 
 
These are the optimal cost-efficient defence strategies. 
 
 






Figure 33: Defender’s minimum payoffs for each of her strategies 
 
Findings and Conclusions  
 
In this work, we combined two classic Systems Analysis techniques, VSM and 
Game Theory, in order to model an ICS through a living analogy. Unlike the traditional 
risk analysis methods, where emphasis is on calculating probabilistic measures of risk 
based on perceived likelihoods of threat occurrences, our approach allowed us to compose 
a set of formulae that describe the level of service provision of an ICS and can provide 
the basis for an impact analysis through the lenses of viability (defined the ability to 
maintain a core level of functionality, as it would deem necessary per critical 
infrastructure). Based on the perceived significance of interacting components and an 
estimate of the impact of their compromise we set up typical scenarios of attack and 
defence in ICSs as games between rational players and compute Nash Equilibria for 
varying strategies of redundancy and immunisation. This approach can be used to design 





3.3.2 CI-ICSs Risk Management using Monte Carlo Predictive Modelling 
 
 
There are a lot of fundamental issues associated with risk evaluation, reporting 
and mitigation costs in the IT security domain. The problem of cyber security risks 
management in corporate organisations is non-trivial, hence, constructing tools that truly 
satisfy risk measurement theory is difficult and not readily available [136]. Information 
security is fundamentally concerned with the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information assets at all times. In order to defend against threats to information assets, 
organisations invest in countermeasures. However, as the number of assets to be protected 
grows and IT budgets are constrained, there is need for deliberate evaluation of 
information security investments [137]. Cyber security is one of the biggest challenges 
that businesses face today. Economic loss due to cyber-attacks is on the increase and 
many businesses have been obliterated due to the loss of intellectual assets to cyber 
criminals. This figure is set to grow exponentially, according to the study conducted in  
[138] which enunciated that by 2020, losses from cyber-attacks may hit the $20 trillion 
mark. In a different report [139], studies conducted to quantify the actual and potential 
value of losses as a result of successful system breaches is placed in the region of $500 
million and $5 billion per year in the United States alone. Hence, the importance of risk 
management cannot be over-emphasised. As firms’ vulnerability to cyber-attacks 
increases, so is the need for further investment in enhancement measures. Security 
managers can effectively reduce the potential and probability of loss to cyber rouges by 
reinforcing firms’ cyber capabilities. [140].  
What constitutes Information Security risk, is relative to organization risk 
acceptance level. However, in all cases, security managers’ priority is to mitigate 
organizational risk exposure that could undermine the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of mission-critical systems. Apart from huge financial losses, security breach 
can lead to sanctions from industry regulators, negative corporate image, and loss of 
The content of this section addresses part of RQ2 by expanding on our Monte 
Carlo predicting modelling which can serve as a benchmark for policy and 






confidence in clients and customers. A classic example is the case of TalkTalk, a UK 
giant communication firm that was hacked in 2015. Personal details of nearly 157,000 
TalkTalk customers were accessed through a rudimentary SQL Injection attack on the 
company’s website. More than 15,000 personal account numbers and sort codes were also 
stolen. Impact of the cyber-attack is reported [141][142] to have cost the company £42m, 
loss of over 100,000 customers and a fine of £400,000 for data breach by the Information 
Commission Office (ICO). The ICO claimed that hacks could have been prevented if 
TalkTalk had implemented basic cyber security measures to safeguard its customers’ 
data. 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned facts, this work explores how 
Monte Carlo simulation model can be used for effective cyber security resource allocation 
and investigates how to make a business case for resource allocation decisions within an 
enterprise or Small and Medium-sized Businesses (SMBs). Monte Carlo simulations have 
been extensively used by risk analysts in various fields of study to make future risk 
estimations [143]. A simulation approach to managing and visualising uncertainties in 
cyber-security context allows different variables to be applied to different risk scenarios, 
for optimal resource allocation to mitigate and manage those risks. Monte Carlo 
simulation can perform quantitative risk analysis by assigning probability distribution to 
uncertain parameters; and through random sampling of the distribution, it is possible to 
determine all potential outcomes under those uncertainties [144].  
 
Risk Management Overview 
 
Information security risks are generally described under the broad categorization 
of disaster or abuse. Top priority of Chief Information Officers (CIOs) and management 
is to ensure continual functionality of IT resources at all levels of operations. Risk 
management can be described as a systematic and logical approach for identifying, 
treating, analysing and monitoring risks in any process. Managers benefit from risk 
management strategies as it has direct bearing on how available resources are put to best 
use. Risk management is practiced in both private and public sectors; including health 
care, government establishments, insurance, finance and investments. However, in the 




assets. Information Security Risk Management is defined [145] as the protection of 
information assets from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, 
manage business risk and maximise return on investment. Risk management within the 
context of an organisation involves the implementation of appropriate controls to 
mitigate, share, transfer, insure, accept and continually manage risks as set out in the 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (2014) Standard. The ISO/IEC2700 series of standards define best 
practices, baseline requirements and controls for information security management 
systems (ISMS), under the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) triad. In 
addition, given that threat climate changes all the time, it is essential that the effectiveness 
of security controls be periodically reappraised by the organization. This is an important 
element of risk management cycle [146]. There are various reasons why an organization 
may require some measures of security control against potential threats; these could stem 
from internal factors like corporate regulations and organizational policies, or mandatory 
external influences like the data protection acts or compliance requirements of industry 
regulators. Whatever the driver, it is apparent that risk management will involve some 
mitigation control investments and resource allocation decisions. 
However, Information Security professionals often do not quantify and 
communicate risks effectively in order to attract the right level of resource allocation. 
Again, organisations may struggle to present a measure of accurate cost benefits of 
information security activities, primarily because security investment results in loss 
prevention rather than profit margins [147]. That is why business executives often opt for 
compliant security, whereby, baseline requirements of standards like the ISO2700, NIST 
etc. are implemented, then businesses operate under the assumption that compliance 
equates security. Whereas, this is often not the case because baseline controls may be 
enough for industry regulators and business executives but often fail to result in holistic 
protection [148]. The costs associated with risk management range from personnel to 
hardware and software outgoings. Therefore, information security expenditure is a crucial 
resource allocation decision, yet little is known about the budgeting process used to 
ensure optimal investment in information security capabilities [149], or at best, the 
budgeting process is generally beclouded with ambiguities.  
Traditionally, organisations use risk assessment model to determine the optimal 




regulation whereby firms determine their security investment based on risk-assessment 
analysis, potential losses and investment profile [150]. An organisation’s budgetary 
decision is then based on its threat tolerance and its score from the risk scoring matrix. 
Risk scoring matrix is calculated on the assumption that an event will happen given a 
probability of occurrence, and impact or severity of security breaches. Information 
security budget is then allocated based on the resultant estimated risk score. The risk 
scoring formula is given as: 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑃)  ×  𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 (𝐼) (31) 
 
Values of (𝑃) and (𝐼) for a given asset are assigned based on expert opinion and 
their product represents the risk score for that particular asset. To suggest that the risk and 
impact of threat to information assets are subjective probability estimates is rather 
ambiguous and deterministic. In practice, it is difficult to apply this calculation to real 
world problems, in order to optimise resource allocation decisions. This approach raises 
the question of reliability [27], as risk predictions are misrepresented for effective 
mitigation. Information security risk and management is transitory, hence, actual impact 
of risky events might not be a true reflection of the current deterministic estimation. 
 
Different Approaches to Resource Allocation Decision Processes 
 
When risk analysis is based on the traditional risk matrix approach, security 
assessors extrapolate that under certain assumptions, certain events would be true; while 
completely discarding the possibility of least significant and extreme events as part of 
that extrapolation. For organisations that base their threat tolerance on information 
security risk assessment, trying to guess the odd under so many uncertainties can only 
lead to erroneous results. Difficulty of this approach is further emphasised in [151], where 
it is stated that effective allocation of resources under the circumstance of uncertain risk 
and severity of breach cost is very hard. In order to explain how uncertainty affects 
security breach costs and resource allocation decision to mitigate those risks, we present 






Figure 34: High level conceptual model diagram 
 
 
Figure 35: Low level conceptual model diagram 
 
We assume that the bank has only 5 high risk asset points that need to be 
safeguarded from security threats at all times. Also, stakeholders’ resource allocation 
decision is based on the severity of breach to those assets and how it may impact banking 
operation. For illustrative purposes, we consider (DDoS) Mitigation System, Personnel 
and third-party contractors, Data Backup and Recovery System, Incident Response 









Deterministic Estimation of Security Breach Costs 
 
Below we elaborate on both the deterministic and the probabilistic estimation of 
the security breach costs. 
The deterministic approach is based on the use of conventional risk assessment 
model to determine appropriate resource allocation. Deterministic point estimation is 
associated with random variability like a game of chance. In a roll of die, probabilistically, 
there is a 1/6 chance that a certain number would come up, and it would have an 
interpretation given long-term frequency. Risk/vulnerability output is based on a five-
level scale (very low, low, medium, high and very high) and it similarly has five 
probability levels. See Table 6 for description of likelihood and severity of risk, especially 
in terms of financial impact. Likelihood of risk is ranked on the scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is 
rare or very low and 5 is frequent or very high. 
 
Table 6: Risk likelihood and severity description 
 
 
Similarly, Table 7 shows the risk scoring matrix by taking into account the 
likelihood and severity value of each risk. Risk scoring is carried out by applying a simple 




risk occurring. After scoring each risk, risk rating is then applied by choosing the most 
appropriate definition under likelihood and the most appropriate definition under severity, 
then the numbers are looked up on the risk matrix table and matched to obtain the risk 
rating. After the risk analysis phase, given an organisation risk threshold and the risk 
score, budget is allocated for countermeasures to mitigate risks in that context. 
The idea of risk assessment is to evaluate scenarios of security incidents and take 
proactive measures before it happens. Consider one of our scenario high risk assets; a 
dedicated DDoS Mitigation System (DMS) that can deter DDoS attacks. How effective 
the DMS is to mitigate volumetric attacks may be uncertain but it is unlikely that an 
enterprise operations and vital computing resources will be subjected to complex layer 7 
attacks, in order to ascertain if the defence mechanism is worthy of investment. Rather, it 
is more likely that we use historical data to assist with resource allocation decisions, but 
in the absence of data we can use estimations. A risk analyst may make a statement that 
the probability of a successful attack without mitigation (the DMS) is 3, and the cost 
impact in terms of human and financial resources needed to recover from the attack is 
$53,477. 
 
Table 7: Risk rating table 
 
 
However, when deterministic point estimate is used to score risk and model 
uncertainties; what that actually means is that based on the subjective estimates for each 
asset point, the total breach cost without security investment for all tangible and intangible 
assets in the enterprise, will always be the sum of breach costs to each asset (as shown in 
Table 8). If it is certain that an expert’s deterministic estimate is 100% reliable, then 




risks should correctly reflect the assessment. In reality, a security breach to some asset 
will cost less with insignificant impact while some may result in colossal losses with 
catastrophic consequences. Therefore, resource allocation under uncertain risk-based 
assessment is unlikely to match risk mitigation efforts. 
 
Table 8: Expert estimation of security breach costs 
 
 
Probabilistic Estimation of Security Breach Costs 
 
In order to address the huge amount of uncertainties associated with deterministic 
approach, especially in view of increasing information assets; we can consider the 
probabilistic approach. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we can determine the 
probabilistic cost of breach for each asset in a given scenario. The Monte Carlo simulation 
works by sampling lots of scenarios from a probability distribution instead of static point 
estimates. Probabilistic estimation assigns minimum and maximum cost boundaries for 
each security breach. The combined cost of all security breaches is then calculated as the 
total minimum and maximum cost of a security breach for each asset in order to project 
total resource allocation for the enterprise. In that case, it is possible to establish absolute 
bounds for allocated resources to the entire enterprise. 
Monte Carlo may not be able to tell with certainty the exact cost of breach, but it 
can describe the probability of cost associated with security breaches, to aid resource 
allocation. In comparison to the deterministic approach, probabilistic estimate is also 
based on random variable, however, each estimate follows a particular distribution, 





Table 9: Model simulation parameters 
 
 
We will now consider the deterministic cost of breach for the DMS as described 
in the previous section. Under probabilistic estimation approach, we can use a smearing 
out parameter to suggest that in place of a fixed quantity like $53,477, we could include 
minimum value in of $30,000 and the maximum value of $65,000 in a distribution, as 
shown in Table 9. Essentially, we replace a fixed value with probability distribution, 
which is a true representation of state in the real world. Hence, the fixed quantity is now 
our most likely value, but it is not the only possible value in the distribution. The key to 
Monte Carlo simulation is that, each variable is assigned a random value; and the total 
value is calculated thousands of times during the simulation. It therefore allows us to 
understand the risk that expectations may not match reality, hence, appropriate 
precautions can be taken [152]. It is difficult to compute values for multiple scenarios 
without some form of simulation, especially if we have to factor-in multiple assets and 












There are two basic assumptions for this model: 
• Key information asset points are determined by an organisation CIO and the 
security team. 
• Minimum and maximum values of security breach costs are subject to expert 
elicitation, based on experience and previous security breach events. 
 
The work described in this paper uses some security breach cost parametric values 
obtained from verifiable information security breach reports. Model parameters are taken 
from the Ponemon Institute 2015 cost of security breach report [153] and Kaspersky Lab 
IT security risks special report series [154]. The study in [153] covered data breach cost 
and impact of 350 organisations around the globe. The study uses Activity-Based Costing 
(ABC) for data breach calculation which takes into account the direct cost, the indirect 
cost and the opportunity cost. It also takes into account a range of expenditure associated 
with organisation data breach detection, containment, response and remediation. The 
study in [154] covers corporate IT security risks survey of more than 5500 companies in 
26 countries around the world. It covers IT threats and the cost of recovery when security 
breach occurs. Values taken from both studies serve as input parameters for our 
simulation model as shown in Table 9. However, limitations of the costing methodology 
outlined in the studies are not validated nor described in this work. 
We identify uncertain deterministic security breach costs in our model and convert 
them into ranges using a triangle distribution, as shown in Figure 37. Each asset’s breach 
cost estimated fixed values are replaced with a probability distribution. Triangular 
distribution used in this model, is one of the most used probability distributions to elicit 
expert opinion, especially in the case of limited or absence of historical data. It defines 
uncertain breach cost values as minimum (Cmin), most-likely (Cml) and maximum (Cmax) 





Table 10: Schema of the Monte Carlo predictive model 
 
 
This approach shares some similarities with the model implemented in [155], 
whereby the (Cmin) and (Cmax) are held constant while the values of (Cml) are selected 
randomly from the distribution graph. (Cml) is a non-negative random variable which 
follows a triangle distribution. For this simulation, we used MATLAB and Vose 
ModelRisk software [156]. Both tools allow configurable simulations with a very large 
number of runs and can generate thousands of scenarios for each set of uncertain inputs. 
ModelRisk uses a mathematical model for input variables and triangle distribution 




(𝐶𝑚𝑙 − 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛)(𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛)




(𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐶𝑚𝑙)(𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛)
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑚𝑙 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 (33) 
 
Simulated output is generated given the mathematical relationship with input 
variables, and the results provide predictive indicators to support decision making 
processes. However, with Monte Carlo, input variables for the simulation model are 
uncertain, random and defined according to a probability distribution in order to capture 
and model those uncertainties. In this model, what happens is that thousands of scenarios 
are generated to reflect a probabilistic output for each uncertain input, according to 























over again during the simulation. However, in order to obtain a convergence and more 
realistic values, a recommended run of 10,000 simulations is required, with 1,000 of them 
being the barest minimum acceptable [157]. We generate 50,000 simulation runs; the 
model output is a probabilistic range of values and scenarios associated with security 
breach costs, as well as the probability distribution associated with those values. 
 
Results and Findings 
 
Results of Monte Carlo simulation shown in Figure 36 add extra dimension to the 
initial deterministic values. As the simulation begins, sample is taken from each of the 
breach cost probability distribution. ModelRisk then computes the average random value 
at the end of each iteration. During the simulation, different scenarios are generated based 




Figure 36: Simulation result with cumulative overlay 
 
At the end of the simulation, the output histogram represents 50,000 scenarios for 
security breach cost. Result of the simulation takes into account all uncertainties and it is 
in the form of probability distribution similar to the input parameters. These distributions 




From the model result in Figure 36, it can be seen that the upper 5% and the lower 
5% represents extreme cases that are marked differently by the simulation output because 
they are practically ignored. From the parametric values in Table 10, it can be seen that 
the total resource allocation could be as low as $123K or as high as $272K, but the 
realistic chance of resource allocation nearing these extreme values is very unlikely, 
hence the model ignored them. It can be seen that 90% of the simulation iterations fall 
under a value less than the upper bound estimated total values. Hence, we can say that 
90% of the total allocation will meet our initial estimate. While this is not a guarantee, it 
allows us to adjust IT security budget to match cost of potential breaches and also 
understand the risk that resource allocation may not meet initial estimates. 
Further analysis of the result in Figure 36 shows that given all iterations of 
simulation, the absolute minimum value of $151.67k is much higher than the original 
deterministic lower bound value of $123k. Similarly, the absolute maximum probabilistic 
value of $255.15k is much lower than the deterministic value of $272k, after iteration, 
with only 5% chance of the allocation going over this value. The most likely point 
estimate is around the value of $229k. From the location of the peak of the distribution, 
it can be seen that this value is rather more realistic than the deterministic value of 
234,383. However, the cost of impact could be significantly higher, possibly twice as 






Figure 37: Simulation result in MATLAB showing values for Cmin and Cmax 
 
In an attempt to validate our model, we compared the result with another 
simulation in MATLAB shown in Figure 37, using the same input parametric values. 
What is common in both states of the models is that extreme values are ignored in the 
output of both simulations. While both models follow similar distributions, it can be seen 
that not only did both simulations ignore lower and upper bound values, but also show 
higher 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 and lower 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 than the deterministic values. This is an additional 
reassurance about the validity of the representation entities behaviour. 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
In general, predictive models allow us to make more useful and less erroneous 
decisions. Making important decisions without diligent consideration to uncertainties in 
the budgeting process can lead to unrealistic values. Forecasting with accuracy, how 
much damage a successful security breach can cause is a real challenge for risk managers, 




conducted estimates for all assets tend to become unreliable, especially, as the complexity 
of asset classes in the model increases. Using probabilistic simulation therefore simplifies 
the complexity of cost estimation processes. The application of Monte Carlo simulation 
to information security investment decision, in particular, allows us to visualize different 
probabilistic outcomes in view of what might go wrong; given best case, worst case and 
most likely case scenarios.  
Monte Carlo also allows us to understand the outcome of scenarios and help to 
understand unexpected pattern or behaviour without necessarily exposing information 
assets to real threats. Output of Monte Carlo simulation is a range of values and risk 
assessor can derive confidence level from that range. It is expected that predictive models 
will enable management to make more effective decisions and be part of analytical input 
for policy formation If there is sound understanding of what might go wrong, decision 
makers can utilise the model to implements appropriate risk mitigation strategies and 
budget allocation for security investment. 
This study can be expanded as part of future work to include different resource 
allocation patterns for different assets, depending on their characteristics. As such, assets 
with the highest frequency and impact of threat events could be allocated more resources 




This section is about the use of epidemiology properties in order to build a custom-
made epidemiology model, that borrows some features from the already established ones 





In order to face the spread of malware in a corporate network (𝑆4) we model its 
dynamics within the network resulting in finding ways to mitigate it in a cost-efficient 
way. Although there are other models in the literature that examine the dynamics of 




epidemiological models (SIR and SIS), which were designed to describe the dynamics 
within human population. In addition, Game Theory is a very effective tool in situations 
where antagonistic interests are involved and has been introduced in the past in problems 
from the field of network security [2][158] where an attacker and a defender were 
interacting; the former aiming to harm the network and the latter aiming to keep it safe. 
Approaching malware as a threat agent is a reasonable assumption since its acts are based 
on inscribed behaviour that is coded by cybercriminals. 
This work’s aim is to combine epidemiology and a game-theoretic framework in 
order to describe a game between an attacker (malware) and a defender, each with their 
own set of strategies, trying to achieve their highest possible individual benefit. As a result 
of the game (during which we are taking into account the malware’s spread dynamics as 
well) the defender is able to identify his optimal strategy while minimizing the security 
cost, on a cost-benefit basis. 
 
3.3.3.2 Proposed Model 
 
 
Worms have the ability to self-replicate and spread without human intervention 
in a network [159], resembling human viruses. They may utilise various proliferation 
mechanisms, depending on the way they scan the network to find their new targets. Our 
work focuses on the examination of random scanning worms, which select their target IP 
addresses randomly without any topological restrictions [160][161]. For a random 
scanning worm, the whole Internet is seen as a fully interconnected network. 
Consequently, each node has the same probability to get infected. This type of malware 
has been widely used by cyber-criminals, since it is easy to deploy. However, such attacks 
have lower infection rates than other topology-oriented scanning methods, such as 
malware that spreads through email exchange or the social media. This holds true as, their 
The content of this section addresses part of RQ2 by expanding on our approach 
that combines Game Theory and a custom Epidemiology model based on the 
traditional SIR and SIS ones, in order to provide a cost-benefit risk management 





randomly picked IP addresses might not be used by any device. It is important to note 
that this work does not focus on modelling the malware dissemination process itself, 
instead it utilises already known modelling techniques and combines them with game 
theory in order to propose optimal mitigation strategies for the defender.  
In the human virus spread paradigm, a “random scanning” virus would mean that 
individuals are always in contact with one another. As mentioned, the probability of an 
individual to get infected by an already infected node is the same for everyone within the 
population. In a network it means that an infected node can infect every other node in the 
network without topological restrictions, since all nodes are linked with one another either 
directly or indirectly.  
There are three basic security mitigation practices against the random scanning 
worm dissemination: i) Remove, ii) Patch and iii) both Patch and Remove. Under the SIR 
and SIS models, a susceptible node can either be patched against the certain worm and 
become immune to it or stay in the susceptible state, respectively. If a susceptible node is 
infected then it can either stay infected and consequently spread the worm, or it can use 
the removal tool (e.g. an antivirus) in order to remove the worm. However, the removal 
tool does not encompass immunisation functionality. Thus, when an infected node 
removes the worm it returns back to the susceptible state, where it can subsequently be 
reinfected. However, if an infected node uses both the remove tool and the patch against 
the worm then it moves to recovery state, where it is immune against the specific worm. 
For each of the three security strategies differential mathematical expressions are set up, 
as in SIR and SIS models, which describe the dynamics of the system.  
 
Malware Proliferation with Patch Strategy  
 
When the Patch Strategy is used, susceptible nodes become immune to the worm, 
but infected nodes cannot recover from the infection. In this case, the worm and the 
defender seem to take part in a race. If the worm spreads very fast, it will infect most 
computers in a short time before defenders notice it; if people in the network can patch 
their computers much faster than the worm’s proliferation, the wide-range infection can 






Figure 38: Patch Strategy Model 
 
The mathematical specification of the Patch Strategy is given in Equations (34), 
(35) and (36), where S is the susceptible population, I is the infected population, R is the 
immune population. β is the probability that a susceptible node gets infected in each time 














= 𝛾𝑆 (36) 
 
Malware Proliferation with Removal Strategy  
 
When the Removal Strategy is used, infected nodes can recover from the infection 
when the worm is detected and removed. However, nodes that have recovered from an 
infection are still susceptible to the specific worm, since no immunisation against it is 
included. In this case the model is transformed into a SIS model where the system reaches 
an equilibrium where the number of infected nodes and the number of susceptible nodes 





Figure 39: Removal Strategy Model 
 
The mathematical specification of Removal Strategy is given in Equations (37) 
and (38). Again, S refers to the susceptible population, I refers to the infected population, 
β is the probability that a susceptible node gets infected every time unit and r is the 










= 𝛽𝐼𝑆 − 𝑟𝐼 (38) 
 
Malware Proliferation with Patch and Removal Strategy  
 
The last strategy devised is the Patch and Removal. In this strategy both moves of 
patch and removal are available. A susceptible node can become immune to the worm 
when the patch is used. Furthermore, an infected node can recover from the infection if 
the worm is removed and then become immune to the worm by using the patch. This is 
the most efficient, yet costly, way to eliminate malware spread. Eventually, all nodes in 
the network will be immune against the specific worm. The strategy model is shown in 
Figure 40. 
The differential equations that describe the dynamics of the model are shown in 
Equations (39), (40), (41) and (42). S refers to the susceptible population, I refers to the 




population that becomes immune to the malware. As before, β is the infection rate, γ refers 
to the immunisation rate when a susceptible node uses the specific patch and λ is the 
“removal and patch” rate. 
 
 














= 𝜆𝐼 (41) 
   
 𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾𝑆 + 𝜆𝐼 
(42) 
 
Unified Malware Proliferation Model  
 
By combining the aforementioned mitigation strategies we constructed a unified 
malware proliferation probabilistic model, where each of the strategies is chosen by the 
defender with a probability P, based on the patching and immunisation rates. In this model 
there are three states, the susceptible compartment, the infected population and the 
immunised. The state transitions of the model are depicted in Figure 41. A susceptible 
node can either be infected with infection rate β or immunised with immunisation rate γ. 




with rate r. Lastly, an immunised node cannot transit in any other state. The emerging 
dynamics are described by the differential Equations (43), (44) and (45).  
By observing the model, it can be seen that the defender can control the 
disinfection and immunisation rates (γ, λ, r), while the attacker controls the infection rate 
(β). These rates will form the strategies of the players in the game model. 
 
 














= 𝜆𝐼 + 𝛾𝑆 
(45) 
 
Game theory takes into account all the possible outcomes in order to find the 
optimal strategies. These strategies represent the NE of the game. All possible outcomes 
are computed and the NE is found by the pair of strategies from which, if either players 
deviates will always get less payoff.  
Figure 42 presents the state of the system for a specific configuration for both 
players (the attacker has chosen β = 0.00016 and the defender r = 0.56, γ = 0.4, λ = 0.08). 
Although there is an initial increase of the infected population, the infection starts to 
decrease after the 16th day, mainly due to the impact of immunisation. A change even in 
one of the parameters of the game could result in a whole new situation. This can be seen 




a significant increase of the infected population, when compared to the case where β = 
0.00016. At the same time, the cost for the attacker increases, since for the increase in the 
infection rate an algorithm of higher complexity than before has to be utilised.  
Nevertheless, in the case where β = 0.0003, if the defender increases one of his 
own parameters as well, that could again lead to a significantly different state of the 
system. For example, Figure 44 depicts the state of the system when the defender 
increases his immunisation rate (γ) from 0.4 (in Figure 43) to 1.2. The final state of the 
system is better than in Figure 43, since the final infected population is less. However, at 
the same time this increases the cost to the defender, since increasing the immunisation 
rate requires additional resources.  
 
 






Figure 43:  β = 0.0003, r = 0.56, γ = 0.4, λ = 0.08 
 
 








FLIPIT: Game-theoretical Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
In FLIPIT [158], two opponents compete to gain full control of a shared resource 
and gain is defined by the time the resource is under one’s control. In our epidemiology 
model, the shared resource is the population of nodes in the network. Each time unit, the 
two opponents (attacker and defender) perform actions to take under their control a part 
of the population. The population under the attacker’s control is denoted as the infected 
population and corresponds to the Infected (I) compartment in the unified malware 
proliferation model presented above. Therefore, the gain for the attacker when spreading 
malware in a network is represented by the I compartment of the model. On the other 
hand, if N is the initial population then N − I is the population under the defender’s 
control. This population includes both the Immunised (R) and the Susceptible (S) states 
of the unified model. As the population in each compartment changes in time according 
to the dynamics described by the above equations, the total gain of each player is defined 
by the average fraction of node population under one’s control. Therefore, by considering 
player 0 as defender and player 1 as attacker we define 𝐺𝑖(𝑡) the gain of player i and 
calculate it as shown in Equation (46), where 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) is the fraction of population under 











As there are only two fractions of populations, one under the control of the 
defender and one under the control of the attacker, then 𝑃0(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑃1(𝑡) . Hence: 
𝐺0(𝑡) + 𝐺1(𝑡) = 1.  
Before the game, both players pick their strategies in order to optimise their 
outcome. The game is non-cooperative, static, imperfect, complete information, and not 
a constant-sum game. There is no cooperation between the players (network security 
games fall under the category of noncooperative games because there is, obviously, no 
cooperation between attacker and defender) [2]. As we have a static game, players have 




chosen to maximise their personal benefit. Both players choose their strategies before the 
game in a one-shot fashion, not being able to change them during the game. It is an 
imperfect game as the two players choose their strategies simultaneously, without 
knowing the choices of the other players. However, they are aware of the opponent’s 
available strategies and payoffs; therefore, it is a complete information game. Finally, it 
is not a constant-sum game because the sum of the players’ rewards is not always the 
same, for any combination of their strategies. In general, a pure Nash Equilibrium does 
not necessarily exist for this kind of games. Nevertheless, it exists in our case study. 
Accounting for all actions of all possible strategy combinations (β, r, γ, λ), the 
optimally defensive strategy can be identified and it will be the one that returns the 
maximum possible gain under the minimum possible cost, regardless of attacker’s chosen 
strategy. 
 
Defining the Players’ Strategies 
In the beginning, both players choose their strategies, namely (γ, λ, r) for the 
defender and (β) for the attacker. 
More specifically, player 0 (defender) can manipulate the immunization rate of 
two compartments: the susceptible population by immunizing susceptible nodes before 
the spread of the worm (represented by γ in our unified model) and the infected population 
by disinfecting and then immunizing the infected nodes (represented by λ in our unified 
model). Furthermore, the defender can disinfect infected nodes with disinfection rate r. 
Therefore, his strategy is defined by those three parameters in the unified malware 
proliferation model. Choosing them wisely can increase the player’s benefit. However, 
each of these actions costs, what is known as security cost. In this work, the cost of 
immunisations is considered higher (a more resource demanding operation) than the cost 
of disinfection since it entails patching the vulnerability. In some scenarios for instance, 
patching an organization’s mission critical host can become prohibitively costly. 
On the other hand, player 1 (attacker) has the ability to manipulate the infection 
rate (denoted by β in our model) of the malware, by choosing among different random 
scanning worms with different infection rates. The infection rate of each scanning worm 
may depend on the vulnerability it exploits and the randomization mechanism it uses. 




and consequently the cost of deploying the attack increases. For that reason, the attacker 
aims to find the infection rate that will return the optimal payoff. 
 
Defining the Players’ Payoffs 
 
As mentioned, both players’ strategies bear some cost. We define cost 𝐶0(𝑡) as 
the total number of moves made by player 0 as 𝐶0(𝑡) = 𝑛0,1(𝑡) + 𝑛0,2(𝑡) + 𝑛0,3(𝑡) 
where 𝑛0,1(𝑡), 𝑛0,2(𝑡) and 𝑛0,3(𝑡) correspond to the number of disinfections, 
immunizations, and disinfections and immunizations, respectively, multiplied by each 
move’s cost  (𝑘0,𝑗) (Equation (47)). The move’s cost is defined as the cost of disinfecting 
(𝑘0,1), immunizing (𝑘0,2), or disinfecting and immunizing (𝑘0,3) a node. 
 
 𝐶0(𝑡) = 𝑛0,1(𝑡) ∙ 𝑘0,1 + 𝑛0,2(𝑡) ∙ 𝑘0,2 + 𝑛0,3(𝑡) ∙ 𝑘0,3 (47) 
 
We define as cost for player 1 the perceived complexity of the algorithm that the 
malware implements. The complexity of the algorithm is commensurate with the 
infection capabilities of the malware. Therefore, the higher the infection rate of the worm 
is, the higher is also the cost, 𝑘1, that attacker has to pay in order to implement the 
malware (Equation (48)). 
 
 𝐶1(𝑡) = 𝑘1 (48) 
 
Each player’s payoff is equal to the player’s total gain minus the related cost 
according to Equation (49). 
 
 𝐵𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐺𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐶𝑖(𝑡) (49) 
 
To compute costs, we use quantitative tables of operational complexity. A strategy 
by either player (e.g., Patch Strategy for the defender or Code-Red worm for the attacker) 
may encompass several actions, with each action characterised by a complexity level. For 




medium, and high) and assign a score to each of 1, 2, or 3, respectively. Therefore, the 
cost of a move for player 0 or the total cost of player 1 is equal to the sum of the costs of 
the actions it involves. An example is given in Table 11 and Table 12, where we present 
the actions cost for the defender and the attacker when the latter uses the Code-Red worm 
(in which case the attacker has already chosen her strategy). 
 
Table 11: The cost for Code-Red worm 
 
 
Table 12: The cost of each move for the defender 
 
 
As in FLIPIT, the gain is defined by fraction of population under each player’s 
control. The population under the attacker’s control corresponds to the infected 
population, while the population under the defender’s control corresponds to the 
susceptible plus the immunised population. 
In order to find the defender’s strategy that will return the optimal payoff, known 
as the Nash Equilibrium strategy, we construct the description of the game, which is a 
table with all possible payoffs for both players for all the available combinations of 








In this section we apply our game-theoretical malware proliferation model to a 
real case scenario, where the attacker can choose between five hypothetical worms with 
different infection rates (β). For the determination of the infection rates we used as a 
reference the Code-Red worm. According to [162], a node infected by this worm infects 
other nodes with rate 1.62 nodes per hour. Albeit old, we have chosen Code-Red because 
it is a random-scanning worm with no topology constraints and, thus, its characteristics 
fit well into the generic nature of our abstraction. Its behaviour has also been thoroughly 
studied in the past [162][163][164].  
In the examined scenario, the defender (e.g. the ICS vendor), tries to prevent the 
spread of the malware within the corporate network (𝑆4) in which 10,000 nodes are 
deployed, taking the corresponding security costs into account. Therefore, the probability 
that a susceptible node in the network gets infected by an infected one, in each second, is 
1.62/𝑁, where 𝑁 is the total population. Thus, 𝛽 = 1.62/𝑁 = 1.62 ∙ 10−4. 
To provide the attacker with more options, we make the assumption that she can 
choose among five different types of worms, whose propagation rates are equal to integral 
multiples of Code-Red’s propagation rate. As a result, the attacker can choose from five 
different worms and her available strategies are described as 𝛽 = 𝑘 ∙ 1.62 ∙ 10−4, where 
𝑘 = 1,2,3,4,5.    
Moreover, we assume that the defender can determine his strategy by choosing 
the immunization rate (0 ≤ γ ≤ 100 immunisations/hour), the disinfection rate (0 ≤ r ≤ 100 
disinfections/hour) or/and the combination of both disinfection and immunisation with 
rate 0 ≤ λ ≤ 100 per hour. In reality these rates can potentially get higher values, depending 
on the capabilities of the stakeholder. However, for the purposes of our experiment we 
limit all three rates from 0 to 100.  
To simplify the scenario, we predetermined that the cost for the attacker is equal 
to β ·  1000, implying that the propagation rate of the attack affects the complexity of the 
algorithm that implements the attack. We also make the assumption that the cost of a 
disinfection is 10 and the cost of an immunisation is 100 (considering that immunisation 
costs more than disinfection). Table 13 forms the description of the game. Each cell 




defender, for the specific pair of strategies. For instance, 𝑃𝐴1,1 corresponds to the 
attacker’s payoff when the attacker chooses the strategy β = 1.62 and the defender chooses 
the strategy (γ = 0, r = 0, λ = 0). The defender’s payoff for the same pair of strategies is 
𝑃𝐷1,1.  
Table 13: The description of the game 
 
It is worth noting that a different selection of the parameters of this case study 
would obviously change the outcome of the game, without however changing the 
principles of the proposed model. These parameters are given here not as a reference, 
which falls outside the scope of this work, but to demonstrate the application of our 
unified model against malware proliferation. The parameters depend on each malware 
proliferation scenario, namely depend on the skills and goals of the attacker and the risk 
status of the defender (organization, individual).  
For the simulation of the epidemiology model we used the Ventana Simulation 
Environment (Vensim). The simulations are based on Equations (43), (44) and (45), with 
total population of 10,000 nodes, 5 of which were initially infected. For the possible 
values of β, γ, r and λ we run the model for tk = 168 hours = 7 days. Vensim produces the 
data that are needed to set up the game. More particularly, it provides the infected, 
disinfected and immunised populations per unit time (in our case the software is set to 
run the simulations per hour). Therefore, the total number of disinfections (n0,1(tk)), 
immunisations (n0,2(tk)) and ‘immunisations and disinfections’ (n0,3(tk)) in those 7 days 
can be found. Vensim also returns the infected (P1(t)) and uninfected (P0(t), susceptible 
plus immunised) populations per unit time.  
Based on the results from Vensim, the related costs and gains for both players can 
now be computed. For every combination of strategies (β, γ, r and λ), Vensim returns the 




Equation (46). As mentioned, it also returns the values n0,1(tk), n0,2(tk) and n0,3(tk), which, 
in conjunction with the assumed cost of disinfection (k0,1 = 10) and cost of immunisation 
(k0,2 = 100 and therefore k0,3 = 110) and based on Equation (47), return the defender’s 
cost. Based on Equation (48) and our assumptions about the attacker, the attacker’s cost 
for the different values of β is equal to β ·  1000. The gain of each player, as mentioned 
earlier, is equal to the mean fraction of population under each player’s control. Thus, for 
every different combination of strategies we can now compute the related payoffs for 
both players according to Equation (49), populating the Table 13. 
In order to solve the game, the Lemke-Howson algorithm was used, which returns 
Nash Equilibria for two-player non-zero-sum games [165][166] [167]. The algorithm 
(implemented in MATLAB) takes Table 13 as input and returns the Nash Equilibria of 
the game.  
The results revealed a unique pure NE that corresponds to the optimal strategy for 
the defender, represented by the values γ = 10 immunisations/hour, r = 100 
disinfections/hour and λ = 10 “disinfections followed by immunisations”/hour with payoff 
= −5.44·103. Our experiment suggests that even though the proactive immunisation 
should be preferred to the other two actions for security reasons, it does not get the 
maximum value. In fact, the game results in a NE where the disinfection rate (r) is larger 
than the immunisation rates, meaning that security costs have changed the optimal 
solution for the defender. On the other hand, the attacker’s optimal strategy is to choose 
𝛽 = 8.1 which is the maximum infection rate in the table. This happens due to the fact 
that in this particular experiment, the attacker’s gain is much higher than the cost of her 
strategy and, therefore, she will always get larger payoff by choosing the worm with the 
highest infection rate. If the cost of attack is much higher (for instance in case the attacker 
can choose a zero-day attack), the resulted NE may differ. 
 
3.3.3.3 Findings and Conclusions 
 
In this work, malware proliferation models have been integrated with game theory 
in order for a cost-benefit approach to be developed. With this approach we managed to 
evaluate defense strategies that mitigate malware proliferation in the corporate network. 




the effect of random scanning worms (such as Code-Red worm) infecting a corporate 
network of 10,000 susceptible hosts. In this scenario, both the defender and the attacker 
can choose among a variety of strategies in order to achieve their individual goals. The 
results of the case study highlight that the cost of security restricts the security level of 
the defender, since the resulted optimal strategy does not correspond to the most secure 
one; it is however the one that offers the highest possible security under the least possible 
cost, regardless of the attacker’s strategy.  
An interesting extension of this work could be the introduction of a security level 
threshold in the game eliminating the strategies that correspond to gains that do not meet 
the defender’s requirements. In addition, applying the model against other worms and 
other strategies is expected to produce different, but still interesting results, but this falls 
outside the scope of this work. 
Another idea could be to incorporate topology-oriented malware that spreads 
more efficiently within networks. The logic would still be the same; a topology-oriented 
malware dissemination model will feed our game with the necessary parameters. This 
game would then, again, return the optimal defense strategies. In any case, Game Theory 
under traditional malware proliferation approaches can make those models an extremely 
useful tool for the efficient and effective protection of networks. 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
  
All in all, in this chapter, our security-oriented contribution is presented through 
the corresponding use cases. These use cases include models that apply on WSNs 
(approaches using Game Theory on IDS and IPS) and CI-ICSs (approaches using the 
combination of VSM and Game Theory, Monte Carlo predictive modelling and also the 
combination of Epidemiology and Game Theory). As a result, the identified gaps of the 











































































hapter 4 includes the proposed models on improving systems from a non-
security perspective. It examines this topic within the context of improving the 
resilience of WSNs (specifically, energy efficiency, packet loss and processing 
time) and a novel application on using Hot-Desking in order to increase employees’ 
productivity in a work environment. Within this chapter, RQ3 is addressed.  
 
This chapter includes material from the following published papers, as per below:  
Section Published Paper 
4.2 Haghighi, M., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2015). Game-
theoretic approach towards energy-efficient task distribution in wireless 
sensor networks. In 2015 IEEE SENSORS (pp. 1–4). 
4.2 Haghighi, M., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., Oikonomou, G., Burrows, A., 
Woznowski, P., & Piechocki, R. (2015). Game-theoretic approach towards 
Optimal Multi-tasking and Data-distribution in IoT. In 2015 IEEE 2nd World 
Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT) (pp. 406–411). IEEE.. 
4.3 • Maraslis, K., Cooper, P., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2016). An 
Intelligent Hot-Desking Model Based on Occupancy Sensor Data and Its 
Potential for Social Impact. In Transactions on Large-Scale Data-and 
Knowledge-Centered Systems XXVII (pp. 142–158). Springer 
4.3 Cooper, P. B., Maraslis, K., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. (2017). An 
intelligent hot-desking model harnessing the power of occupancy sensing 
data. Facilities, 35(13/14), 766–786. 
4.2 Maraslis, K., Haghighi, M., Tryfonas, T., & Oikonomou, G. Game-theoretic 
and Auction-based Algorithms towards Autonomous Decision-making in 













4. SYSTEMS RESILIENCE AND OPTIMISATION 
 
The previous chapter was about the security and risk management perspective of 
a system. This one will be about their resilience and optimisation perspective, instead. 
Firstly, there is a focus on the resilience and optimisation of WSNs and later there is a 
section on Hot-Desking.  
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In the bibliography, there is a wide variety of methods that are used in order to 
improve different aspects of a system. In this chapter, we present some custom methods, 
using which we bring an improvement on energy consumption, agent processing time and 
packet loss within a WSN with only a minor (in most cases) increase in latency, as well 
as a fresh and innovative look at the concept of Hot-Desking which brings significant 
improvement on the employees’ productivity, as defined in the work itself. 
 
4.2  Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
In this section, there is firstly an introduction on WSNs and after that the 
presentation of the modelling methods using SensomaX along with their evaluation after 




WSNs have become a major technology for a wide variety of applications, ranging 
from medical to military and environmental monitoring. Conventional applications often 
involved a limited number of sensors spread across an area of interest, in order to gather 
various parameters in a central unit and they mostly performed simple functionalities such 
as calculating the average variation of a parameter from different sensors. 
Modern applications however, require data to be aggregated online, and often 




of the data aggregation process. Therefore, they should be able to handle much more 
sophisticated set of logical and mathematical functionalities, often implemented in a 
collaborative fashion, amongst a large number of sensors and actuators. Such 
functionalities necessitate a relatively powerful processor and sufficient memory for 
retrieving raw data and storing the processed ones. As such, sensor nodes need to be 
equipped with more capable components compared to conventional WSNs. In addition to 
the need for extra components, such advanced functionalities are power-hungry 
processes, which consume considerable energy in order to handle the high footprints on 
the memory and processor. 
In this section we use auction-based techniques [168][169] with Game Theory to 
optimise multi-tasking, distribute applications’ tasks amongst sensors based on their 
available resources, investigate how quickly and energy-efficient applications’ 
requirements can be served and improve energy efficiency.  
 
4.2.2 Proposed Model 
 
 
Before we go deep into any low-level details, it is worth mentioning that serving 
the end-users is considered the most important requirement of the base station. Therefore, 
the base station needs to satisfy the services required by the end-user as its first priority. 
However, new applications, which are deployed onto the base station, either by the 
existing end-users or the new ones, have certain requirements that also need to be satisfied 
in addition to the pre-deployed applications.  
In the context of game theory, the base station should weight its strategies and 
choose the best option, which maximises or at least maintains its profit (utility) whilst 
meeting old and new applications’ requirements simultaneously. A node’s utility is 
The content of this section addresses part of RQ3 by demonstrating how utilising 
auction-based techniques along with SensomaX, can improve energy 
consumption, agent processing time and packet loss in WSNs with an increase in 





defined by the amount of processing time spent on the given tasks, where maximising 
utility means spending less processing time, thus saving more energy.  
As was briefly pointed out, the decision (strategy taken) of the base station will 
be known to the Cluster-Heads. The same applies to the communications between the 
Cluster-Heads and their members. Therefore, in this section we will consider maintaining 
or maximising the base station, Cluster-Heads’ and cluster members’ utilities in an 
extended game-theoretic form with perfect information.  
As explained earlier, our proposed approach uses auction-based algorithm in 
conjunction with Game Theory. The auction-based algorithms are only used to calculate 
the price of each task. When the base station receives an application from the end-user, it 
initially needs to query all the Cluster-Heads with the operational details of the new task, 
in order to collect their offers for the task. Cluster-Heads advertise their offers based on 
their on-going operations and the number of applications running concurrently. Once all 
offers are collected, the base station starts the task distribution process by initially 
applying the game-theoretic approaches in order to identify its options, or in other words, 
its strategies, as defined by the game theory. 
Every application is comprised of a number of tasks, which can be priced based 
on its given operational paradigms. Therefore, each task has a certain value regardless of 
every node’s operational state. Once applications arrive in the base station, their tasks are 
priced, and offers are collected from the Cluster-Heads. 
For this case study, full details of the game will be given in order to establish a 
better understanding of how interaction works amongst the sensor nodes. Also, the game 
is implemented in a simplified form with low network density. 
All nodes are initially assumed to be indifferent in terms of their capabilities, their 
on-going operations, number of concurrent applications and their remaining energy level. 
Hence, for the first phase of this experiment we will demonstrate the interaction between 
the base station and a single Cluster-Head in order to identify their available strategies 
with perfect information. This interaction can be envisioned as a game between the base 
station and the Cluster-Head, where both network entities’ rewards calculated based on 
the task price and the available resources in the node. In the second phase, the game will 




The Cluster-Head used in this experiment is already running an application, which 
requires registering Temperature at 5-second intervals, and forwarding the recorded data 
to the base station at 60-second intervals. This application is hereafter referred to as the 
‘pre-deployed’ application. Assuming that the base station receives a new application, 
which requires recording Light level, with the same timing and recording requirements 
as the previously deployed application, here we will analyse the interaction of the base 
station and the Cluster-Head in handling the new application. 
The maximum utility (reward) of every Cluster-Head is achieved by minimising 
the processing time, thus saving more energy for longer lifetime, whereas the maximum 
utility of the base station is directly related to serving the end-users’ application 
requirements. 
The decision-makings done by the network entities (including the base station, 
Cluster-Heads and the nodes) for handling the new task, will narrow their choices down 
into prioritising their given tasks. 
 
The base station can make its selection from the following strategies: 
 
A. Receive the task and never relay it to any CH (Priority 0)  
B. Accept the task and relay it immediately (Priority 1) 
C. Accept the task and delay its relay with minor latency (Priority 2) 
D. Accept the task and delay its relay with major latency (Priority 3) 
 
The priority number appearing next to each option indicates the execution 
priorities based on SensomaX’s internal architecture. Priorities define how urgently the 
tasks need to be executed, and effectively assign their position in the execution queue. 
Similarly, the Cluster-Head also has the above-mentioned options as the base station, 
except that, instead of relaying the given tasks to another node, it executes them 
internally, which results into the following strategies: 
 
a. Receive the task and never execute it (Priority 0) 
b. Accept and execute the task immediately (Priority 1)  




d. Accept the task and delay its execution with major latency (Priority 3) 
 
Given the above strategies for both the base station and the Cluster-Head, and 
assuming that the entities cannot reverse their decisions (static game), and the new 
application has a lower priority to the pre-deployed one, the interaction can be 
demonstrated as shown in Figure 45. Rewards are shown in parentheses with the first 
figure denoting the base station’s reward - BSR - and the second standing for the Cluster-
Head’s reward - CHR - in the form of: (BSR, CHR). 
 
Figure 45: Base station and Cluster-Head in a game-tree 
 
As this figure depicts, the base station’s maximum reward leans towards taking 
strategy ‘C’ with payoff 1, whereas the Cluster-Head’s maximum rewards can be 
achieved by taking strategy ‘c’. That is because, if the base station takes strategy ‘C’, it 
in fact serves the end-user’s requirements to the best of its capability and maintains 
serving the pre-deployed application as well, compared to relaying the task with no or 
major delays, or not relaying the task at all. The same applies to the Cluster-Head, 
whereby taking strategy ‘c’, which executes the application with minor delay, allows it 
to first execute the pre-deployed task and then act on the new one. Whereas taking other 
strategies either delay the current task (b), never executes the new task (a), or executes 
the new task with a major delay (d). In case ‘a’, although not executing the task results in 




requirements and will result in being queried frequently for the given task’s progress 
(which results in spending energy on processing the queries), and it could be assumed 
faulty by the base station and ultimately excluded from the network. Given the above 
explanation, there is a single dominant strategy, which is also the Nash equilibrium: (C, 
c) resulting in maximum payoff for both network entities. This is because both entities 
cannot maximise their payoffs by unilaterally changing to other strategies other than 
taking the (C, c) strategy. This equilibrium is achieved in an extensive form of the game-
theoretic approach with perfect information. 
Figure 45 demonstrates the rewards of network entities in simple numerical values 
as a result of the hierarchical decision-making between the base station and Cluster-Head. 
The actual pricing scheme however, differs immensely, which results in greater quantities 
of payoffs.  
Applying the auction-based pricing equations [168][169] to the aforementioned 
application, results in the following figures for the base station and the Cluster-Head: 
 
Table 14: Processing times 
 
 
It is worth noting that the actual processing time in SensomaX’s architecture has 
been defined in milliseconds. However, for simplicity the above figures are normalised 
by a factor of 1,000,000. 
Once nodes’ utilities and tasks’ prices have been calculated using the 
aforementioned auction-based techniques, the rewards gained by the peers, based on the 





















This function simply returns how much energy can be saved by taking into 
account the number of pre-deployed tasks (n), new tasks (m) and the total number of 
query/responses (k). Having calculated the total saved energy, node’s remaining energy 
can be calculated by deducting the saved energy from the total energy: 
 
 𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝐸𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐸𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 (51) 
 
For the purpose of this model, we will not deal with the remaining energy, and the 
only focus will be on the saved energy, which is considered as the reward. Based on the 
actual pricing units, which were shown in Table 14, the base station will compare its 
available strategies, whilst calculating the following rewards using the function for 
𝐸𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔. The calculated rewards are therefore shown in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Actual rewards for the base station and Cluster-Head's strategies 
 
 
Table 15 represents the actual rewards (profit and loss) of the base station and the 
Cluster-Head in normalised milliseconds and is actually the application of Table 14 on 
equation 50. In this table, we can again see that, strategy ‘C’ for the base station and 




What has been described so far only included the interaction between the base 
station and a single Cluster-Head. In order to expand the game to involve more players, 
the base station iterates the same process for every Cluster-Head involved in the task 
distribution process. 
 
Case Studies and Evaluation 
 
In this section, the investigation of the impact of latency and cluster density on 
different operational paradigms with and without game-theoretic utilisation will be 
presented, as well as the energy profiling and packet loss of nodes and Cluster-Heads 
using Game Theory. Firstly, we examine how effectively Game Theory can contribute 
towards energy consumption between the base station and Cluster-Heads. This was 
mainly done to optimise task distribution as the first step in which Cluster-Heads receive 
their tasks. As we mentioned in the previous section, task allocation can be challenging, 
depending on Cluster-Heads’ properties, such as their remaining energy and pre-deployed 
tasks. Therefore, we have built two separate applications. The first one is deployed and 
executed as the pre-deployed application, and the second application is deployed whilst 
the first one is still running. This approach creates a situation, where nodes tend to 
compete, in order to take the new application’s tasks depending on their available 
resources as the result of executing the first application’s tasks. 
The first application is a time-driven application, which demands light level 
sensory data every second upon base station’s query (request), as well as requiring the 
sensor node to report temperature every 10 seconds without any request from the base 
station. The second application demands light level every 5 seconds upon base station’s 
request, as well as requesting automatic reporting of acceleration on three-axis (X,Y,Z) 
every 500 milliseconds. Cluster-Heads receiving these applications query their members 
for the required parameters at the specified intervals. This experiment is repeated twice, 






Figure 46: (A) Sensor nodes' energy profiling, (B) Energy reduction and latency associated 
with the number of Cluster-Heads using game-theoretic approach 
 
Based on the explanation given in the previous section and how Cluster-Heads 
decide on allocating different priorities to their given tasks, the results achieved from the 
experiment are shown in  Figure 46(A). 
As a result of such trial and error iterations, and mainly due to the high number of 
price calculations, the energy level drops significantly in the beginning of the process. 
However, once a winning strategy is chosen, energy-hungry price calculating process is 
reduced considerably, and the Cluster-Head tends to stay with a single strategy. 
Therefore, as brown histogram shows, Cluster-Head’s energy spending stabilises after 
approximately 30 minutes. In fact, the Cluster-Head achieves a better energy profiling 
when Game Theory is applied (blue part of the graph) compared to the non-game-
theoretic approach. Figure 46(B) demonstrates the reduction in the energy consumption 
and the mostly insignificant increase in latency of 1-8 Cluster-Heads with and without 
the game-theoretic approach in a WSN. The applications used in this experiment are the 
same applications used in the previous experiment (Figure 46A), which were deployed in 
the same fashion. As Figure 46(B) shows, the dark grey bars denote the total reduction in 
the energy consumption of the network compared to the non-theoretic approach, whereas 
the light grey bar represent the latency caused in the Cluster-Heads response to the base 
station during the lifetime of the applications. As dark grey bars show in this figure, the 




is mainly due to the higher number of Cluster-Heads fulfilling the application, whereby 
game theory can facilitate task distribution amongst higher number of Cluster-Heads. 
 
 
Figure 47: (A) Cluster-Head energy profiling with and without game theory, (B) Energy 
reduction and latency associated with different cluster densities using the game-theoretic approach 
 
The presence of more players helps the base station to locate Cluster-Heads faster. 
Mainly because they are already engaged in other tasks. Whereas in the non-game-
theoretic mechanism, tasks are simply split up amongst Cluster-Heads with no 
consideration on the overhead imposed on them whilst executing other tasks. 
This outcome prompts the end-users to adopt more Cluster-Heads in order to 
reduce the energy consumption. However, as we mentioned earlier, as the number of 
players increases, the timely responses of the Cluster-Heads are reduced. As the first three 
light grey bars on the far left side of the chart show, the response delay for 1-4 Cluster-
Heads is around 1%, which can be considered insignificant. That trivial impact is with 
regards to the second application, where three acceleration variables (X, Y, Z) are 
reported every 500ms, which could sum up to 15ms. However, as the number of Cluster-
Heads increase, the latency could increase to up to 2%, which can sometimes be 
considered quite vital, over the lifetime of the application, especially if they are 
considered critical. 
In this experiment, each Cluster-Head was allocated two members only. The other 




response latency within each cluster. Therefore, we repeated a version of the previous 
experiment, this time with a variable number of nodes in each cluster. 
As Figure 47(B) depicts, the dark grey bars represent the total game-theoretic 
energy reduction with a variable number of nodes in a single cluster compared to the non-
theoretic approach. According to this figure, as with the higher number of Cluster-Heads, 
the higher number of nodes in a cluster reduces the energy consumption significantly. 
The total reduction energy consumption reaches up to 14% with 8 members in a cluster, 
which is more than a third higher the quantity of energy saved over 8 Cluster-Heads. 
However, the response latency is also considerably higher. Based on Figure 46(B) and 
Figure 47(B), the optimal number of Cluster-Heads and cluster densities used in a WSN 
needs to be in the range of 1-4 Cluster-Heads, each containing 2-3 members, in order to 
achieve minimum latencies towards meeting application requirements. 
Figure 46(A) depicts the average energy profiling of one of the three clusters in a 
WSN, each of which has a CH and 3 nodes reporting to it. As seen by the brown 
histogram, the game-theoretic approach can save nearly 15% on the energy consumption 
with our experimental optimal values. 
The experiments reported in this section were mainly conducted using time-driven 
applications. The next experiment will investigate how game-theoretic approach affects 
energy consumptions of applications with different operational paradigms as in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Applications with different operational paradigms 
 
 
The previous experiment was repeated four times, each time deploying one of the 




applications with different operational paradigms, with (black bars) and without (green 
bars) the game-theoretic approach. 
 
 
Figure 48: Energy expenditure for different operational paradigms 
 
According to Figure 48, apart from application C, which is an event-driven 
application, game-theoretic approach saves around 2% on the total energy consumption 
of all operational paradigms. That could be because, event-driven applications involve 
various unexpected events, which are triggered according to the given environment. 
Therefore, it leaves less flexibility to the Cluster-Heads’ game-theoretic mechanism in 
order to stabilise and adapt to the application’s behaviour. 
Additionally, there also exists a high number of packet collisions, which results 
in many data packets being lost in transition. Packet loss happens due to high number of 






     
Figure 49: 'Packet'collision'with'and'without'game'theory' 
 
SensomaX in general suffers from slight packet loss in its communication 
mechanism. However, since our game-theoretic approach also involves a very large 
number of negotiations amongst various network peers, we decided to investigate the 
packet loss with regards to the number of applications deployed on to the network.      
Figure 49 shows the amount of packet loss with (green vector) and without (grey vector) 
the game-theoretic approach. Based on our analysis, the game-theoretic approach slightly 
improves packet loss as the number of tasks is increased. In order to decrease 
inefficiencies in our experiment, the tasks used in this experiment were all of the same 
type of time-driven task. Using game theory improved packet loss by nearly 3% with 14 
tasks deployed onto the network. The decrement in packet loss is primarily due to the 
latency, which indirectly delays the communication amongst the peers, which results in 
lower packet loss. 
Finally, it is briefly described how auction-based algorithms could improve the 
processing time of each agent. Since most of the operations in SensomaX are primarily 
based on agents, packets transmitted around the network are all in the form of agents. 
Therefore, processing time of each agent according to the size of the network has a major 
impact on the execution of each application. Figure 50 demonstrates the average 






Figure 50:  Agent processing time vs network size 
 
Orange plot represents the agent processing time without market-based 
algorithms, whereas blue plot represents the agent processing time with market-based 
algorithms. According to this figure, auction-based (or market-based, it is the same in this 
context) algorithms improve the agent processing time significantly across the network. 
That is mainly due to the aforementioned smart mechanism for allocating the tasks to the 
cluster-members. 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
In this work we have demonstrated how utilising auction-based techniques along 
with SensomaX, can improve energy consumption with only a small impact on latency 
within a WSN. SensomaX, as a multitasking WSN middleware, can identify the optimal 
strategies in an autonomous decision-making process. The proposed approach exhibited 
how SensomaX in conjunction with Game Theory can optimally allocate resources to the 
deployed applications, based on nodes’ processing and memory availability, as well as 
their remaining energy level. On top of that, we were also able to show how the model 
can improve agent processing time and packet loss in large scale scenarios. Further work 
could include applying similar techniques on WSNs with specific topologies or many 





4.3  Hot-Desking 
 
4.3.1 Introduction to Hot-Desking  
 
Due to the increasingly digital world we live in, we tend to derive value and 
knowledge from as many sources of data as possible. Apart from any sociological 
parameters, there are two key factors that enabled that trend. 
Firstly, it is the Internet of Things (IoT) or in other words the idea of providing 
internet connectivity, not only to established IT devices such as phones and computers 
but also to more ‘traditional’, seemingly non-IT devices such as air conditioners, fridges, 
chairs, locks etc. [170]. 
Secondly, it is the rise of the so-called Big Data (BD). The constantly increasing 
amount of connected devices is generating an exponentially growing amount of data. 
This, in conjunction with the more and more sophisticated methods of analysing data and 
extracting knowledge, is bound to change the way we live. 
Nowadays, numerous industries collect and analyse data for multiple purposes. 
From organisations with environmental mindfulness that try to measure and mitigate the 
impact of modern life-style on environment to businesses that are after the most effective 
methods to reduce costs and increase profits. For reference, almost 80% of the developed 
countries’ population live in cities with the percentage falling to almost 51% in 
developing countries. The forecast for 2050 is 88% and 67%, respectively. In addition, 
the global CO2 emissions (in metric tons) is expected to demonstrate a 46% increase from 
2010 to 2030. Therefore, it is unlikely this focus is going to drift any time soon [171]. 
These are only some technological trends, among the many that use data-
harnessing concepts, often labelled as ‘Smart’. Due to their ubiquity, we can only expect 












Today, the notion of Smart Cities is popular, profitable and academically thriving. 
The underlying notion that a proliferation of connectable infrastructure, distributed, 
personal sensors and big data could create efficient, enjoyable and sustainable cities has 
become one of the defining schemes of the current age  [170][172][173]. 
The application of the same notions and fundamentals within the bounds of a 
building instead of the whole city (i.e. Smart Buildings) has a relatively smaller growth 
although it is actually an essential part of the applications in a city level [174]. 
At the Barcelona Smart Cities Expo 2014, a Cisco representative suggested that 
buildings had ‘locked the doors’ to the widespread interest and awareness of intelligent, 
integrated data-based solutions that were sweeping the cities of the world outside, missing 
out on a significant amount of potential value [175]. 
The existing work in the field of Smart Buildings, research tends to be more 





After the rise of the service sector in developed western economies, new large 
office workplaces were built by a new and increasingly diverse wave of consultancies 
and financial services. This, in conjunction with the rising rental costs in the large cities 
where these offices needed to be located [176], generated the issue of excessively high 
real estate costs for the companies. 
As such, minimising the cost of large office areas became increasingly important. 
A popular idea emerged in the late 90s to replace territorial working systems - whereby 
each individual is directly associated with a specific desk - with an allocation system 
whereby those who attend the office on a specific day are given a free desk from a pool. 
The key value driver of this was that office sizes could be reduced up to 30% [177] 
depending on the tendency of the business to visit clients and collaborators outside the 





Today, the form of Hot-Desking that is usually met is simply employee-led: on 
attendance to the workspace, an employee chooses a free desk and claims it for the day. 
However, such schemes have had mixed success [76]. Literature’s criticisms on that can 
be categorised into three key aspects: (a) Ineffective management applying slow and 
inconsistent methods of distributing desks that can often even lead to misunderstandings 
about whether or not a desk if free [77], (b) Loss of working synergies which actually 
consists of the loss of collaboration and exchange of ideas due to not placing staff working 
on similar projects in close proximity, and (c) cultural and behavioural barriers which 
could include but not limited to the personalisation of an office (which is mostly lost in 
Hot-Desking environments) that could make the individual more comfortable and 
therefore more productive [79]. None of these parameters should look insignificant since 
even small variations (for example 1% decrease) in productivity can have significant 




The rise of ‘smart’ enablers provides a unique opportunity to fundamentally alter 
the nature of Hot-Desking by utilising increased data about the workplace, its occupants 
and their intentions and preferences. There is a considerable literature base that high‐ 
lights that an employee’s position, both in an absolute sense and in relation to other 
employees, has a strong impact on their behaviour and happiness in the workplace [86]. 
In principle, rather than a ‘pegs into a slot’ approach (i.e. simple linear desks assignment 
in a first-come-first-served basis), intelligent Hot-Desking would evaluate the best 
position for an employee to work based on an algorithm combining a number of weighted 
inputs. These inputs could include, but are not limited to: 
Noise levels of workplaces derived from acoustic sensors distributed across the 
office. There are workgroups that due to their work subject can only tolerate minimum 
noise (and usually produce minimum noise too) while other groups can work effectively 
in a noisy environment as well. The inability to effectively manage noise-sensitive and 
noise-making workgroups in an office can be one of the top 3 factors preventing their 




Duration of stay, derived from calendar data or asked for at an on-arrival desk 
request. Smaller ‘touch down desks’ can be useful for individuals staying for 
exceptionally short periods of time. This may further improve the floor area savings of 
traditional Hot-Desking. 
Nature of work, which in the case of a very large staff group, could be derived 
from a system, where keywords for the type and project of work could be requested from 
individuals for a given day or calendar period. This element will enable workgroups of 
individuals with similar subjects and possibly similar goals to be formed which is proven 
to lead in greater productivity. Similar benefits would be realised for smaller projects, 
too. [83] 
Environmental preferences derived from various datasets, that could be generated, 
among others, from temperature and light sensors across the office. Many small but 
psychologically significant issues could be tackled this way. For example, individuals 
with a preference to warmer office environments could be placed further away from 
colder areas, whereas those with a mood that is more influenced from daylight on could 
be placed closer to the window.[86] 
Desk configuration derived from asset location and management information and 
could include office equipment such as multiple monitors etc. 
There could also be other kinds of personal preferences that could be, derived 
from occupant feedback (like for example level of satisfaction about previous desks 
given). Of course, the most appropriate combination of all the aforementioned parameters 




While it is apparent from the outset that distributing desks intelligently is indeed 
possible, little research exists on how optimization might look in practice, or the value it 
could bring to the workplace. This is a significant lack, especially considering that 
intelligent Hot-Desking cannot only increase the productivity within the office premises, 
but also decrease the rental costs, which can sometimes be up to 10% of the total cost of 




Within this study we will explore the potential for Intelligent Hot-Desking to 
result in superior working conditions (in the form of increased productivity) in 
comparison to Traditional Hot-Desking Systems. 
To demonstrate this, we will use the distribution logic of ‘work theme’ within a 
demonstrator context of an engineering consultancy’s commercial office, facilitated by 
primary data. 
As such our objectives are as follows: 
 
1) Establish a modelling framework, context and distribution algorithm for our 
scenario. 
2) Observe the practical workings of an Intelligent Hot-Desking System 
throughout a simulated day. 
3) Deduce an estimate for the improvement in productivity that Intelligent Hot-
Desking Systems could bring over Traditional Hot-Desking Systems. 
4) Discuss the potential barriers and enablers to implementation of Intelligent 
Hot-Desking Systems. 
5) Explore the potential for expanding the model to inter-organisational 
scenarios and professional social networks. 
 
4.3.2 Intelligent Hot-Desking Model 
 
 
This section will detail the approach followed in order to test the concept of 
Intelligent Hot-Desking. This entails: 
− Optimisation Selection: consideration of the type of data and corresponding 
mechanism of value creation that will be the focus for testing the concept; 
− Detailed design: the specific assumptions and model design in translating the 
real-world environment to the digital model; 
The content of this section addresses part of RQ3 by thoroughly presenting our 
Intelligent Hot-Desking approach and explaining how it improves the existing 





− Value proposition: the approach of assessing any value that is created; 
− Intelligent Hot-Desking Distribution Process: the specific approach of 
implementing the mechanism of value creation; 
− Comparison Cases: consideration of base cases for reference points when 




To test the concept of Intelligent Hot-Desking, a distribution logic of just one data 
type will be used for simplicity. After analysis of all of the potential distribution types 
that have been identified in the literature review, the distribution logic of ‘work theme’ 
has been chosen. This has been selected for the following reasoning: 
 
− It is relatively easy to collect primary data on employee’s typical work-type 
patterns, compared to more complex datasets such as noise generation. 
− It works around a hypothesis of creating ‘positive’ working benefit, rather 
than avoiding ‘negative’ working obstacles. It is believed that this will be 
applicable to more real-life contexts. 
− In theory all employees of the office are influenced by such a distribution 
logic, on the logic that all have work of a certain type. 
− Placing employees based on the work-type may also indirectly take into 
account their noise level needs. 
 
The scenario context we will be emulating will be based on primary data provided 
by an engineering consultancy in the UK with an office in the city of London. By 
observation and interview, this is perceived to be an office that bears many similarities to 
the majority of offices for medium and large organizations. 
The scenario will be modelled by a discrete events simulator focusing on the 
office as a number of desks; each of which either has an individual in or not. Each 
individual will have characteristics, some of which are input (relating to their intentions) 
and some others are output (relating to how their working environment has influenced 




On arrival, an algorithm will decide the place for an individual to sit. While an 
individual is in a desk, for every unit time that progresses, the environment will be 
assessed, through a methodology defined in the section about value proposition. The 
simulation will run for 1 day, with one-minute clock pulses. The productivity values for 
each person will be summed each second, for the day, giving a selection of overall 
‘scores’ for a given allocation system. 
This process will run for a selection of distributions of Intelligent and 
‘Traditional’ Hot-Desking for the purposes of comparison, detailed in the corresponding 





The behaviour of individuals will be based on primary data including 
observational data, security ‘swipe gate’ data and interviews with office occupants. Based 
on these, the scenario has been given the following characteristics: 
 
Office grid: 12 x 12 desks 
Total daily employees: 155 
 
The employees are more than the offices since, as discussed, one of the benefits 
of Hot-Desking is to cut down on costs by not having as many desks as there are 
employees. 
It was observed in our primary data that the time spent in the office will vary 
distinctly between individuals. Support staff, such as HR and Accounting are unlikely to 
ever leave for off-site work. Low and middle-ranking general employees are likely to 
attend client sites on occasion, and high-ranking staff, whose role include client relation 
management and thought-leadership, are likely to regularly leave, and be, out of office. 
These are generalisations that are being made on one specific primary data on a specific 
context, and the exact spread and nature of office attendance will depend on 




purposes of this model we will generalize to an ‘average’ staff member based on our 
primary data. 
By observation of the primary data - specifically the swipe gate records - from the 
office, the flow in to and out of the office in this scenario is a combination of: 
 
i. Traditional morning and evening peaks for entrance and exiting to the office. 
ii. Between these, a lesser, broader flow of assorted leaving and re-entering of 
the office for various business engagements. The leaving is centred around 
before lunch (12:30-13:30), the arriving centred after lunch. 
 
The first is relatively easy to simplify for repeatability in the model; the latter will 
require considerable simplification. Fitting normal distributions by observational trial and 
error, this model will estimate the probability of an individual entering the office over the 
course of the day and the probability of an individual who is in the office, leaving an 
office, as the sum of the following weighted distributions: 
 
 • 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔: 𝑤1 ∗ 𝐴 + 𝑤2 ∗ 𝐵, 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 = 1 
o 𝐴: 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚(8.5 , 1), 𝑤1 = 0.7 
o 𝐵: 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚(13 , 5), 𝑤2 = 0.3 
• 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔: 𝑦1 ∗ 𝐴 + 𝑦2 ∗ 𝐵, 𝑦1 + 𝑦2 = 1 
o 𝐴: 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚(18 , 1), 𝑤1 = 0.7 







Figure 51: Arrival and Leaving probability distributions 
 
Figure 51 displays this graphically. These estimates will serve as a reasonable 
assumption for a generic context – variation will exist between different companies and 
different industries so accuracy beyond this is excessive. 
A simplification will also be made as to there being no interrelation between 
comings and goings of individuals; if an individual arrives late to the office, they are just 
as likely to leave for a meeting as they are as someone who has been there since early. 
Furthermore, employees will only be able to enter and leave the premises once. The 
probability distributions will in effect simulate real return visits as new individuals. 
Lunch and other temporary breaks have been ignored as observation demonstrates 
that desks remain allocated during these periods. In addition, individuals may not have to 
swipe their card when going for lunch. 
 
The distributions of work-types in the primary data are: 
 
Type A: 0.4, Type B: 0.3, Type C: 0.15, Type D: 0.1, Type E: 0.05 
 
Indeed, while this specific distribution may not be the reality in all samples, interviews 
conducted suggest this is not unusual for the industry from which the examined 







Value Proposition  
 
To evaluate the potential of Intelligent Hot-Desking a framework for assessing 
the value of this distribution over a traditional Hot-Desking system must be defined. As 
mentioned previously, the literature has demonstrated that Hot-Desking overall can save 
rental and operational costs through a smaller floor area and brings improvement to the 
‘wellbeing’, ‘happiness’ and ‘effectiveness’ of individuals. In terms of considering which 
can be quantified with the most validity we concluded at ‘effectiveness’. For simplicity, 
we will perceive being ‘effective’ as one’s ability to complete their purpose in the office 
environment, which we will simplify in turn as the ‘productivity’ of an individual in the 
office.  
As discussed, research has simply shown that the quality, with respect to 
pragmatic business ends, appears to be higher when ‘the right’ individuals are in a ‘close 
proximity’. In particular, the ability to speak to one another is regularly cited as a 
beneficial consequence of sitting near another individual [174]. In our research, we 
assume that employees working at the same work-group will benefit each other (i.e. will 
improve their productivity) if they sit close to each other, due to the interaction and 
communication developed. Thus, we will use the behaviour of noise to model these 
interactions since noise levels can determine the quality of the aforementioned 
communication.  
For that, we consider employees of the same workgroup of being able to have a 
positive impact on each other when in close proximity; impact that will follow a square 
law decay. Since this impact only depends on the workgroup that they belong and their 
distance, we have that the influence of employee 𝑖 on employee 𝑗 is equal to the influence 
of employee j on employee i. Of course, every employee will benefit from each colleague 
of the same group, thus the total influence on an employee is the sum of all these 
influences. We model irrelevant employees (the ones that do not belong to the same 
workgroup) as having no impact on each other.  
Units are assumed to have a size of 2.5m boundary from observation and noise is 
considered to be measured 0.5m from the centre of the unit – again, a realistic point of 
















× 𝐼1 (53) 
 
Figure 52: Propagation of positive work theme environment 
 
For simplicity, diagonal inaccuracies will be ignored. Value of n will start at 25, 
and according to Figure 52 and formula (53), will produce a value of 1 for individuals in 
the closest possible proximity – the immediate row and 0.25 for the row next to it. Further 
rows are neglected for simplicity.  
In other words:  
 
2nd Row: 0.25 
3rd Row Onwards: (negligible, neglected for simplicity)  
 
This means that every employee has a productivity equal to zero when arriving at 
the premises. The algorithm then assigns a desk to each one of them and each one’s 





 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑(𝑒𝑚𝑝) = 1 × 𝑘1 + 0.25 × 𝑘2 (54) 
 
where, k1 is the number of employees that occupy desks (out of the 8 in total) directly 
neighbouring to the employee whose productivity we measure (i.e. first row neighbours) 
and belong to the same workgroup and k2 is the number of employees that occupy desks 
(out of the 16 in total) that are next to the first row neighbours of the employee whose 
productivity we measure (i.e. second row neighbours) and belong to the same workgroup.  
It can be easily observed that if all first-row neighbours are of the same 
workgroup, a productivity of 8 (8x1) is achieved. If this is the case for the second-row 
neighbours as well, then a value of 12 is achieved (8x1+16x0.25), which is the maximum 
achievable productivity for any individual. Therefore, there is obviously a synergy that is 
developed among individuals of the same workgroup since they improve each other’s 
productivity. Based on this way of calculating an employee’s productivity, the Hot-
Desking algorithm will assign to an incoming employee the desk that will increase the 
total productivity of the offices (which is the sum of the productivities of all the 
employees) as much as possible. If the incoming employee is not possible to sit next to 
the employees of the same workgroup, then the total will remain the same. In general, the 
productivity can only decrease when an employee leaves the premises.  
According to formula (54), the productivity of any individual is equal to zero 
when there is no one of the same workgroup at the next two rows (initial productivity). 
That does not mean, that this individual is not productive at all or that is not contributing 
at all to the company. However, since this model’s goal is to allocate employees to desks 
in a way that the total productivity is as high as possible, we would still get the same 
optimal solution even if we assumed that their initial productivity is not equal to zero. For 
example, setting initial productivity for employee i equal to prodi and comparing between 
two possible allocations, U1 and U2, of a number of employees where c among them do 
not have any neighbours of the same workgroup, then assuming initial zero productivities 
we would have:  
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑈1) = 𝑃1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑈2) = 𝑃2 (55) 
 




 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑈1) = 𝑃1 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑1 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑐 
  
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑈2) = 𝑃2 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑1 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑2 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑐 
 
(56) 
Thus, the result of the comparison between Productivity(U1) and Productivity(U2) 
would, obviously, be always the same as the result of the comparison between 
NewProductivity(U1) and NewProductivity(U2).  
 
Intelligent Hot-Desking Distribution Process  
 
There are several methods by which the allocation of the desks among the 
employees could be evaluated. These include:  
Method 1: On-arrival, current-state individual optimisation – In a system where 
no information is given in advance about who will be in and who shall not, each seat is 
allocated in a way that will maximise the benefits (in this case the productivity) of the 
arriving individual at the exact moment they enter.  
Method 2:  On-arrival, current-state group optimisation – In a system where no 
information is given in advance about who will be in and who shall not, each seat is 
allocated in a way that will maximise the benefits (in this case the productivity) of the 
whole office at the exact moment a new attendee arrives.  
Method 3:  Full-term, group optimisation – In a system where information is 
indeed given in advance about who will and will not be in (including duration of stay), 
each seat a way that will maximise the net conditions for all individuals intending to arrive 
that day, considering all permutations of seating across the entire day.  
It is clear from basic experimentation that the more advanced the system is, the 






Figure 53: Tie-breaker distribution logic 
 
In order to avoid reviewing an allocation process with significant barriers to 
implementation (Method 3 which requires the supply of additional staff data in advance), 
Method 2 will be utilised.  
It can be observed that with Methods 1 and 2, many desk allocations will be 
equally optimal, especially at the beginning of the day – yet their decision will strongly 
affect the rest of the day. As such a tie-breaker rule is required.  
After experimentation of several tie-breaker systems, the most effective was 
settled upon. When there is no difference in the effectiveness of the allocation, the system 
will attempt to send an employee with a specific work-type as close to a predefined 
extremity of the office that has been preassigned to that work-type. In our case, these will 
be the four corners of the office grid along with its centre desk (Figure 53). In this way, 
the allocation process has a disposition to form colonies when no better allocation logic 
is available. Based on the aforementioned logic, this will have a positive impact on the 
overall productivity of the employees since the creation of colonies will attempt to 









Comparison Cases  
   
For the purposes of developing a reference point for comparison, three ‘less 
intelligent’ scenarios will be prepared:  
 
i. Individuals come in and are allocated a desk at random from free desks, with 
no logic applied.  
ii. Individuals come in and are given a desk in a ‘closest desk free’ (to the top 
left of the office) system. Essentially, this is the linear, ‘pegs into a slot’ 
distribution that has already been discussed.  
iii. For means of understanding its influence, a distribution that simply has the 
‘extremities’ tie-breaker logic only and aims to place individuals as close to 




The below outputs are displaying the office state at specific time ‘slices’ 
throughout the day.  
 
Figure 54: Snapshot of A) all groups’ allocation among desks and B) time spent by employees 




The first diagram, seen in Figure 54(A) is a graphical representation of the 
position of different work themed individuals, labelled and shaded by their work theme, 
or an empty office space, designated by ‘?’.  
Figure 54(B) demonstrates the duration an individual has been at the desk. Note 
that all times are rounded to 1 decimal number, so zero does not necessarily specify an 
empty desk. In this figure and the similar to this below, the darker a ‘desk’ is, the higher 
the number on the figure for this particular desk.  
The following time snapshots were taken for different times throughout the day.  
 





























Figure 56: Snapshots at 1pm 

















Figure 58: Snapshots at 3pm 






Figure 60: Total Value Proposition Framework Output by distribution method 
 
 
The summed productivities of all individuals in the office by the Intelligent Hot-
Desking System (“Hotdesk”), Comparison Case 1 (“Random”), Comparison Case 2 





Compared to either of the traditional Hot-Desking results it appears that over the 
core hours of the day, the system of allocation has produced approximately 2.8 times the 
improvement of seating location – using the relative metric - over the two traditional 
methods of desk allocation.  
Additionally, it can be observed in the scenario from Figure 60 that the influence 
of the tie-breaker logic is extreme.  
By 11am when the majority of the am peak has entered, the office is at a high 
occupancy and there has been little exiting of the workforce. By 2pm, as some individuals 
leave and others attend, it can be observed that the algorithm is making decisions between 
several sub-optimal configurations and improving over the extremities system. By 4pm, 
the office is sufficiently clearing out from the beginning of the PM peak that when new 
entrants arrive, there is a high probability of a reasonable desk choice being a distributed 




outperformed by the “corners” variation. An increase in the number of work groups, 





Now that we have concluded which one of the four Hot-Desking logics is 
performing better (i.e. leads to a distribution of employees with higher total productivity 
than the total productivity of the distribution that the remaining three variations lead to - 
Figure 60), we are going to examine four different variations of this logic. All four 
variations are the following: 
Model 1: When an employee arrives, the algorithm assigns an empty desk to them. 
If there is no free desk, the employee leaves the premises and does not return the same 
day. When the employees leave the premises, either because it is time for them to leave 
or because there is no free desk, they do not return the same day. 
Model 2: When an employee arrives, the algorithm assigns an empty desk to them. 
If there is no free desk, the employee goes at the end of a First-In-First-Out queue. The 
employee leaves the queue if it is time to leave the premises or if there is a free desk for 
them (whichever comes first). When the employees leave the premises, either because it 
is time for them to leave or because there is no free desk (or both), they do not return the 
same day. 
Model 3: When an employee arrives or when an employee departs, all the 
employees (apart from the one that is leaving, in the case of departure) are reassigned 
(possibly differently) desks of the grid, so that the maximum possible productivity can be 
achieved with the given employees at that time. When an employee arrives and there are 
no free desks, the employee leaves the premises. When the employees leave the premises, 
either because it is time for them to leave or because there is no free desk, they do not 
return the same day. 
Model 4: When an employee arrives or when an employee departs, all the 
employees (apart from the one that is leaving, in the case of departure) are reassigned 
(possibly different) desks of the grid, so that the maximum possible productivity can be 




no free desks, the employee goes at the end of a First-In-First-Out queue. The employee 
leaves the queue if it is time to leave the premises or if there is a free desk for them 
(whichever comes first). When the employees leave the premises, either because it is time 
for them to leave or because there is no free desk (or both), they do not return the same 
day. 
It is worth clarifying that an employee can leave the premises while waiting in the 
queue, for the same reasons that they could leave while being in a desk (i.e. external 
business commitments etc.). Model 1 is the one that prevailed before.  
The aim of these extra variations is to take that previous part of the study one step 
further and compare Model 1 with variations like Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4. 
Although it is obvious that Model 3 and Model 4 are not applicable in real life, they are 
still useful for comparison because they represent the ideal models. That is because these 
two models solve an inevitable problem that Model 1 and Model 2 have. Although Model 
1 encourages the creation of colonies by employees from workgroups A, B, C, D and E 
(which is the best way to result in a high total productivity since individuals increase their 
productivity when they are close to other individuals of the same workgroup), inevitably 
there will be times where a colony will have a free desk in it, due to a departed employee 
of that colony, which will be occupied by an employee of another workgroup who cannot 
be placed closer to their own workgroup because there are not any free desks close to that 
group. That will create desk grids with individuals that are not placed in the most 
optimised way. However, this is inevitable unless all employees are rearranged frequently 
during the day, which is impractical and inapplicable in real life. It is useful though to 
check how much better the results of Model 3 and Model 4 are when compared to Model 
1 and Model 2 respectively, because if the difference is small that would mean that Model 




The impact of all models on the total productivity of the organisation throughout 
the whole day, is depicted in Figure 61. 
The equivalence of the aforementioned models to the ones on Figure 61 is: Model 




this figure, we can tell that the addition of queues not only has very small impact on the 
productivity, but also that slight impact is not always positive (it is not easily visible in 
this size of the figure but it is positive sometimes) and it can also be negative. That may 
not always be the case with queues, but even in this case it should not be seen as an 
unorthodox fact. The reasoning behind that phenomenon can be explained with the 
following example. Since the employees are less than the desks, there can be times where 
all desks are occupied and employees keep arriving. In the scenario that includes queues, 
if employee e1 arrives and there are no free desks, e1 will go last in the queue. If employee 
e2 arrives later and there are still no free desks, e2 will go last in the queue, behind e1 
(providing that e1 has not left the queue because it was time to leave). By the time there 
is a free desk for e2, it can be the case that e2 has already left while some other employees, 
like e1 for example, may have found a desk by then. Therefore, due to the queues, 
employee e1 was advantaged compared to e2. However, if there were no queues, there 
would be higher chances for e2 to find a desk on arrival because if some other employee, 
like e1, had arrived before e2 and had not found a free desk, they would have left, instead 
of waiting in a queue in front of e2. Thus, in the case of queues, e2 would be 
disadvantaged compared to e1 even if e2 had more to offer than e1 to the total 
productivity. This example demonstrates situations that can occur and lead to Model 2 
resulting in less productivity than Model 1 (and Model 4 less than Model 3, respectively) 
for some periods of time. To sum up, queues maintain the first-come-first-served logic of 
the desks assignment whereas absence of queues can break that rule (like in the example 
where e2 could have found a desk before e1, if e1 had departed just after their arrival) 






Figure 61: Comparison of all 4 models with respect to the productivity they result in 
 
However, the most important finding that comes out of this figure is the fact that 
Models 3 and 4 do not produce significantly better total productivity than Models 1 and 
2, respectively, throughout the biggest part of the day. In other words, the, not applicable 
in real life, Models 3 and 4 that produce the best possible total productivity, seem to 
perform only slightly better than Models 1 and 2, respectively. The only periods of time, 
that Models 3 and 4 outperform Models 1 and 2 significantly is towards the end of the 
day when not many employees are still at their desks and if they have been arranged 
according to Models 1 or 2 then they will most probably be disorderly spread. And still, 
this difference is significant, more in percentage terms and less in absolute numbers That 
is a huge success for Models 1 and 2 and a very good indicator that there is not much 
room for improvement of the algorithm, providing that the fundamental assumptions of 
the model remain the same. A possible and simple way to make Model 1 (resp. Model 2) 
almost equivalent to Model 3 (resp. Model 4) is to rearrange all employees only once 
(which is viable) in the afternoon, when the impact of the many departures is already 
apparent. After that time, although Models 3 and 4 will continue to perform better than 1 
and 2, the difference will be even smaller. Figure 62 actually demonstrates that idea in 
practice for Model 1 (‘Hotdesk’) compared to Model 3 (‘New’). The reassignment occurs 




In order for the difference between Model 1 and Model 3 to be seen in practice, 
snapshots from the distribution of employees among the desks is provided at 3 pm, when 
a significant amount of employees has already departed and since there are not many that 
are still to come, most of the workgroups are not optimally spread across the desks, in 
case of Model 1, but are still optimally spread in case of Model 3. This is not a 
contradiction to the previous explanation of Figure 63 because it is expected that the 
snapshot at 3 pm of the modified version of Model 1 (with one rearrangement at 3 pm) 
will be the same as the snapshot of Model 3, at the same time (3 pm). 
 
 







Figure 63: Snapshots of workgroups allocation for Model 1 (left) and Model 3 (right) after 
reassignment at 3 pm (? = Free) 
 
 
Figure 64: Payback time, in years, of an implemented system within the scenario office, at 
varying productivity and cost levels. 
 
A sensitivity analysis of payback years for the adoption of this Hot-desking 
sustem can be seen in Figure 64. Based on interviews, an office improvement that pays 
back within 10 years is generally viewed favourably, which means the scenario system 
would be viewed as a positive investment in all but the most conservative of scenarios. It 
is also worth mentioning that a cost around £15,000 is considered realistic enough [180]
  
Barriers and Enablers  
 
The following consideration of barriers and enablers is derived from a 
combination of interviews, observations from the modelling above and literature review.  
Considering practicalities, Method 2, the distribution logic chosen here, may 
actually be the best possible distribution method for an office manager, if they do not 




attendance in advance. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where Method 1 would be 
preferred to Method 2 as the difference in processing complexity is minor for what is 
perceived to be substantial improvement.  
The popularity of Intelligent Hot-Desking systems in commercial office contexts 
will depend heavily on the business and industry in question. Level of suitability may 
well mirror those typical of traditional Hot-Desking - where the cost of labour is high in 
relation to real estate costs and are likely to favour maintaining a territorial working 
environment. However, there may be interesting niches within high-wage industries 
where concepts - such as 100% staffing models experiencing growing popularity in 
strategy consulting and product design - may favour project-based allocation. 
Furthermore, the more of these workgroups there are or the smaller they are defined to 
be, the more valuable the intelligent distributions will get.  
Considering the cost of implementing the sensing for such a system, it is notable 
that this infrastructure may be shared across a number of other Smart Building use cases, 
thus improving the return on investment further.  
Related to this, broadening the boundary of analysis further, regardless of the data 
type upon which distribution takes place, a significant source of value in Intelligent Hot- 
Desking comes from the reusability of the occupancy data it creates. There are many 
possible incarnations of this.  
One example would be the consideration of a real estate strategy. Rich occupancy 
data could allow analysis of the future real estate requirements of large, multi-office 
commercial entities at minor cost; a procedure otherwise slow and expensive [181]. 
Considering the market in different sectors, anonymised occupancy data could be sold 
externally to be used by taxi companies who are interested in rapidly detecting and 
capturing the trade associated with those leaving commercial buildings at unexpected 
times. As another example, the occupancy data of buildings could be used to adjust the 
routing or schedule of nearby public transport services in real time. 
Finally, and more specifically to Intelligent Hot-Desking rather than occupancy 
data, this concept could help to facilitate short term office hire. Through user-recognition, 
these systems can not only simplify the payment for per- desk-per-hour real estate models, 





Findings and Conclusions 
 
Out of the three methodologies that were described earlier (i.e. (a) On-arrival, 
current-state individual optimisation, (b) On-arrival, current-state group optimisation and 
(c) Full-term, group optimisation), we modelled the second one. That is because it is more 
sophisticated than the first methodology and there are only specific applications where 
this could potentially be preferred. The third methodology would require even more data 
and forecasting on the arrival and departure times which means that there would be the 
danger of resulting in big inaccuracies. Furthermore, an adjustment period is required 
before such a model can be trusted. Using the second methodology we managed to 
provide a realistic and productivity-oriented way of assigning desks to individuals at a 
workplace and not only did we confirm that this method can outperform other common 
ways of desk assignment, but we demonstrated that its effectiveness is comparable with 
an impractical model that was designed to result in the optimal outcome. Furthermore, 
the profit implications for the corresponding organisation were analysed and the adoption 
of the model was found to be an easily repayable investment. 
Ultimately, intelligent Hot-Desking appears to have the potential to bring about 
transformative change in the commercial office workplace backed by a strong value case. 
The exact value such schemes bring however, will be highly-dependent on the type and 
methodology of implementations, and it is the opinion of this work that significant 
research needs to be undertaken on this topic. Primary research in the form of 
experimentation and observation, to better understand the specific productivity benefit, 
would be highly influential in drawing in industrial interest.  
This whole work can be used for greater social impact that transcends 
organisational boundaries. At the heart of it, is the assumption that sensing data and 
personal preferences can be fed into an intelligent platform that will bring together the 
most suitable co-workers under their preferred working conditions. But there is no 
constraint to assume that these persons must be working within the same organisation. In 
fact, if we apply this model in facilitating the desk allocation in the scenario of a business 
incubator, it could bring together complementary skills and expertise as well as 
personality types. To that effect, this model could be developed further to include inputs 




which may include e.g. presence and location, as well as predefined personal preferences 
(like noise and environmental conditions) and maybe calendar entries, as well leading in 
multi-dimensional optimization. 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
 
All in all, in this chapter, our resilience-oriented contribution is presented through the 
corresponding use cases. These use cases include models that apply on WSNs 
(approaches combining Game Theory and SensomaX) and EDS on Hot-Desking. As a 
result, the identified gaps of the existing approaches have been mitigated and RQ3 has 



























































III. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
Section II, the last section of the thesis, includes Chapter 5; the chapter that concludes the 
research conducted. In particular, it summarises this work’s findings and research 
contribution, discusses how and where exactly in this thesis the research questions have 





























































hapter 5 summarises the research contribution and discusses the findings of this 
work. As such, it provides the outputs and summary of the two focused areas 
and how they have been delivered, improving the security and/or the risk 
management procedures as well as improving the resilience (in this context meaning any 
system’s aspect that is not security-oriented) of the systems. Finally, it discusses the 

























5. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
5.1  Summary of Contribution and Future Work 
 
 This thesis covers many different use cases. Therefore, for better understanding, 
this section will include each use case’s summary of findings and conclusion, instead of 
just one attempting to cover them all. 
 
5.1.1 Security and Risk Management 
  
 Starting with the part of the research that focused on improving the security or the 
risk management procedures of different kinds of systems, we firstly have the proposition 
of an IDS and an IPS that can be applied on a WSN in order to help the network operators 
make automated decisions regarding the trustworthiness of the data that their WSN 
produces. In particular, the proposed IDS and IPS were able to suggest to the network 
operators, the strategies that would best help them access the quality of the data received 
by the WSN while, in the case of the IPS, these strategies would also help the network 
operators apply the recovery pattern that would best benefit them by keeping the cost of 
recovery to an optimal level. The optimality of the suggested strategies was validated 
both in a cluster-based deployment using SensomaX and in an IPv6-based deployment 
using Cooja. Future extension of this work can include the introduction of forecasting. 
What that basically means is that we can the iterated version of the proposed model for 
many different numbers of rounds, identifying each time the optimal payoff. Then, having 
many pairs in the form of (number of rounds, optimal payoff) it will be possible to 
estimate new optimal payoffs for new numbers of rounds. Furthermore, the models’ 
applicability on networks with different densities and its scalability while network’s size 
increases, can be further examined. 
 The next security-oriented work that was presented, was about a novel approach 
that combined VSM and Game Theory towards cyber security risk management in CI-
ICSs. In particular, we created a method that takes into account the proprietary and 




for the defender. This method models the cyber components of the CI-ICS as agents so 
that the criticality of an asset of the system can be quantified based on its interconnections 
to the system’s components. The use case was solved as a game, with an attacker and a 
defender, both with their attacking and defending strategies, respectively, and as a result 
the Nash Equilibria, consisting of both players’ optimal strategies were found. In other 
words, we managed to find the strategies that best serve the defender’s interests and 
demonstrate that the game indeed has a state which no player would unilaterally want to 
leave from, once reaching it. Thus, we managed to show that the combination of VSM 
and Game Theory provides a very useful tool with excellent insight in such kind of 
problems. In future, this model can be further enhanced in order to cover a wider range 
of attack and defence strategies while validation using real data should be also considered. 
 In a similar fashion, VSM and Game Theory were again combined for the next 
presented work, in order for an ICS to be modelled and the whole setting to be treated as 
a two-player, zero-sum game. The viability of this CI-ICS was defined through a system 
of weighted components connected through weighted links, where the weights in both 
cases represent their importance. Once more, the defender’s objective was to minimise 
the impact of a possible cyber attack while keeping the security costs as low as possible. 
That was, again, achieved by finding the Nash Equilibria of the game. This approach can 
be used to design defence strategies against unknown attacks, with reference only to the 
system’s architecture. 
 Moving on to the next presented project, there is the Monte Carlo predictive 
modelling approach. Using a conceptual enterprise as a case study and verifiable 
historical cost of security breaches as parametric values, our model shows why using 
conventional risk assessment approach as budgeting process can result in significant 
over/under allocation of resources for cyber capabilities. To solve that, we use Monte 
Carlo simulation which allows us to understand the outcome of scenarios and help to 
understand unexpected pattern or behaviour without necessarily exposing information 
assets to real threats. Simulation’s output is a range of values and risk assessor can derive 
confidence level from that range. This model can serve as a benchmark for policy and 
decision support to aid stakeholders in optimizing resource allocation for cyber security 
investments. As further work, we could include multiple resource allocation patterns for 




 The last presented case study from the research focus on security and risk 
management combines Game Theory and Epidemiology in order to describe a problem 
where a random scanning worm (attacker) attempts to proliferate within a corporate 
network of 10,000 susceptible hosts and a defender attempts to mitigate that while at the 
same time trying to keep the security cost as low as possible. The epidemiological model 
is a custom one created for the needs of this research and combines SIR and SIS. The 
results of this use case is the recommendation to the defender of his optimal strategy 
which will award him with the optimal balance between network damage (by the 
aforementioned worm) and security cost. As shown, this strategy is not the one that would 
lead to the strictest possible security which is reasonable when taking into account the 
high cost that this would incur. Future work could very well include the adoption of a 
minimum security level by the defender or even the use of a topology-oriented malware 
that would spread more efficiently within the network. All in all, the combination of 
Game Theory and Epidemiology has led to a model that can provide automated 
recommendations to the defender on how to protect a network in a cost-efficient manner. 
  
5.1.2 Resilience and Optimisation 
 
 As far as the resilience and optimisation oriented research is concerned, there are 
two different areas of focus. Firstly, a multi-beneficial application of a model that 
combines Game Theory and SensomaX in order to optimise non-security-related aspects 
of a WSN and secondly, an application of intelligent Hot-Desking, utilising real data and 
applied on an industrial work environment. 
 Beginning with the former, we managed to combine auction-based techniques and 
SensomaX in order to improve energy consumption, processing time and packet loss 
within a WSN with only a small, in most cases, impact on latency. We showed that our 
model can successfully improve all these aspects of the examined network compared to 
the case where our model does not apply. Although the proposed model demonstrated a 
great insight in this category of applications, it would be interesting to apply similar 
techniques on WSNs with specific topologies or much different densities. However, this 




 Finally, we have the intelligent Hot-Desking model. In the corresponding section 
we managed to demonstrate a novel approach on using real occupancy data in order to 
provide automatic allocation of employees to free desks in a way that their productivity 
is maximised. We also managed to prove that this approach is not only better that the 
traditional, less intelligent, approaches but that it is also almost as good as an ideal (but 
practically impossible to be applied on a real case scenario) approach. The model is built 
in such a way that there are plenty of modifications that can be easily made and therefore 
it can be applied in numerous occasions and work environments providing a tool of great 
insight in its category. Thus, further work could include input from other sources apart 
from occupancy data, like for example personal preferences, calendar data or forecasting 
outputs about employees’ schedules, social media data and much more.  
 
5.2   Addressing the Research Questions 
 
 The research questions that were mentioned in section 1.4 are also mentioned 
here, along with a small summary of their answers and where these can be found in the 
thesis. 
 As explained in section 1.2, the answers to the research questions will be split 
among the three categories that were mentioned in that section (i.e. i) Critical 
Infrastructures and Industrial Control Systems (CI-ICSs), ii) Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs) and iii) Hot-Desking systems). In other words each question will be addressed 
within the context firstly of CI-ICSs, secondly of WSNs and thirdly of Hot-Desking 
systems.  
 
RQ1: Up to what level can the existing approaches improve the security and the 
resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems? 
 
 From the perspective of CI-ICSs, this research question is addressed in the second 
part of the sections 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2 and 2.3.1.4 where the omissions of the existing 
literature are discussed.   
 From the perspective of WSNs, this research question is addressed in the second 




From the perspective of Hot-Desking, this research question is addressed in the 
second part of section 2.3.2.2 where the omissions of existing literature are discussed. 
 
RQ2: How can we improve the security of Cyber-Physical Systems?  
 
 From the perspective of CI-ICSs, this research question is addressed in sections 
3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.2.The first one is about our model that combines VSM 
and Game Theory in order to provide cost-efficient defence solutions for CI-ICSs. The 
next one presents a novel approach that combines VSM with Game Theory in order to 
develop a risk management process which provides a holistic, cost-efficient cyber-
security solution that takes into account interdependencies of critical components as well 
as the potential impact of different attack strategies. Section 3.3.2 expands on our Monte 
Carlo predicting modelling which can serve as a benchmark for policy and decision 
support to aid stakeholders in optimizing resource allocation for cyber security 
investments. Finally, the last one refers to a custom Epidemiology model that provides a 
cost-benefit risk management framework for managing malware spread in computer 
networks. 
From the perspective of WSNs, this research question is addressed in section 3.2.2 
by demonstrating how Game Theory can be used in order to build an IDS and an IPS that 
are applied on a WSN in order to enhance its security. 
 Hot-Desking systems do not participate in this research question as we do not 
examine a related security perspective in this work.  
 
RQ3: How can we improve the resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems? 
 
From the perspective of WSNs, this research question is addressed in section 4.2.2 
by demonstrating how utilising auction-based techniques along with SensomaX, can 
improve energy consumption, agent processing time and packet loss in WSNs with an 
increase in latency that is considered trivial in most cases.  
 From the perspective of Hot-Desking, this research question is addressed in 
section 4.3.2. In summary, we offer a model that based on the occupancy data of the 




employee at the time they arrive at the organisation. The model decides which desk will 
make the incoming employee (or all the employees) as productive as possible, based on 
the project that they are working on, at that period of time. That way, not only employees 
find themselves working in the most productive environment possible, without having to 
decide the sitting arrangements themselves (with any disadvantages that this would entail 
in terms of the relationships among them) but also the organisation will have a double 
benefit as it will make profit not only due to the number of desks that will not need to be 
used anymore (desks will be less than the employees while still covering their needs), but 
also due to the fact that all employees will work under optimal productivity conditions. 
This is a way to improve existing Hot-Desking applications. 
 CI-ICSs do not participate in this research question as we do not examine a related 
resilience perspective in this work.  
 
5.2.1  Final Remarks 
 
The research presented in this thesis applies novel modelling and simulation 
techniques in order to improve the security and resilience of cyber-physical systems.  
As far as the security perspective is concerned, we developed an IDS and an IPS, 
both of which are based on game-theoretic principles and are able to handle multi-
dimensional strategy sets and high levels of complexity. We applied them on a WSN in 
order to improve its security and as a result we were able to provide the network operators 
with an automated mechanism that can identify the strategies that would optimally defend 
the WSN against an attack. 
Still within the context of security, we proposed three different approaches for 
three use cases. Two of them combined VSM and Game Theory towards cyber security 
risk management in CI-ICSs. In particular, these methods take into account the 
proprietary and interconnected nature of a CI-ICSs in order to provide optimal, cost-
efficient defence strategies for the defender. The third one used Monte Carlo predictive 
modelling in order to improve resource allocation for cyber security investments. 
The last security-oriented use case is a unified malware proliferation model that 
combines the benefits of SIR and SIS along with Game Theory in order to provide a cost-




In terms of resilience-oriented research, we propose a combination of auction-
based techniques and SensomaX in order to propose a light (in terms of latency surcharge) 
approach on reducing energy consumption, packet loss and processing time. 
Finally, we present a Hot-Desking model that can be implemented in a business 
environment and decide the seating positions of the employees, at the time of their arrival, 
in a way that will maximise their total productivity. 
All in all, our models manage to tackle the issues identified in existing approaches 
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